Mortuus est Ludwig Schnorr von Carolsfeld tenor, primus qui anno 1865 cecinit Tristani partes, exhaustus atque aeger paucos dies post quattuor spectacula. Horowitz praeclarus cecinit claviario transcriptionem ex Isoldae morte et paulo post ipse mortuus. Nonnulli praefecti musici, cum Felix Mottl et Joseph Keilberth et aliis, infarctum cordis passi sunt dum symphoniam medias operam in res edentem moderabantur. Etiam Salvator pictor Dalì mortem obiit notis audiendis. Mirum non est ut saepe musica quae de dissolutione unico modo agitur peremptoria fuit, quae interdum cardiacum rhythmum afficit. Ne Wagner quidem putabat publicam actionem permittendam esse. Quae opera effecta est ad desperationem canendam ac solutionem quaerendam – desperationem amoris cuiusdam impossibilis erga Mathildam Wesendonck, uxorem patroni sui Ottonis Wesendonck; et vitae vero solutionem, liberationem quae rectius mors diceretur.

Sed ista sunt fortuita. Omne magnum opus, cum primum ad vulgus editum, corpus sui iuris fit, nec musici consilium in componendo id tangit. Simile est patri filium gignenti. Fortasse procreat ut filius id et hoc faciat, sed natus homo liber erit. Pater non est dominus, nec dominus Wagner operis sui, contra opera quia iam manet dum componista peperit revera maior est ac vera domina.

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Opera ipsa loquens musica est dissolutionis. Id efficit harmonica forma iam antequam ulla ratio cum actione consideratur. Nam actionem Tristani et Isoldae poterit etiam Mozart vel Monteverdi componere, classicà tamen harmonia. Sed Wagner, quia iam in ouverture ominosum illum concentum canit, qui concentus solutionem quaerens nullam invenit, dissolvit eo facto multa occidentalis musicae saecula, frangit antiquissimam subitus traditionem in superando, reducendo ad absurdum. Dictum est multos primae actionis spectatores nequisse opera audita dormire. Concentus, chromaticam tensionem, imagines vivas, tenebras sonoritatis etsi pulchras tota nocte in animae auribus tintinnavisse. Quasi tria spectacula non satis fuissent, rege ipso postulante quartum datum est, ut iterum Monachium miram musicam urbs audiret.

Discrimen aestheticum quod Tristanus et Isolda effecit, harmoniam ad absurdum reductam, musica numquam superavit. Audax componista ianuam aperuit ad experimenta magis magisque abstracta. Harmonia soluta est in dissonantia, eventus autem necessarius, quoniam repetitio antiquissimarum traditionis regularum non iam compleverit aestheticum dissolutionis naturale desiderium. Dissolutionis quia extremum hominum desiderium aestheticum est liberatio per formam, sed liberatio per formam appetit liberationem ex ipsa forma. Quapropter dissolutio, quamvis pulchritatem delere videatur, liberat a desiderio aesthetico.

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Homo autem ab omnibus huiusmodi desideriis est liberandus, quod non vivit liber qui se attinet ad conceptus et in particularibus amissus universalia conspicere nequit. Ars abstracta, musica dissoluta eo modo salutaria sunt et admonent: Conceptus sunt manci, imperfecti, haud idonei ad nobis cognitionem pulchri absoluti dandam. Quamobrem in conceptibus permanere ut dogmatibus non implet animum, non ducit ad verum nec bellum, verum contra ad dolorem impossibilis quaesitionis in perpetuitate. Sed finis doloris modo liberatio per dissolutionem. In omni re, qui parum cupit minus dolet.

Ratio hic est inter abstractionem et argumenta tum Schopenhauris cum Buddhismi, inter quos consensus: Desiderium dolor est. Nihil quod possideri potest felicitatem fert permanentem. Possideri dicitur tum corpore cum animo. Sic animus possidet conceptus, qui autem varios nec firmos se habent. Qua de causa non sunt digna adhaerendo – sed nil est dignum. Tristanus et Isolda opera in dissolvendis harmoniae conceptibus liberat ab aesthetico dolore in eorum desiderio inhaerente. Sed liberatio pro dolor non perfecta, primum quia musicae dissolutio non est absoluta, verum modo initium motus aesthetici qui vicesimo saeculo evolvit; deinde quod actionis dissolutio interdum morbida est: Tristanus et Isolda mori volunt, non quia dissolutionem finalem quaerant, sed cupiunt dissolutionem alter in alterum, mortem petunt quod non tanta voluptate delectari possunt quanta volunt. Sed voluptatem dicamus? Fortasse verum amorem, mortis autem desiderium cum mundus non fuerit aptus ad verum amorem tolerandum praeter conventiones. Melius mori quam in orbe sine amore vivere.

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Multae sunt interpretationes. Tristanus moritur cum Isoldae nomine in labris, Isolda cum verbis »ertrinken, versinken, unbewusst, höchste Lust«, i.e. mergere, insciens mergi, suprema voluptas. Quid est autem suprema voluptas? Alii dicent maximum esse gaudium sexuale cum Tristano, quae fuit prima interpretatio et scandalum effecit undevicesimo saeculo, ubi critici reprobarunt actionem ut laudem (sic visa est) effrenati Hedonismi. Alii autem voluptatem supremam nil aliud quam voluptatis dissolutionem esse, saltem si intellegis supremam ut puram ac veram. Tamen, quomodo pura ac vera fuerit si in actione ambo amantes obstinati concupiscunt alter alterum neque oculos habent ad reliqua consideranda? Hic ratio est cum Schopenhauris argumento quod amor tantum humanam vitam servat, et sexualis atque animalis amor ex instinctu tam fortis ut in eo quaerendo nonnulli ipsam vitam perdant.

Tristanus et Isolda igitur fuerint victimae irrationalis sensus. Irrationalis etiam quod ambo mirificam amoris potionem bibunt. Sed bibunt sine scientia, credunt in bibendo mortem petere. Hi sunt veri Tristanus et Isolda, quorum duae sunt mortes. Quoniam non ferunt sensum tantam voluptatem petentem, in principio quaerunt in morte iniquae cupiditatis dissolutionem. Consilium pudicum est, et id sequentes et Tristanus et Isolda bibunt e Brangänae manibus primam mortem. Quod postea videmus non iam sunt Tristanus et Isolda, verum potius duo homines sub funestae potionis torpore nec suas actiones praestantes. Secunda mors advenit cum, iam mortui postquam biberant et amiserant rationem, quaerunt in morte ambiguam illam supremam voluptatem. Tamen, fortasse id quod torporem dicimus est vera conditio humana sub irrationali sensuum et instinctuum iugo. Eo modo, Wageris actio imago veritatis inversa fuerit. Quod in opera sobrietas est, in vita somnium, quod in opera torpor in vita veritas.

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Inversionem etiam videmus et oppositionem cum vetustioribus. Inter primos omnium narratores fuit Thomas Britannicus (Thomas d’Angleterre), Anglo-Normannus qui ca. anno 1170 composuit Tristan et Yseult (Roman de Tristan), opus tantum in fragmentis relictum, scriptum eo sermone qui putabatur pulcherrima dialectus Francogallica, cum nondum una esset lingua. Differentia inter Thomae et Wagneris actiones conspicua est. Apud Thomam, quamvis ambo se ament hos prohibiti amoris pudet. Cum rex deprehendit Tristanum cum Isolda in eodem lecto dormientem, ille regem animadvertens hanc e somno excitat et tristissime discedendo Isolda nunc offert anulum ne amicae obliviscatur:

Pudicas tales angustias Wagneris amantes parum ostendunt, sed dissolutionem quaerunt extremam, dum in Thomae actione tantum plangunt de impossibili amore. Notorium est momentum cum ambo canentes noctem evocant absolutoriam:

Descende, o nox amoris, fac me vivere oblivisci, accipe me gremio, a mundo me absolve! Sic moreremur, ut inseparati, sempiterne iuncti, sine fine iam non exspergituri, sine metu, amore sine nomine amplexi et alter altero dati pro amore tantum viveremus! Sine nomine, sine separatione rursus cognoscere, rursus inflammari semper infiniti, conscii unitatis: ecce ardescentis pectoris summa amoris cupiditas!

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Nec Tristanus neque Isolda ita loquerentur apud Thomam vel Gottfried Strasburgensem, qui Theodisce interpretationem scripsit praeclaram. Sic Thomae Tristanus dicit «Je n’i os, dame, plus atendre; Or me baisiés au congié prendre,» i.e. non audeo, domina, diutius exspectare, da mi osculum dum discedo. Isolda consentiens respondet: «Nos cors partir ore convient», i.e. convenit ut cursus nostros partiamur. Nullo momento cogitatio est Marcum regem Isoldae maritum perrecto adulterio dehonestare. Similaris est animus apud Wagner in primo actu, priusquam potionem biberunt. Qui actus est Isoldae et eius angustiis quoniam Tristanum amans nolit sponsum infamare, malit vero mori. Sed etiam mori, quia Tristanus Brangänam servam cum nuntio missam apud omnes offendit, qua de causa putat Isolda Tristanum ipsam non amare.

Rogandum fuerit scilicet qua ratione Isolda illius amore capta sit qui primum maritum Morold interfecerat, sed servae narrat originem: Cum Tristanus vulneratus esset et Isoldae artes novisset, incognito ad Hiberniam navigat ut eum sanet. Quae hostem cognoscens decernit eum gladio iam tenente interficere, sed eius pietate capitur:

De cubili suo spectavit non in gladium, non in manum, in oculos meos! Tantam miseriam lamentata sum! Gladium cadere sivi! Vulnus quod Morold intulit sanavi ut integer et sanus domum discederet, aspectu me non iam molestaret!

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Pietas amor facta est. Sed Tristanus proponit pro conciliatione inter regna Hiberniam et Cornualiam ut Marcus rex Isoldam uxorem ducat, quod eius familia assentitur. In contumeliam accipiens Tristani nunc actiones, qui pollicitus erat se semper gratum et fidelem futurum esse, statuit Isolda ut ei Brangäna mortis potionem daret, quam Isolda ipsa quoque bibenda erat ut ambo tandem simul morerentur. Tristanus nondum amat, ut videtur, Isoldam. Quod autem sequitur non est fallacia, sed pietas Brangänae, quae pro mortis amoris potionem parat. Quocumque modo, Wagneris Isolda etiam in primo actu differt a Thomae et casu et sensu.

Cogitari forte poterit: Quod secundo et tertio actu Tristanus et Isolda quasi sub crapulae torpore agunt quodam modo depretiat tragoediae valorem, quia amantes non iam exsistunt tamquam ethicae personae, quid faciant nescientes, actionum parum responsales. Agiturne opera de hominibus aut de machinis? Nam ubi tantum machinae agunt non est tragoedia sed fortuita trivialitas, et amantium gemitus, sensus, motus animi non vera, sed facta sub drogae effectu.

Tamen, potionis imago fortissima translatio fuerit et metaphora de amoris bio-chemica irrationalitate et tali qualis romanticum amoris conceptum ad absurdum reducit. Non iam est liber, ingenuus, purus et metaphysicus amor vel amicitia ad astra ducens sed tantum liquidae hormoniorum secretiones et animales instinctus contra quos parum faciendum, ita ut Freud dixerit neminem domi dominum esse – dum autem romantici plus ultra ad inania spectantes irrationalem veritatem pulchris verbis, conceptibus dissimulare conantur. Sic intellecta actio Tristani et Isoldae tremendum opus fuerit amoris dismystificationis – et animae, qua refutata homo tantum bio-chemica machina fit.

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Iam Schopenhauer dicebat mundo irrationale principium inesse, mundus cuius scaena Tristani et Isoldae imago est allegorica, ubi amor iam non est quod videbatur, ubi sola dissolutione irrationalis effectus desinit. Erant psychologi qui olim putabant homini dissolutionis desiderium quoddam inesse. Utrum recti sint annon, ratio inter amorem et dissolutionem conspicua est in natura. Species sunt quarum individua modo nascuntur ut procreent et statim moriantur. At mors et dissolutio non idem sunt, quia mors absoluta cessatio, dum dissolutio cessatio quaedam verum etiam metamorphosis in aliud. In Tristano et Isolda, mors vel ultra-mors quam crapulà quaerunt est amoris consummatio, orgasmus maior quam vita seu aeternus, et quoniam solum mors est maior quam vita in tempore, mors fit imago dissolutionis vitae non in mortem, sed per mortem in aeternum orgasmum. Quem noctu Tristani et Isoldae «ardescentis pectoris summa amoris cupiditas» in totum evocat.

Sed imago hominis tamquam bio-chemicae instinctuum machinae interdum morbida est. Nam si omnia hominum gesta sub huius machinae effectu geruntur, homone iam ethicus est? Responsalem enim appellamus qui sua acta libere gerit, quod solum ubi libertas est vera deliberatio potest esse. Hoc sensu, Wagneris opera ostendit triumphum moderni bio-chemici fatalismi contra romanticam metaphysicam libertatem. Nihilominus, primus actus fere totus liberarum personarum scaena est. Isolda sua propria optione decernit Tristano toxicum dare et ipsa bibere, i.e. mori. Tristanus quoque sua sponte bibit. Unum vere tragicum discrimen Brangänae est, quae maxima pietate capta toxicum mortis pro amoris mutat. Sed Brangänae pietas amantibus tantum lentiorem mortem parat. Nam primum volebant e quadam pudicitia mortem absolutam cessationem, deinde autem volunt ex effrenata cupiditate impossibilem, aeternum orgasmum ad mortem ducentem. Casus typicus est classicae tragoediae: Magna pietas malum magnum excitat. Brangäna permoto corde bonum cupit maximum facere, transformat autem et Tristanum et Isoldam in duos zombies, in morts-vivants ut illos qui LSD drogam sumentes e delirio numquam regressi sunt.

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Inopia communicationis mater omnis tragoediae est. Efficitur actio tragica ex ignorantia benevolentis, i.e. iunctione ignorantiae cum benevolentia in eadem persona, ita ut cum bonum facere velit tamen erret quia res et causas nescit. Sed ut vere tragica sit actio, ignorantia non potest e mera negligentia fieri. Potius tragicus heros conatur quantum potest res nosse, nequit autem propter contrariorum casuum multitudinem – praecipue quia commercium cum conflictantibus non est possibile, e.g. cum eventus se praecipitant nec tempus manet. Brangäna ideo potionem non mutavisset si tempus ei fuisset ad Isoldam consulendam et causam considerandam. Isolda quoque non voluisset mortem per toxicum si ipsa Tristanum convenisset. Tristanus ipse Isoldam minine vitavisset si novisset quid sentiret illa. Omnia reducunt ad parum vel male intellecta, et sequentia errorum ad infinitum regressum. Nam si Tristanus Isoldae maritum non necavisset, maritus si cum rege Marco non bellum fecisset sed in pace vixissent, nulla fuisset tragoedia. Quae est finalis exitus sequentiae quorundam verborum atque actionum male intellectorum.

Unde vero colligitur tragoediam malum antiquum vel saltem alterius temporis esse, quod hodie et facultates et instrumenta communicandi plura ac meliora sunt, conflictuum exaggeratio saepius vitatur, interdum triviali modo: Antigona sat est celere SMS ad Creontem mittere «what’s going on, dude?» et cuncta res se melius gerit. Rarius factum est quod communicatio cum conflictantibus non est possibilis. Modernitas enim, quoniam heroicam tragoediae solemnitatem amisit, vero non iam est multarum huiusmodi tragoediarum scaena. Hoc nonnulli signum amissae sensibilitatis putant, sed tragoedia moderna, quia subtilior, haud minus gravis est. Eodem modo, catharsis manet ubi manet pietas, nec deest inter nos pietas quaedam erga hodiernas mundi miserias, quamquam malorum facilius est technologica delectatione saepe oblivisci.

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Cum autem de Wagneris Tristano et Isolda tractamus, cur hoc tragoediam dicamus? Tantus est potionis in amantes effectus ut quodam modo actio tragicam altitudinem amittat. Quid pietatis, quam benevolentiam sentiremus pro meris machinis? Nam hoc sunt toxico sumpto Tristanus et Isolda. Non iam exsistunt ut responsales entitates. Nesciebant forte quid facerent, verum tanta est negligentia ut pietati fere nullus locus sit. Una tragica ratio fuerit quod amantes, ratione propter drogam amissa, tamen sensum verum alter pro altero patiuntur. Fuerint enim quod remanet ex homine cum ratio peperit: nec liberi, nec responsales, idonei ad amorem altissimum sed machinae. Id est tragoedia quod amor est sublimis, dignus deorum immortalium quibus nec procreandum nec laborandum est. Sed non est dignus mortalis bio-chemicae machinae. Melius fuerit ut mures vivere quam meri mortales tam altum sensum pati. Igitur tragoedia duorum amantium fit omnium hominum.

Quoniam amor reductus ad effectum bio-chemicae potionis, quid ex antiquo conceptu remansum est nisi philosophicus tantum aspectus? Nam verus amor iam non potest dici ullus sensus esse – sensus est fortuitus casus e corporis liquoribus. Amor ut imago libertatis et deliberatae rationis est tantum alterius studium quoddam, studium ad intellegendum potius quam possidendum. Quod possidere facile est cum sub potionis torpore animus fuit, sed alterum intellegere difficile, nobile, vero amori. Ironicum est quod amor nobis relictus unus qui nomen meretur antiquissimus est Platonicus quem in Phaedro, Symposio et Lysi legimus – nam parum amor est in sensu et cupiditate. Alterum amat ad bonum quoddam ducendo, non tangendo. Sensum quem amorem dicimus dicamus instinctum, altum et verum tamen abstractionem mentisque studium.

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Non fuerat prima opera talia tractans nec prima ubi amor impossibilis fuit. Apud Lohengrin amorem reperimus divinum, tam sublimem ut intactilis sit: Caelestis heros Elsam ex iniusta morte servat et uxorem ducit cui autem non licet eius originem nec nomen rogare. Limites sunt inter ambo, dispar ratio inter divinum et humanum. Nam quamvis Lohengrin imago sit puri ac veri amoris, Elsa quoniam humana est divinum non assequitur, nec potest Lohengrin amorem praebere quem cupit illa. Gravis inde difficultas, conflictus oritur, aporia, quod verus amor nimie divinus est ad humanam vitam. At Tristani et Isoldae aporia omnino contraria est: Verus amor ad humanam vitam est nimie carnalis. Tota enim actio ostendit dolorem, desperationem, desiderium gaudii cuiusdam tam effrenati ut parum limes humanae vitae huic satis sit. Ad amorem tunc anima non satis erat, nunc corpus. Quod bene illustrat mutationem tremendam quam amoris conceptus in Wagneris operis paucis annis patitur. Lohengrin primo tempore 1850 moderatur, Tristanum et Isoldam ad finem anni 1854 componere coepit «in memoriam», scribit, «dulcissimi omnium somniorum» quod «numquam in mea vita vera amoris felicitate fructus sum» (16 Dec. 1854 ad Liszt), dum verum et uxorem habebat et cum Mathilda Wesendonck amores.

Sed quamquam Tristanus et Isolda alter alturum concupiscunt potius quam amant, amor tamen in actione non deest: Purum ac generosum invenimus in rege Marco. Qui proditione patefacta verus amicus deplorat amicum fere magis quam se ipse. Nam cum amantes deprehendit tanta est tristitia ac dolor ut amicum quidem punire nulla cogitatio sit, sed omnes vires modo satis sunt ad plangendum.

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Inde videtur tragica nobilitas: Marcus intrinsecus vulneratus non cessat amicum amare neque ex odio plangit, sed plangor est vox dolens amoris nimie puri in hoc indigno mundo, ita ut amor et generositas superflua fiant. Tristanus enim erat ultimus e quo Marcus fidem fractam exspectavisset. Verum amor erga Tristanum, quia amicitia nec cupiditas fuit, cum etiam sobrius, gravis ac tranquillus, quodam modo verior quoque fuit. Repente autem se deceptum fuisse comperit neque intellegit quid fecerit ad haec merenda. Unus est in opera Marcus rex qui nobilem patitur amorem, unus cuius in planctu vere miserati simus. Ex istis partibus Wagner personam tragicam maxima altitudine efficit, summo artis ingenio utitur. Casus est unicus, quoniam in reliquis actionibus Marcus homo cupidus ulciscendi depingitur. Quod infertur e Thomae Britannici actione, ubi amantes deprehendens dicit iratus:

In rogo eos cum res probata erit cremarit! Attamen ira epici herois Christianaque «ira iusti» legitima aestimatur hoc in litterario genere. Sed Wagner efficit heroem cuius in plangore nulla est ira. Unus aliquando impetus contra Tristanum tristissima «sceleste!» exclamatio est. Hic patefit intimus dolor: Ne cupiebat quidem rex Marcus uxorem ducere, plangere potius mortem primae uxoris quae nullos regi liberos reliquerat. Sed amicorum cohorte cum omnibus regni ipsoque Tristano perseverantibus, haud sine mora assensus erat uxorem ducere novissimam. Quam Isoldam Tristanus ei ferens, rex putabat sese atque amicos regnumque totum honorare, gavisus ipse de «mirifica muliere» quacum tranquillam vitam agere cupiebat. Ubi tali in animo Tristanum deprehendit et Isoldam cum regni cohorte «hoc, Tristane» tantum inquit «vere fecisti?» et «mihi hoc, hoc, Tristane, mihi» dedisti? Et plangens canit:

Quare innumerabilia servitia, honoris gloriam, magnam potestatem mihi Marco tulisti? Honorem gloriamque, magnam potestatem, innumerabilia servitia tandem infamia Marci tibi solvere debuerit? (...) Quam ne caelum quidem liberat, quid mihi hic inferus? Quam ne miseria quidem expiat, quid mihi haec infamia?

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Ignorat scilicet amantes intoxicatos esse. Sed tanta est amicitia, tanta pietas et ultra hunc bio-chemicarum machinarum mundum nobilitas ut veritate comperta de potione atque amoris torpore, non tantum amico mortem quaerenti veniam dat verum etiam festinat ut amantes in matrimonio coniungat! At sero festinat ad Hiberniae litora cum Isolda navigans ubi Tristanus iam moribundus iacet. Moribundus profecto, quia aut Marci plangorem audiens aut in impossibili amore dissolutionem ultimam cupiens sese postquam Marcus locutus erat in inimici gladium iecerat sibi mortiferum vulnus poscens. Hoc animi statu sanguinisque copiam effundens discedit ad Hiberniam, ubi autem delirio captus navem exspectat Isoldam ferentem. Naves vero appropinquant, sed cum primum in terram egrediuntur cum aliis primum Isolda, deinde Marcus, Tristanus nomen Isoldae vocans moritur. Isolda tunc delirans ingente capta desperatione canit et amantem secuta ipsa moritur. Vivit Marcus.

Rogarit quidam cur una persona vere tragica Marcus, qui tantam ac puram animi altitudinem exhibet cuiusque tantum miserendum est, in actione parum appareat. Forte est actio imago mundi, ubi omnis verus amor veraque virtus raritas, communis tamen turpitudo, ebrietas ac vilis cupiditas. Quas ubique dramae musici videmus et audimus. Rarus contra est Marcus qui amorem ostendit ubi ira exspectabatur. Nam non reperitur in tota opera amor praeter Marcum – inter Tristanum et Isoldam modo sensualis a potione excitata cupiditas. Rex autem et Isoldam et Tristanum amat, Tristanum profecto etiam altius quam Isoldam, quia eius non tantum avunculus verum etiam diuturnus amicus forti cordis vinculo erat. Isolda erat res nova, certe pulchra, et pura et benevolenti regis amore digna – sed nova. Nondum erat firmis intimitas, rex etiam timidus, quapropter Tristanus magis quam altera adversus regem fidem frangit. Et Marcus, quia omnia ignoscit, emergit una tragica persona cuius et amor et dolor veri sunt.

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Maximum gaudii modo potest cogitari ut deletio et gaudii et gaudentis. Haud differenter Plato arguit in Philebo: Praestantia omnis rei consideranda est in eius absoluta infinita significatione. Gaudium autem absolutum infinitumque iam dolorem appropinquat, quod omne gaudium quo magis gaudetur eo minus satisfacit, dum gaudens quia numquam satisfit quo magis cupit eo magis sese delet. Amor enim ut infinitum gaudium se tamquam aporiam habet, quod ad infinita finita vita inepta est. Cum desiderium sine fine tenetur, vita quoque vilis videtur. Inanis surgit spes quod facile superanda est. Sed vita, cum maxime vilis ac parva finitaque sit, maximum est omni homini datum. Transcendenda non est sine delenda. Itaque falluntur Tristanus et Isolda dissolutionem quaerentes quae neque ad amorem nec vitam ducit. Actio videtur fatalem nobis casum significare: Homo est bio-chemica machina sese sua sponte deletura, natura volente confecta ad sese per desiderium infiniti gaudii delendam. Mendacis enim dissolutionis cupiditas fuerit vera sensuum tragoedia.

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Innatum dicit Schopenhauer unum errorem esse: Quod mundus institutus est ad felicem exsistentiam continendam. Nam quid felicitatem vocamus nisi infinitam cupiditatum satisfactionem? Ridiculum esset metaphysicam cogitare potestatem statuentem: Fiat mundus ut septem miliarda hominum felices vivant et quisque quodcumque cupit capiat. Ne metaphysicis quidem terminibus hoc possibile esset. Quid enim accidat si duo homines eandem rem cupiant quam unus habere possit? Iam Hobbes in Leviathan respondit: They become enemies. Felicitas non potest cogitari ut effrenata quam in Tristano et Isolda videmus cupiditatum satisfactio. Mundus nimie parvus est ad omnium hominum cupiditates, et tristes sunt instinctus qui nos ad reproductionem pellunt, quoniam quo magis homines mundo infuerint eo infeliciores erunt alter alterum obstantes. Quis est enim felicitatis prospectus?

Pietas, et meditatio, et mentis abstractio tantum servant e se ipso hominem. Pietas quam Tristanus et Isolda delirantes merentur eadem est ac humana conditio a felicitatis delirio illusa meretur. Quoniam principium mundo irrationale inest, quod nemini favet, delirium est omnis spes quod vitae finis amor est. Amor ne possibilis quidem est in bio-chemica machina sese sua sponte deletura. Itaque Isoldae mors et mortifera musica non unius ruinam sed omnis humanitatis ostendit in amoris aporia. Operae morbiditas necessaria est: Necare potest, sed etiam docere.

Wagner cogitarit Anulum Nibelungensem magnum opus fuisse, in quo fortasse diutius laboraut. Sed neque Anulus nec Parsifal superat Tristani et Isoldae audaciam. Saepe enim accidit ut artifex cum multum laboret ad opus quoddam perficiendum haud tam magna efficiat ac opera facilius orta. Nam omne opus nimia artificis cura atque tensa exspectatione confectum non ostendit ipsius ingenium naturale, liberam artem. Opera magna sunt illa quae musicus non componit quae magna sint: Artificis altitudinem naturaliter, scilicet fortuito casu ostendunt. Opus ipsum loquitur.

Tristanus et Isolda discrimen harmonicum effecit. Wagner omnibus usus est quae musica, melodia atque harmonia, adhuc tradita praebebat. Et uno opere omnia superaut – ita ut postea nullus musicus serius traditionem perrexerit. Utrum secundum an contra Wagner, omnes alia experti sunt, et Debussy et Schoenberg, et Stravinski et Strauss. Nullum opus tam magnum effectum in harmoniae historia ac Tristanus et Isolda habuit. Praeclarus Tristani concentus, etsi Wagner non primus adhibuit, in contextu quo tunc apparuit totam componendi artem mutavit, unum inter reliqua exempla. Sic componista eversit musicam, sic monumentum, sic monstrum creaut peremptorium: Necat incautum.

15

Fascistae heroicum modum apud Wagner amabant, quod videbatur mythicum populi epos musicum narrare. Quamvis talia de Tannhäuser ac Lohengrin operis dici possent ipseque Wagner anti-semita esset, genus componendi mutavit. Heroici romantismi apice cum Lohengrin assecuto, Tristanus et Isolda multitudine dissonantiarum ac chromatico ingenio romanticam musicam transcendit. Heroicus mythos, quamquam in superficie manet, amaro realismo cedit e quo pessimista mundi visio emergit, amor sublimem auram amittit – nihil fuerit minus romanticum. Nonnumquam autem accidit ut circa ingeniosum turba mediocris ambulet quae artificis opus amat sed parum intellegit. Sic operae ut Tristanus et Isolda et Anulus Nibelungensis a Nazis laudabantur quibus nulla facultas bene interpretandi erat. Nam Anulus cum quidem mythicam auram habeat tamen de cupiditatis ruina agitur, quod minime allexerit cupidissimi benevolentiam. Sed olim potestatis cupidi tam caeci erant ut modo cupiditatem suam viderent, subtilem operae significationem neglegerent. Wagner ipse, qui praeter musicam ignobilis homo erat, nimie praeumbratus est a Tristani et Isoldae magnitudine.

Opus magnum inter maxima humani ingenii compositum est. Dissolvit musicam ne vita deleatur. Nam perfectio, summa delectatio, omnis cupiditatis transcendentia quid esset nisi infinitum gaudium? Musica et gaudium necesse est vitae speculum sint. Ne desiderium decipiant, ad finem veniant. Wagner harmonicam abicit pulchritudinem, at musicam pro ea componit haud minore altitudine. Omnia quae pulchra videntur non pulchra sunt, nec minus pulchra quae non videntur. Schoenberg, Strauss, Luigi Nono, Ligeti parum audiuntur quod primo tempore non adulantur aures. Ignobilis est immediati gaudii cupiditas, frivolam modo mentem ostendit. Sic diversas nunc vias sequuntur musica classica et popularis. Haec ubique sonat et tonat, illa sub oblivionis umbra iacet. Quae res si bene consideras haud mala: Superioris musicae veritas non fuerit adulatio, sed gaudium altius quaerendum, laetitia tenera sive sobria, finis conscia et contenta – etiamsi Schopenhauer principium dicit irrationale mundo inesse. Animi refugia secundum Buddhismum tria adsunt: Omnia transeunt. Desiderium dolor. Nihil est ipsum.

It is a special occasion, indeed, to present a book like «Emily and the Hermit». These are two friends who embark together on a quest for the best form of livelihood. They will explore, in particular, the idea of an independent settlement, a haven for sustainable, self-sufficient and democratic life.

Borrowing the frame of a Platonic dialogue, my criticism of civilisation does reflect some Platonic thoughts (which is difficult to avoid once you have studied Plato’s entire work), but Plato is too categorical for our world. My book echoes rather what a “Plato remastered” would say, among others, to today’s socio-economic problems.

I chose a literary dialogue to make complex, intense arguments accessible to a greater readership. Most people looking for social or economic alternatives will focus on changing society from the top to the bottom or preaching some kind of traumatic coercion. I am not doing that. Emily and her friend are just looking at what a small settlement could do to build a truly better life.

This is definitely a book on political philosophy. Yet in a debate full of twists, Emily and “the old man” also discuss the concepts of civilisation and society, the role of money in economic relations, the nature of law, the purpose of education and problems in the definition of knowledge, beauty and friendship.

You will find below an extract from the beginning of the dialogue. «Emily and the Hermit» is printed as a circular book and can be borrowed from the Carolingian library.

Emily and the Hermit

[on livelihood; ethical]

CHARACTERS.
Emily. An old man.

MORNING.

HR. What brings you from town, Emily; when did you arrive?
EM. I have just arrived, thank you. I don’t want to sound flattering, but the reason that brought me here is the man who is talking to me now.
HR. Why is that? Are you willing to learn the art of a groom?
Or will you help me cut some wood?
EM. If that is your secret, let it be done!
HR. Secret? You appear to keep more secrets than I.
EM. Then let me tell you mine: There is the most extraordinary talk in town about a hermit who gave a full lecture in politics to a few friends of mine.
HR. I knew it couldn’t be my horses that brought you here.
EM. Good for you, but now be so kind and tell me everything about your discussion with Gregory. He was so overwhelmed that he was unable to give a proper account of what happened. It is as if he had spent day and night gazing at impossible stars.
HR. That was a difficult talk, Emily, and I would need some time to remember and report it.
EM. I am determined to hear every word.
HR. I hope the words are worth the effort, but as I am working now I must carry on while I talk.
EM. Will it not disturb your reasoning?
HR. How then? Have you never done repetitive work before?
EM. Yes, I have.

1

HR. Then, as you know, when you get used to the work you can do it with greater ease.
EM. Sometimes.
HR. And with your mind free, you often talk to yourself while your hands are working.
EM. Absolutely.
HR. It’s the same here, with the difference that, instead of talking to myself, I am talking to you.
EM. This is kind of you, but I would feel embarrassed to stand here and do nothing. Let me help you a bit.
HR. If you insist, you can help me with lifting. Together we are stronger!
EM. I like the attitude!
HR. So did Gregory, but suddenly he started asking strange questions.
EM. Which questions?
HR. He asked me what a state is. And by that he meant not something like a state of the water, but rather the assembly of people and institutions that politicians call the state.
EM. And what did you answer?
HR. What could I answer? Little do I know, but I can ask you this: Are people better off when they live alone or somehow together? Look at it this way: If both of us needed to do this lifting we are doing now, would it be better to do it each on his own or together?
EM. I guess together. Otherwise life would be much harder.
HR. I have no doubt it would. But before we start working together, we are strangers to each other, are we not?

2

EM. Yes. We may have heard of each other, but never having seen one another, we would still be strangers.
HR. Yet once we start working and living together, we become more acquainted with each other.
EM. Obviously.
HR. And what is it that arises from acquaintance? In other words: If all goes well, where does acquaintance lead us?
EM. Well, to sympathy, I would say, and to friendship!
HR. Good! And friends are no longer strangers?
EM. Not at all!
HR. But what if, coming together to do this lifting work, we did not like each other? Would life be much easier then?
EM. Not much.
HR. Only the work would be done more quickly.
EM. It would, but in a way we would still be strangers.
HR. You see, Emily, for a long time there was talk of bringing people together for a common good. If someone said this to us, we could answer: “Indeed, my dear friend, Emily and I got together to lift these heavy logs, and both of us will benefit from it. What is more, by working together we will benefit from it even quicker, because four hands can do more than two.” Would you find this talk reasonable or nonsense?

3

EM. That would be fine.
HR. What if it went further? I could also answer: “Never mind the lifting, stranger. The lifting is important, but Emily and I got together because we had no friends and we thought that friendship is better than solitude.” Would that be acceptable?
EM. Absolutely.
HR. If this is true, lifting the logs belongs to our common good, and friendship also belongs to our common good. But make me wiser: If we could have only one good and were to choose between lifting and friendship, which good would you judge better and worthier?
EM. What a question! I would call friendship the highest good among people.
HR. What are you saying, Emily? Are you saying that, as we gather here to collect logs and become friends, if we failed to gather the logs but became friends we would be better off than if we failed to become friends but collected the logs? Is this what you are saying?
EM. You can engrave that on gold!
HR. But does this apply only to us or perhaps to all people that might gather together and do something in common?
EM. To all of them, I would say.
HR. What you are saying, then, is that people who gather together to achieve a common good will never achieve a good higher than friendship, and that without friendship no common good will be true. Why, the people, not being real friends, will be half strangers, and either will their good not be common or their things in common not good.

4

EM. You put it perfectly, man alive!
HR. I am just wondering. Imagine if, instead of only you, suddenly a hundred people turned up to help my lifting. I am trying to think how that would work. I am sure all of them would have a great heart, but what do you think: Would it be better to let everyone work spontaneously as they wish, or would you rather have someone guiding their work and giving instructions here and there?
EM. If the guide really knows what she is talking about when giving instruction, that will be a relief.
HR. Emily, I hate to mention this, but I have to: If these wonderful people were to stay for the night, and after that for a month, and after that they settled, would it not be better for this settlement to choose one or two guides? I mean people to guide the settlement’s work and daily life.
EM. If these rulers don’t turn out to be tyrants, hermit, that would be a great thing.
HR. You take the words out of my mouth: The guide, then, would become a kind of ruler, an authority to be obeyed, and those who obey would be ruled.

5

EM. True. But I am not sure how this authority should work.
HR. Neither am I, but we are looking at something much simpler than that now. We can agree, at any rate, that we do not need to wander too far to find a settlement, a community or any other kind of livelihood where there are the rulers and the ruled, and where the rulers have authority over the ruled.
EM. This is very much the way of the world, I dare say!
HR. Perfect, Emily, just be so kind and let me know what you think. Which is the better livelihood: that of friends ruling over friends, or that of strangers ruling over strangers?
EM. Definitely the first. It follows from what you were saying.
HR. Then it is much easier, in a settlement of twenty, fifty, or even a hundred, to have friends ruling over friends. How many people live in your country, Emily?
EM. I don’t know exactly. Ten million? Eighty million?
HR. Is there any doubt, then, that in such a country there will never be friends ruling over friends, but always strangers ruling over strangers?
EM. This is quite a sad truth, I must say.
HR. It depends on the way you look at it. No truth is sad when it teaches, and what this truth teaches me is this: When people are seeking a good kind of livelihood, one where the highest common good can be achieved, they have to avoid the place and the case where you have strangers ruling over strangers.
EM. Provided this is feasible.

6

GREGORY NAME

EMILY
AND THE HERMIT

on livelihood

HR. This is not the way of looking at it. Nothing untried is feasible.
EM. But my friend, my country is only one of hundreds of states with millions of people, strangers to each other, and ruled by strangers. How will you change that?
HR. You can start by helping me with the lifting, Emily! What makes you think that, being born in such an overcrowded place, you are obliged to stay? While respecting both the rulers and the ruled who choose to live and stay, you can always withdraw. Yet I can imagine what someone may say. Someone like Gregory can look askance at me and say: “What are you talking about? Are you trying to say people should leave cities and avoid state administration and join your primitive settlement in the middle of nowhere? Do you think anyone will leave the comfort of civilisation, the opportunities of their jobs, their culture and their prosperity to embark on such an adventure? Sure, life in modern states is not perfect, but it has also many benefits and people should stay!” Now Emily, if Gregory turned up and said this, what would we say? I guess we would be quite at a loss.
EM. I would think he’s got a good point at any rate.
HR. Of course he has, and since his point is so good, I would carry on and question him: “My good friend, pray enlighten our primitivism and tell us some of the benefits that a civilisation of big and well ordered states bestowed upon us. I do confess I have a thrill when I hear of states with a hundred thousand, nay one million, nay one billion inhabitants on the globe, thriving and bringing further and further the cause of civilisation. Just come and tell us, then: What is the highest good these states have achieved? Or perhaps you may say they have not achieved much but they still can and will. It’s all the same, Gregory, just tell us the highest good these states can achieve. Shall we say they will have achieved the highest good once everybody has a car?”

7

EM. That would be laughable!
HR. Why would that be laughable? Is it because everybody having a car is not good enough or because we are going in the wrong direction altogether?
EM. I don’t know. Perhaps we should consider both cases.
HR. So be it! Let’s assume first that everybody having a car is not enough. Why not enough? Well, there are cars and cars, and if you measure the highest good in terms of cars, then we must say that the better the cars the higher the common good, and the more people have the best cars the higher the common good. Agree?
EM. Sure, at least following the assumption.
HR. Very well! Yet then, cars would not be enough, for good cars need a good garage, and a good garage requires a good house, and a good house requires a good job, and the better the house and the job, the higher the common good. Does this not follow from the assumption too? We know it does. See how interesting now, and think for yourself: Why do people like Gregory focus on a good car, a good house and a good job? Is it because they believe that a good car, a good house and a good job will make them better as individuals and improve their character, or is it because of something else?
EM. It is probably because of something else.
HR. Interesting. And yet they would still say that, acquiring all these possessions, they are pursuing a good life, and that the well ordered state enables them to pursue a good life. Or would they not say such a thing?

8

EM. They would certainly say they are looking for a good life.
HR. Emily, excuse my ignorance: If we had the choice of only one, what would we call a truly good life: the life with a good car or the life with a good character?
EM. What a question! A life with a good character, though most would choose the car.
HR. You see, Emily, I am not going to ask you to marry me, but it’s good to know we have something in common: I could not agree more with you. If what we say is true, then we could think of a marvellous state of one billion, say one trillion citizens, where everybody has the best possible car, the best possible house and the best possible job. Would that be good?
EM. Perhaps.
HR. Perhaps! Let’s look further into it and imagine this delightful state. Is it not possible that in such a paradise people have the best possible cars and houses and jobs and still hate each other and live full of contempt and envy and mutual derision, behaving as badly as possible?
EM. It is possible.
HR. And yet, was this not the good life they were looking for, and was this not the good life their sophisticated state was supposed to provide? Yes, you say! What is it then that is good about such a life? Gregory would say it is a life of benefits, and I will not say their life is useless, but what is the good this benefit represents?
EM. It’s comfort, my friend. When they say good life they mean simply a life of comfort.

9

HR. Yet it is a sad a thing, Emily, that in their understanding the highest good is not friendship, but comfort. Why, you do not need a sophisticated state to enable friendship, but such a thing is needed to provide a place for their huge competition of comfort. Or do you think they hate each other so much because they want to be friends?
EM. That would make no sense to me.
HR. They hate each other because each of them wants the best car, the best house and the best job. Is it not interesting that the outcome of a good life should be hate and a competition for comfort and money? If this is the highest good of civilisation, civilisation proves to be simply maximisation of comfort. Or should we rather ask what civilisation is?
EM. We can. But before we do this, we can already conclude that, concerning Gregory’s argument, the laughable thing about comparing a good life with everybody having a car is not that having a car is not enough, but that we are going in the wrong direction.
HR. Excellent, Emily, thank you! This is one more reason for us to ask, then, what is the right direction for civilisation and what civilisation is. I can tell, this is not an easy task. For if we were to say that civilisation is about comfort, then it is useless for a truly good life, since we ascertained that the highest good is friendship and thus a good life is a life of friendship. On the other hand, if we say civilisation is about friendship, then we must call any tribe of gatherers and hunters where there was friendship civilised. In this case, there would be no difference between gatherers and hunters on the one side and sophisticated states on the other side, since friendship can occur in both. This is why I do not really know what civilisation is and what difference it is supposed to make in regard to a truly good life. I try to avoid a useless word, and instead of referring to civilisation and primitivism as contrasts, the difference between which I am not able to explain, I simply acknowledge different forms of human livelihood which, since friendship is possible in all of them, are necessarily equal in value.

10

EM. I definitely agree.
HR. Then let us not say, like Gregory, that someone is better off if he or she lives in a sophisticated state, encumbered with cars and houses and jobs.
EM. Well, never mind the cars and the houses, but I am not sure about the jobs. See what I mean: Where there are jobs there is work. Now is not work a good in itself?
HR. Emily, you speak as if the good of work had been invented by a sophisticated state some decades ago. What makes you think that gatherers and hunters did not work?
EM. In fact, they did work!
HR. Not only they. Can you see those birds there? They are blackbirds. Now do birds not need to work as well?
EM. In which way?
HR. In such a way that their food is not provided automatically. They need to fly around and search for food, both for them and for their offspring.
EM. Yes.
HR. I certainly don’t know if they regard this as work, but what I think is this: Any activity a living being undertakes to maintain its life is work. Do you agree with this?
EM. I do.
HR. Therefore, looking for food is work.
EM. Yes.
HR. Getting food is work.

11

EM. It is.
HR. Looking for ways, planing how to get food is work.
EM. Sure.
HR. Making efforts to protect your body and thus save your life is work.
EM. This is true.
HR. What about this, Emily? Can we be friends if we do not know who we are and what friendship is?
EM. Hardly.
HR. Then an amount of knowledge is necessary.
EM. Yes.
HR. And can we save our life if we know not what to eat and how to get it?
EM. No.
HR. Then this knowledge is also needed.
EM. It is.
HR. In this case, is getting knowledge not work as well?
EM. Definitely!
HR. And knowledge as such leads to the truth.
EM. How else?
HR. Are you saying, then, that the search of truth is also work?
EM. It cannot not be.

12

HR. And yet, the body does not feed on truth.
EM. No, the mind feeds on truth, and knowledge for the mind can benefit the body too.
HR. Splendid! Then work is any activity or effort to maintain our life, keeping the body alive with food and water, and the mind alive with knowledge and truth.
EM. This is what work is!
HR. You see, Emily, there appears to be a difference between the concepts of work and job. For the gatherers and hunters certainly worked, but they had no jobs.
EM. What do you mean? You mean, they had no jobs because there was no specialisation of work but everyone did everything?
HR. No. Their work was certainly divided. To prepare a hunt, they had to know who would kill the animal, who would prepare the meat and so on. Or do I talk nonsense?
EM. You are right.
HR. Then it is not specialisation that makes the difference between work and job, since work is any effort to protect your body and save your life as we saw. Now this effort is not uniform, but every one can focus on something different. Some will hunt in the forest and some prefer to go fishing. All that is work. As for the concept of job, Emily, don’t ask me what it is if you can tell me by yourself. If we were to become lazy thinkers and to define things rather by examples than by proper definitions, and so I happened to ask you what a job is, which example would you give me?
EM. Well, the first thing that occurs to my mind is someone selling stuff in a shop, if that doesn’t sound too prosaic to you.

13

HR. Never mind what it sounds like to me. You know what intrigues me: Why did this shop assistant choose to work in a shop? He could have joined a group of hunters in the forest.
EM. I guess he found his work in a shop more comfortable than hunting.
HR. Then he is looking for comfort. Is he also looking for friendship? Let me tell you what I mean: Did the shop assistant apply for his job because he knew that the shopkeeper was a man of integrity, because he wanted to share in his prosperity and be his friend and friend of all in that shop, and also because he believed in the benefit of the products the shop is selling and wanted to be part of a noble cause? Is that it? I see you hesitate, Emily. Or do you mean that the shop assistant was only looking for money, and that he would apply to whatever shop or company which paid him money and never mind whom he would meet and whether he would find any friends, so that if the shop pays him money he will stay, if not, he will go? What do you think?
EM. He is probably looking for money and not concerned about whom he will meet or the nature of what he is selling.
HR. What about the shopkeeper who is employing this person? Is he employing the assistant because he wants to let the other share as much as possible in his prosperity, as a true friend would do, or is he just looking for whoever can do the most work for the lowest possible wage?
EM. The shopkeeper would rather have a slave if he could.

14

HR. You see then, Emily, what an interesting relationship arises between the shopkeeper and the shop assistant? As they care so little for each other, the shop assistant will work as little as possible and charge as much as he can, while the shopkeeper will pay as little as possible and expect as much as he can. In fact, because his employee is not a slave but is being paid, he can treat the shop assistant as he wishes, since the assistant depends on the money, and the employer has the excuse that he is paying. Conversely, the more the shop attendant is badly treated, the less effort he will put into his work, since he knows he is being badly paid and badly treated. Is that it, Emily? What about the integrity of this kind of relationship?
EM. There is little integrity, my friend, for this a relationship conditioned only by money.
HR. Emily, you have just given a definition of job! It is a work relationship conditioned only by money.
EM. So it seems.
HR. And if it be so, it is not conditioned by friendship.
EM. Not really.
HR. And those who are not friends we call strangers?
EM. Yes.
HR. Then a job is also a relationship of strangers working with strangers.
EM. How else?
HR. And these strangers do not relate to each other willingly, but the money is more important than the work to be done, both for those who want to be paid for their service and for those who want to make money from other people’s service. Is that true, or am I wrong?

15

EM. You are right.
HR. Excuse my repetitions, Emily, but I am just trying to understand where our argument is leading us. Have we not said that this is a relationship of little integrity?
EM. Don’t bother about repetitions. There is little integrity in all that.
HR. Then this is not the kind of relationship we want in the settlement we were just talking about.
EM. Good heavens, no!
HR. And is not the alternative of strangers working with strangers friends working with friends?
EM. By all means.
HR. If we call the relationship of strangers working with strangers a job, a conventional means of money-getting not conducive to friendship, what should we call the relationship of friends working with friends?
EM. What should I say? A truer kind of cooperation?
HR. But surely, false cooperation is no cooperation at all, so that we either have true cooperation or none.
EM. Absolutely.
HR. Then there is no true form of cooperation in a job, and therefore no cooperation at all. This is what I mean when I say that gatherers and hunters worked but had no jobs. They worked in cooperation, for even if their relationship was not conditioned by perfect friendship, it was not at all conditioned by money.

16

EM. This is true. But my friend, let’s not reason in such a way that we look at examples of things and conclude that this behaves this way and that behaves that way regardless of circumstances, because there is no single example or set of examples of behaviour that can exclude exception. In fact, two people could meet in a shop, either two shop assistants or even shop assistant and shopkeeper, and become friends, so that a relationship of strangers, originally conditioned by money, turns into something nobler and benefits the friends and their work.
HR. I could not agree more. Working relationships that start as jobs can evolve to cooperation. But it remains true that a job is a working relationship of strangers conditioned only, and only by money. Besides, my dear, it seems to me that exceptions have something in common with coincidence and chance, and that chance is not much an object of knowledge, while probabilities have something in common with regularity, with a constant order able to be measured in some way, which seems closer to the character of knowledge than exceptions. For knowledge is knowledge of what is true, and what is true, if it can be known, must also be able to be measured, by perception or reason, and what can be measured can only be measured in its order, for what has no order cannot be measured, and what cannot be measured cannot be known.
EM. I understand.

17

HR. And as we are trying to measure behaviour and relationships, we should rather look at what is orderly in them and not at what is coincidental or exceptional. If, on the other hand, we cannot measure behaviour as we measure numbers, and since we cannot measure what is always true about behaviour, we should strive to measure at least what is probable in it. And if in this way we do not achieve unshakable knowledge, we are at least closer to knowledge and less helpless than if we just rely on coincidence and exception. Does it make sense to you?
EM. It does.
HR. Then let us still say, even if based on probability, that working relationships conditioned only, and only, by money are not conducive to friendship. Let me put it this way: Would you not conceive of a relationship between a slave and a master where true friendship arises? Could you exclude this possibility?
EM. I couldn’t.
HR. And yet this is not what is likely to arise from a relationship between slave and master.
EM. No.
HR. Then let ours be a settlement of friends working with friends.
EM. Absolutely.

18

HR. And let there be no jobs in this settlement, but only cooperation and working relationships conditioned not by money, but by good will. You must be wondering what I mean by good will, so let’s look at it this way: I should have said friendship instead of good will. But friendship requires time. Or will anyone who turns up in the settlement become a friend of all immediately?
EM. He certainly won’t.
HR. But what do you think? Where there is not yet friendship, there can be at least the will towards friendship, the will to be a friend.
EM. There can be.
HR. And we called friendship the highest good?
EM. We did.
HR. And the highest good is necessarily good?
EM. Needless to say.
HR. Then to move our will towards friendship, Emily, is to move our will towards the highest good, and this is therefore the best possible will. It is the good will par excellence.

1

2

Mar do Norte, mar da morte

O ambiente era inóspito. O Mar do Norte é um mar violento, instável, imprevisível. Causou incalculáveis catástrofes. Não havia previsão do tempo. Na segunda inundação de São Marcelo, em 16 de janeiro de 1362, numa única noite abriu-se um extenso golfo na costa da Holanda, no qual 50.000 pessoas afogaram-se. Na mesma noite, foi tragada uma parte considerável do litoral alemão, incluindo a próspera cidade de Rungholt.

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Em torno de 700 d.C., quando Guthlac habitava Crowland e o mar tinha o controle absoluto da terra, qualquer tempestade invernal de grande porte trazia consigo uma maré irascível. Os territórios tragados, quando não ficavam permanentemente submersos, eram devolvidos como planícies alagadiças, impróprias para construção e agricultura. Era um deserto, uma terra fantasma, visível aos olhos mas escrava do mar. É nesse cenário, temido e evitado por todos, que Guthlac encontra refúgio. A ilha de Crowland estava um pouco acima do que as ondas tragavam, mas o caminho, por terra, bancos de areia, laguna e mar, era tortuoso, a navegação custosa. Foi decerto por isto que a chegada de Guthlac causou uma certa comoção por aquela região, notoriedade que atraía admiradores e detratores.

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4

Uma biografia fragmentária

Embora tenha vivido na Inglaterra, Guthlac insere-se na tradição eremita dos Pais do Deserto, que tiveram profunda ressonância no Cristinismo oriental. O pouco que se sabe de sua vida provém duma hagiografia escrita em 740 por Felix, e dum poema narrativo baseado em parte na obra de Felix. A autoria do poema, por muito tempo atribuída a Cynewulf, ainda é debatida.

De acordo com Felix, Guthlac provinha duma família nobre e fora soldado durante a juventude. Parece ter formado, a certo ponto, uma milícia criminosa. A conversão se deu numa noite em que, considerando os erros de sua vida, prometera tornar-se monge se Deus lhe permitisse acordar no dia seguinte. Abandonando as armas, segue então para o mosteiro de Repton, onde a vida monástica não lhe parece frugal o suficiente. Decide tornar-se eremita, e com o apoio de alguns monges instala-se na ilha inóspita de Crowland, onde é ordenado padre e passa os quinze anos restantes de sua vida, recebendo visitas esporádicas.

Devido à dieta frugal e às condições geográficas, Guthlac sofria constantemente de febre e malária, que na Idade Média ainda grassava na Europa. É nesse contexto hostil e rústico que se lança à sua »batalha da prece«. Após a sua morte, é fundado um mosteiro beneditino em Crowland, que existiria até meados do século XII.

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Apesar do contexto indiscutivelmente cristão, procurei retratar um elemento universal na busca de Guthlac. Deus, a salvação, o »singelo jardim« são evocações a grandezas abstratas. Meu poema não faz apologia a uma crença em particular. Toda busca que transcende a mediocridade das ambições cotidianas é nobre, é grandiosa, é de fato a salvação, e é igualmente belo que Guthlac tenha encontrado na fé em Cristo o meio de sua busca.

Mas não cabe a um poeta fazer asserções teológicas e nenhum poema, ao menos nenhum dos meus, deve ser lido como uma fonte de acurado raciocínio filosófico ou teológico. Para esse tipo de expressão intelectual, a demonstração lógica é mais importante do que a forma, do mesmo modo que o argumento é mais forte do que a mera palavra. Mas entre o homem cotidiano e o raciocício filosófico é necessário haver uma ponte, um elemento que desperte no homem o interesse pelo abstrato. A poesia pode ser uma ponte. Pode evocar, em seu lirismo ou narrar pré-filosófico, por catarse ou mera força retórica, um interesse que doutro modo não surgiria. A beleza da poesia existe apenas em função de alguma verdade para a qual a beleza aponta, de modo que a verdadeira beleza é somente a beleza da verdade. A poesia é forte quando no seu todo, incluindo em sua forma, desperta o interesse pela busca de alguma verdade.

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7

Seria mais acertado falar de proto-métrica.

O inglês antigo, embora assim chamado, não é um mero dialeto nem mesmo um ancestral direto do inglês moderno. É uma língua germânica associada ao baixo alemão antigo, mais próxima do alemão que do inglês. Diferente do português antigo, ou galego-português, que até certo ponto é compreensível ao leitor leigo, o inglês antigo não é compreensível ao anglófono leigo. A métrica mais antiga e tradicional das línguas inglesas é o verso aliterativo, predominante até o Renascimento.

Até o momento, não foi possível descrever com exatidão a métrica do inglês antigo. Os poemas eram cantados, e não se conhece bem a relação entre a métrica e o canto. Seria mais acertado falar de proto-métrica: Do número de exceções conclui-se que o uso sistemático, explícito e previsível das regras gerais não era considerado elegante. Em princípio, porém, o verso compõe-se de uma série de tônicas, frequentemente quatro, das quais a penúltima é a cabeça aliterativa. Com ela, alitera-se pelo menos uma tônica precedente. A última tônica é livre.

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O conceito de aliteração é mais sutil. O que se alitera não são iniciais com iniciais, mas tônicas com tônicas. A aliteração entre tônicas adjacentes é considerada menos elegante do que entre tônicas separadas. Assim,

por muito tempo errou sem rumo o demônio

é mais sutil do que

buscando casa.

Ademais, a aliteração pode ser consonantal ou vocálica. Entre muito e demônio existe aliteração consonantal, pelo |m|. Entre rumo e perfume ocorre aliteração vocálica (ou melhor: assonância), pelo |u|.

Em geral, o verso é caracterizado por uma cesura sintática, não necessariamente ortográfica. A cesura o divide em dois hemistíquios, e no caso ideal há uma oposição retórica entre ambos, uma tensão intrínseca. O que segura o verso é o laço aliterativo. Logo, os hemistíquios são opostos em conteúdo e comuns em aliteração.

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With kind permission of Cambridge University Press, I will be experimenting with the King James Bible in my quest for a better spelling. My focus is the gospel of Mark, which is shorter and less pretentious in style. Why the King James Version? It is a wonderful relict of Early Modern English. It helped shape our modern spelling. Bibles had a tremendous influence. Take the Luther Bible in Germany: It changed the history of a language.

So did the King James Bible, it changed English. Just not for the best. It cemented even further the spelling inherited from Henry VIII. I call it chancery spelling to pay due homage to the eccentric Lords of the Court of Chancery: They really knew better about English. An example of their ingenuity? Well, since o-sounds are written with a delightful |au| in French, why not spell doughter as daughter? Clearly, Chaucer must have been out of fashion to favour the former.

But also the typesetters and pseudo-etymologists left a wonderful contribution – ghost, doubt, gherkin, island. Those were the times when you could have a go at a language and just shape its spelling at will! And here we gather in this digital century, unable to convince half a dozen students we’ve been fooled all along: It’s fake spelling, it’s just a 16^th century craze that’s been going on for far too long. Not even the chancery guys would still find it funny.

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I don’t care about fighting windmills. You know what? I woke up with a longing for miracles. That’s why I took the King James Bible and said to myself: Let’s put that right! On the back of my head, the sweet relief and a heavenly certainty: Whatever non-sense I may come up with will never, never outbid the creative panache of the chancery Lords. Don’t misunderstand me, please! English spelling is unique: It pleases the eyes of the French, it’s generous towards Dutch print-setters and beautifully anxious about etymological truths. It’s a blessing really, it’s divine, but what we need in a post-chancery world is something much more prosaic, nay: I have a dream! It would be nice if our spelling gave us a clue on how a word is pronounced – wouldn’t it?

To cut a long story short, here is my evolving draft for post-chancery bliss, which I am exemplifying on the King James Bible. Please note: It’s just a coincidence that the King James Bible is the greatest showcase of the chancery party. How would I dare attack it? This is not a political statement or something. I just became aware of things when my beautiful work was done. In fact, the work was done many, many times. It’s not as if I were trying to make proselytism for some kind of fixed system. What I have is a collection of reform drafts, and the experiment below is rendered in the third draft: a non-etymological, phonetic approach. It reflects a wider debate with reformers and critics. Yes, there are days when I am in the mood to listen. The third draft is a moving testimony.

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The first draft was called Restored Latin Spelling. Then, I became aware of other reformers with older systems and similar names. That’s why I gave up on names. If you like horses and windmills, do join me in saving the world: Four chapters of the Gospel of Mark will be presented in a third-draft rendition, with annotations in chancery spelling. The comments will focus first on vowels, then on consonants, and finally on special cases. They will be illustrating the above charts of vowels and consonants. I thus have the pleasure to present:

DHE GOSPEL

akordiŋ tu Seint Mark

– AN EKSTRAKT –

Chapter I

1 Dhe biginiŋ ov dhe gospel ov Jiizus Kraist, dhe Sàn ov God; az it iz riten in dhe profetz, Bihould, ai send mai mesenjer bifor dhai feis, wich shal pripeer dhai wei bifor dhii.

Shal, az, chapter: My aesthetics of orthography advocates the least visual impact. Its first principle states: The most frequent phonemes should be rendered with the least innovative letters. Innovative is any letter that does not occur in English. Thus, /æ/ is rendered as |a|.
The third draft focuses on Received Pronunciation, where the raising of the TRAP-vowel to a full /æ/ is not widespread. Some British dictionaries even use /a/ instead of /æ/. Renditions with |æ| or |ae| may be more pertinent for General American.

Sàn, wàn, bàt: /ɐ/ (traditionally /ʌ/) is rendered as |à|. Any form of |a| with diacritics may be used, though I find |à| the least intrusive innovation.
The second principle of the least visual impact states: Innovative letters should be taken from the closest languages. For English, the closest are Middle English, Anglo-Norman, New High German and Modern French. Less close are Wessex Anglo-Saxon (vulgo Old English), Old Norse and Latin. Remote sources are Dutch, Icelandic, Danish and Norwegian.
This is an important principle. If the policy is “everything goes”, you might as well use a Mandarin character to render e.g. /eɪ/: Dhe r馬n in Sp馬n st馬z m馬nli in dhe pl馬n!

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2 Dhe vois ov dhe wàn kraiiŋ in dhe wildernes, Pripeer yii dhe wei ov dhe Lord, meik hiz paathz streit.

Paathz: /ɑː/ is rendered as |aa|. The long vowels /ɑː iː ɔː uː/ are doubled to |aa ii oo uu|: faast, fiid, foot, fuud. John Hart’s lower dots |ạ ị ọ ụ| would be less intrusive: fạst, fịd, fọt, fụd. Yet these are difficult to produce on a keyboard.
Before |r|, round vowels are long. There is no need for the forms |aar oor|. This derives from the third principle of the least visual impact: Any unnecessary doubling should be avoided.
The case is different with |eer|, in which the second |e| is not a doubling of the first, but a schwa. |ee| renders /eə/.
The three /ə/-diphthongs /eə ɪə ʊə/ are thus |ee ie ue|: feer, fier, puer. These do not occur in General American.

Plural and third person /z/: The plural and third person sign is rendered as |z| even when the preceding consonant prevents a fully voiced articulation – paathz, profetz, skraibz, getz (getith), putz (putith) etc.

3 Jon did baptaiz in dhe wildernes, and priich dhe baptizm ov ripentans for dhe rimiſon ov sinz.

Mai, meik, baptaiz: The /ɪ/-diphthongs /aɪ eɪ ɔɪ/ are rendered as |ai ei oi| – mai, baptaiz, mei, teik, loin, emploi.

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4 And dheer went aut àntu him ool dhe land ov Judiia, and dhei ov Jerusalem, and wer ool baptaizd ov him in dhe river ov Jordan, konfesiŋ dheer sinz. 5 And Jon woz kloudhd widh kamelz heer, and widh a gœrdel ov a skin abaut hiz loinz; and hii did iit loukust and waild hàni;

Aut, kloudh: The /ʊ/-diphthongs /aʊ əʊ/ are rendered as |au ou|: alau, lou, rau, rou.

Triphthongs: The triphthongs /aɪə eɪə ɔɪə aʊə əʊə/ are rendered as |aie eie oie aue oue| – flaier, leier, loier, flauer, louer.

Gœrdel: /ɜː/ is rendered as |œ|. The innovative letter is taken from French and is recorded in Middle English calligraphy.

6 And priicht, seiiŋ, dheer kàmith wàn maitier dhan ai aafter mii, dhe lachit ov huuz shuuz ai am not wœrdhi tu stuup daun and ànluus.

Priich, stuup: To reduce the visual impact of the uncommon doubling in |ii uu|, the alternative forms |ie uo| may be used: priich, mii, shuu, stuup; or priech, mie, shuo, stuop. |ie| occurs in Wessex Anglo-Saxon, French, German and Early Modern English. |uo| is an innovation based on and equivalent to |ie|.

Lachit, pripeer: /ɪ/ is rendered as |i| in unstressed affixes from Latin and Romance origin – rikàver, pripeer, praivit, siikrit. But note the forms rekognaiz, riikonsider and priikonsiiv due to primary or secondary stress.

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God, gospel, of, not: |o| renders /ɒ/.

7 Ai indiid hav baptaizd yu widh wooter; bàt hii shal baptaiz yu widh dhe Houli Goust.

Yu: /uː/ in the construction /juː/ is always long. Thus, following the third principle, is does not need to be doubled.
/juː/ can be rendered as |iu| or |yu| in the middle and end of a word: piupel, pyupel, niu, nyu, fiu, fyu. At the beginning, it must be rendered as |yu| to avoid a realisation of /j/ as a vowel. Thus, periuz or peryuz, but yuz and never iuz.

Hii, yii, mii, bii: Monosyllables ending in /iː/ can be unstressed and short. The renditions hi, yi, mi, bi etc. are also acceptable when the context is not explicitly emphatic.

8 And it keim tu paas in dhouz deiz, dhat Jiizus keim from Nazareth ov Galilii, and woz baptaizd ov Jon in Jordan.

Jiizus, Nazareth, Jordan: There is no need for a special rendition for schwas, since most unstressed syllables in every word contain a schwa.
This being said, when a schwa is rendered by two vowels, these should be reduced to one. The vowel to be kept should be the etymologically more pertinent: mauntan, sœrtan, parlament.

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9 And streitwei kàmiŋ àp aut ov dhe wooter, hii soo dhe hevenz oupend, and dhe Spirit laik a dàv disendiŋ àpon him:

Laik, dàv: The third draft can dispense with any silent |e|.
Vowels that are not universally silent should be kept. Thus, militeri instead of militri.

Hevenz, sed: Following Harry Lindgren’s SR1 proposal, /e/ represented by |a ai ea ei eo ie u ue| is rendered as |e| – eni, hefer, jepardi, frend, beri.

10 And dheer keim a vois from heven, seiiŋ, Dhau art mai bilàvid Sàn, in huum ai am wel pliizd.

Kraiiŋ, seiiŋ, biiŋ: After a stem ending in -i, the -iŋ form is added directly. The resulting |ii| is not a long /iː/, but a hiatus. To indicate this, |ì| can be used: kraìiŋ, seìiŋ, bìiŋ.

11 And imiidietli dhe spirit draivith him intu dhe wildernes. 12 And hii woz dheer in dhe wildernes forti deiz, temptid ov Seitan; and woz widh dhe waild biistz; and dhi einjelz ministerd àntu him.

Draivith, draivist, temptid: The verbal forms -eth, -est and -ed become -ith, -ist and -id.
The form -ed becomes:
a) -d after: b, g, j, i, l, m, n, r, u, v, z: braibd, logd, lojd, pleid, koold, neimd, reind, sàferd, foloud, riliivd, ameizd;
b) -t after: ch, f, k, p, s, sh: tàcht, laaft, wœrkt, helpt, siist, vekst, finisht;
c) -id after: d, t, and in poetic usage: adid, weitid, wœrkid.

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Dhe, dhi: The article form dhi is used before vowels – dhi einjel, dhi àdher, dhi œrth.

13 Nau aafter dhat Jon woz put in prizon, Jiizus keim intu Galilii, priichiŋ dhe gospel ov dhe kiŋdom ov God,

Keim, meik, blok: |k| renders all occurrences of /k/. The letter |c| is left only in |ch| and foreign words. |ck| is reduced to |k|.
Similarly, |qu| becomes |kw|: kwiin, kwest, kworter.
|ch| renders /tʃ/: priich, chiip, chœrch.

God, Galilii: |g| renders /g/. |gu| with silent |u| becomes |g|: gard, gest, ges, vog, veig, sinagog.
|g| never renders /ʒ/ or /dʒ/, which become respectively |ʒ| and |j|: ʒandarme, meʒur, viʒon; jeil, larj, jàj.
|ʒ| is a modern writing of Middle English yogh |ȝ| and thus taken from a very close source. Note that yogh had a different use in Middle English. It is only the form I am borrowing.
Only |gw| renders /gw/: Gwinith, Gwam, laŋɡwij.

14 And seiiŋ, dhe taim iz fulfild, and dhe kiŋdom ov God iz at hand; ripent yii, and biliiv dhe gospel. 15 Nau az hii wookt bai dhe sii ov Galilii, hii soo Saimon and Andriu hiz bràdher kaastiŋ a net intu dhe sii; for dhei wer fisherz.

Dhe, dhei, bràdher: |dh| renders /ð/, and |th| renders /θ/ – dhau, dhai, thiŋ. |th| is reduced to |t| when it renders /t/: Tomas, Tailand.

Fulfild: Only |f| renders /f/ – fisher, profet, blasfemi, laaf.

Ov, hav, biliiv: Similarly, only |v| renders /v/.

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16 And Jiizus sed àntu dhem, kàm yii aafter mii, and ai wil meik yu tu bikàm fisherz ov men. 17 And streitwei dhei forsuk dheer netz and foloud him. 18 And wen hii had gon a litel fardher dhens, hii soo Jeimz dhe sàn ov Zebedii, and Jon hiz bràdher, huu oolsou wer in dhe ship mendiŋ dheer netz.

Fisherz, dhens: |s| renders /s/, and |z| renders /z/ – dhens, pleis, Jiizus, Jeimz.
The plural and third person sign is rendered as |z| even when the preceding consonant prevents a fully voiced articulation – paathz, profetz, skraibz, getz (getith), putz (putith) etc.
Verbal contractions are rendered without apostrophe: dàznt, itz, woznt, kudnt, wudnt, aim, yur (the pronoun is yor – yur yor oun maaster).
The genitive singular is rendered as |z| without apostrophe: Godz gospel, Saimonz waif, waifz lament, sànz wœrd. Only the plural is rendered with apostrophe: dhe faadherz’ land.
Singular nouns and some pronouns may end in /s/: keis, pleis (but keisiz, pleisiz), às, its.
Many pronouns end in /z/: hiz, hœrz, dheerz, dhemselvz, dhiiz, dhouz.

19 And streitwei hii koold dhem: and dhei left dheer faadher Zebedii in dhe ship widh dhe haierd sœrvantz, and went aafter him.

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Fisher, ship, rimiſon: /ʃ/ is rendered as |sh| in all Germanic and many Latin-Romance words – ship, cash, shàsh, fish, finish.
In Latin-Romance suffixes containing |ti si ci|, where a ceremonial realisation /si/ is possible, the long s |ſ| is used. It indicates that both /ʃ/ and /si/ are possible: rimiſon, faſon, suspiſon, pritenſon, neiſon, souſal, viſos, apriiſieit, apriiſieiſon. Note also: iſuu (no suffix).
Suffixal |ſ| can be preceded by |k|: fikſon, konstràkſon, akſon. Note also: làkſuri (no suffix).
Suffixal |ſ| can also be preceded by |t|: neitſur, piktſur, kriitſur.
|ſ| is not an alphabetic innovation. Though it be now obsolete, the long s is well documented in Modern English.
Possibly, the distinction between |sh| and |ſ| is not important for General American, General Australian etc., where |sh| and |ch| could be the general use: fashon, neishon, apriishieishon, akshon, fikshon; pikchur, neichur, kriichur.
Similar to /kʃ/ in làkſuri, note also /gʒ/ in vog-ʒandarm as a fashion police à la Louis XIII, an expression kindly coined by Justin B. Rye (check his thoughts on orthography and phonology) to accommodate /gʒ/.

20 And dhei went intu Kapernaum; and streitwei on dhe sabath dei hii enterd intu dhe sinagog, and toot. 21 And dhei wer astonisht at hiz doktrin: for hii toot dhem az wàn widh oothoriti, and not az dhe skraibz. 22 And dheer woz in dheer sinagog a man widh an ànkliin spirit; and hii kraid aut, 23 Seiiŋ, Let às aloun; wot hav wii tu duu widh dhii, dhau Jiizus ov Nazareth? art dhau kàm tu distroi às? Ai nou dhii huu dhau art, dhe Houli Wàn ov God.

Let, aloun, kool, shal: |l| renders both the clear l and the dark l.
Any silent |l| is dropped: baam, kaam, paam, wook.

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24 And Jiizus ribiukt him, seiiŋ, Hould dhai piis, and kàm aut ov him. 25 And wen dhi ànkliin spirit had torn him, and kraid widh a laud vois, hii keim aut ov him.

Seiiŋ, ànkliin: |n| renders /n/, and |ŋ| renders /ŋ/ – kin, kiŋ, thin, thiŋ, thiŋk, loŋ, amàŋ. |ŋ| is a necessary innovation to distinguish /n/ and /ŋ/. Though it does not occur in any close language, it was invented by Benjamin Franklin. It is thus the most vernacular alternative available, and in this regard more pertinent than |ñ nn nh|.
The consonantal innovations in the third draft are therefore: |ʒ ſ ŋ|. The first is taken from Middle English, the second is more obsolete than truly innovative, and the third dates back to the 18^th century.

26 And dhei wer ool ameizd, insoumàch dhat dhei kwestſond amàŋ dhemselvz, seiiŋ, Wot thiŋ iz dhiz? wot niu doktrin iz dhiz? for widh oothoriti komaandith hii iiven dhi ànkliin spiritz, and dhei duu obei him.

Wer, spirit: |r| renders /ɹ̠/ whether it be silent or pronounced. Rhotic accents still occur in Britain. /ɹ̠/ is also pronounced in emphatic or theatrical contexts.

27 And imiidietli hiz feim spred abroud thruaut ool dhe riijon raund abaut Galilii.

Imiidietly, komaand: The third principle of the least visual impact also applies to consonants: Any unnecessary doubling should be avoided.
In the third draft, the only doubling of consonants occurs when the prefix |àn| meets an |n|: ànneseseri, ànnatſural.

28 And forthwidh, wen dhei wer kàm aut ov dhe sinagog, dhei enterd intu dhe haus ov Saimon and Andriu, widh Jeimz and Jon.

Haus, houli: |h| renders /h/. Note that, when the King James Version was written, |h| was silent, thus: an haus, an hundred, an hungred man.
In the third draft, any silent |h| is dropped: auer, onor, onest, eer (to the throne).

29 Bàt Saimonz waifz màdher lei sik ov a fiiver, and anon dhei tel him ov hœr. 30 And hii keim and tuk hœr bai dhe hand, and liftid hœr àp; and imiidietli dhe fiiver left hœr, and shii ministerd àntu dhem. 31 And at iiven, wen dhe sàn did set, dhei broot àntu him ool dhat wer diziizd, and dhem dhat wer pozest widh devilz.

Wen, wer, weer: |w| is only used as a consonant /w/ – wen, wer, weer; but alau, flou, fiu.

Yii, yu: |y| is only used as a consonant /j/ – yàŋ, yes, yii, yot, yu; but bai, bei, boi.

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32 And ool dhe siti woz gadherd tugedher at dhe dor. 33 And hii hiild meni dhat wer sik ov daiverz diziiziz, and kaast aut meni devilz; and sàferd not dhe devilz tu spiik, bikooz dhei niu him. 34 And in dhe morniŋ, raiziŋ àp a greit wail bifor dei, hii went aut, and dipartid intu a soliteri pleis, and dheer preid. 35 And Saimon and dhei dhat wer widh him foloud aafter him. 36 And wen dhei had faund him, dhei sed àntu him, Ool men siik for dhii. 37 And hii sed àntu dhem, Let às gou intu dhe nekst taunz, dhat ai mei priich dheer oolsou: for dheerfor keim ai forth.

Nekst, siksti: /ks/ is rendered as |ks|, and /gz/ as /gz/ – nekst, siksti, eksentrik, ekselent, egzam, egzajerit.
The prefix |ex| disappears. Those concerned with etymological signs should be reminded of the Italian spelling: esame, esagerato, esotico, eccentrico, eccellente. The third draft follows the Italian approach.
|x| is only left for /x/: lox, Galanax and similar.

38 And hii priicht in dheer sinagogz thruaut Galilii, and kaast aut devilz. 39 And dheer keim a leper tu him, bisiichiŋ him, and niiliŋ daun tu him, and seiiŋ àntu him, If dhau wilt, dhau kanst meik mii kliin. 40 And Jiizus, muuvd widh kompaſon, put forth hiz hand, and tàcht him, and seth àntu him, Ai wil: bii dhau kliin. 41 And az suun az hii had spouken, imiidietli dhe leprosi dipartid from him, and hii woz klenzd. 42 And hii streitli charjd him, and forthwidh sent him awei; 43 And seth àntu him, Sii dhau sei nàthiŋ tu eni man; bàt gou dhai wei, shou dhaiself tu dhe priist, and ofer for dhai klenziŋ dhouz thiŋz wich Mouziz komaandid, for a testimoni àntu dhem. 44 Bàt hii went aut, and bigan tu pàblish it màch, and tu bleiz abroud dhe mater, insoumàch dhat Jiizus kud nou mor oupenli enter intu dhe siti; bàt woz widhaut in dezert pleisiz; and dhei keim tu him from evri kworter.

12

Chapter II

1 And agein hii enterd intu Kapernaum aafter sàm deiz; and it woz noizd dhat hii woz in dhe haus. 2 And streitwei meni wer gadherd tugedher, insoumàch dhat dheer woz nou ruum tu risiiv dhem, nou, not sou màch az abaut dhe dor: and hii priicht dhe wœrd àntu dhem. 3 And dhei kàm àntu him, briŋiŋ wàn sik ov dhe polsi, wich woz born ov for. 4 And wen dhei kud not kàm nai àntu him for dhe pres, dhei ànkàverd dhe ruuf weer hii woz: and wen dhei had brouken it àp, dhei let daun dhe bed weerin dhe sik ov dhe polsi lei. 5 Wen Jiizus soo dheer feith, hii sed àntu dhe sik ov dhe polsi, Sàn, dhai sinz bii forgiven dhii.

Dheer, weer, born: The third draft gives rise to a number of homonyms: dheer (there, their), weer (where, wear), born (born, borne), nou (no, know), sou (so, sow), bai (buy, by) etc.. However, the context can easily reveal their meaning.

6 Bàt dheer wer sœrtan ov dhe skraibz sitiŋ dheer, and riizoniŋ in dheer hartz, 7 wai dàth dhiz man dhàs spiik blasfemiz? huu kan forgiv sinz bàt God ounli? 8 And imiidietli wen Jiizus persiivd in hiz spirit dhat dhei sou riizond widhin dhemselvz, hii sed àntu dhem, Wai riizon yii dhiiz thiŋz in yor hartz? 9 Wedher iz it iizier tu sei tu dhe sik ov dhe polsi, dhai sinz bii forgiven dhii; or tu sei, Araiz, and teik àp dhai bed, and wook? 10 Bàt dhat yii mei nou dhat dhe Sàn ov man hath pauer on œrth tu forgiv sinz, (hii seth tu dhe sik ov dhe polsi,) 11 Ai sei àntu dhii, Araiz, and teik àp dhai bed, and gou dhai wei intu dhain haus. 12 And imiidietli hii arouz, tuk àp dhe bed, and went forth bifor dhem ool; insoumàch dhat dhei wer ool ameizd, and glorifaid God, seiiŋ, Wii never soo it on dhiz faſon.

13

Sœrtan, siti: The fact that |s| appears in cases of etymological |c| illustrates the Italian approach of the third draft: It is more important to reflect pronunciation than etymology. The most serious practice is to dismember |c| into |k| and |s|.

13 And hii went forth agein bai dhe sii said; and ool dhe màltitiud rizortid àntu him, and hii toot dhem. 14 And az hii paast bai, hii soo Liivai dhe sàn ov Olfios sitiŋ at dhe risiit ov kàstom, and sed àntu him, Folou mii. And hii arouz and foloud him. 15 And it keim tu paas, dhat, az Jiizus sat at miit in hiz haus, meni pàblikanz and sinerz sat oolsou tugedher widh Jiizus and hiz disaipelz: for dheer wer meni, and dhei foloud him. 16 And wen dhe skraibz and Farisiiz soo him iit widh pàblikanz and sinerz, dhei sed àntu hiz disaipelz, Hau iz it dhat hii iitith and driŋkith widh pàblikanz and sinerz? 17 Wen Jiizus hœrd it, hii seth àntu dhem, dhei dhat ar houl hav nou niid ov dhe fiziſan, bàt dhei dhat ar sik: Ai keim not tu kool dhe raitſos, bàt sinerz tu ripentans.

18 And dhe disaipelz ov Jon and ov dhe Fariziiz yuzd tu faast: and dhei kàm and sei àntu him, Wai duu dhe disaipelz ov Jon and ov dhe Farisiiz faast, bàt dhai disaipelz faast not? 19 And Jiizus sed àntu dhem, kan dhe children ov dhe braidcheimber faast, wail dhe braidgruum iz widh dhem? az loŋ az dhei hav dhe braidgruum widh dhem, dhei kanot faast. 20 Bàt dhe deiz wil kàm, wen dhe braidgruum shal bii teiken awei from dhem, and dhen shal dhei faast in dhouz deiz. 21 nou man oolsou souith a piis ov niu kloth on an ould garment: els dhe niu piis dhat fild it àp teikith awei from dhi ould, and dhe rent iz meid wœrs. 22 And nou man putith niu wain intu ould botelz: els dhe niu wain dàth bœrst dhe botelz, and dhe wain iz spilt, and dhe botelz wil bii mard: bàt niu wain màst bii put intu niu botelz.

14

Children, cheimber: /tʃ/ is better rendered with Anglo-Norman |ch| than Anglo-Saxon |c|. No language has a uniform use of |c|. Any use of |c| on its own is likely to cause confusion. Thus, Charlz, chaild, chœrch are better than Carlz, caild, cœrc.

23 And it keim tu paas, dhat hii went thruu dhe korn fiildz on dhe sabath dei; and hiz disaipelz bigan, az dhei went, tu plàk dhi ierz ov korn. 24 And dhe Fariziiz sed àntu him, Bihould, wai duu dhei on dhe sabath dei dhat wich iz not looful? 25 And hii sed àntu dhem, Hav yii never red wot Deivid did, wen hii had niid, and woz an hàngrid, hii, and dhei dhat wer widh him? 26 Hau hii went intu dhe haus ov God in dhe deiz ov Abaiathar dhe hai priist, and did iit dhe shoubred, wich iz not looful tu iit bàt for dhe priistz, and geiv oolsou tu dhem wich wer widh him? 27 And hii sed àntu dhem, dhe sabath woz meid for man, and not man for dhe sabath: 28 dheerfor dhe Sàn ov man iz Lord oolsou ov dhe sabath.

Chapter III

1And hii enterd agein intu dhe sinagog; and dheer woz a man dheer wich had a widherd hand. 2 And dhei wocht him, wedher hii wud hiil him on dhe sabath dei; dhat dhei mait akiuz him. 3 And hii seth àntu dhe man wich had dhe widherd hand, Stand forth. 4 And hii seth àntu dhem, iz it looful tu duu gud on dhe sabath deiz, or tu duu iivil? tu seiv laif, or tu kil? Bàt dhei held dheer piis. 5 And wen hii had lukt raund abaut on dhem widh aŋger, biiŋ griivd for dhe hardnes ov dheer hartz, hii seth àntu dhe man, Strech forth dhain hand. And hii strecht it aut: and hiz hand woz ristord houl az dhe àdher. 6 And dhe Fariziiz went forth, and streitwei tuk kaunsel widh dhe heroudianz ageinst him, hau dhei mait distroi him.

15

Sinagog, blasfemi: The pseudo-Greek characters |y rh ph| are dropped. They do not reflect pronunciation, and they are not even accurate in showing etymology. In classical Greece, |ph| (whatever that stands for) was not pronounced /f/.
The greatest homage we can pay to the Greek language is (1) to dismember any |c| into |k| or |s| (for which Greek has kappa or sigma) and (2) to make sure |s| is always /s/ and |z| is always /z/ (for which Greek has sigma and zeta). The Greek approach is the most serious.

7 Bàt Jiizus widhdruu himself widh hiz disaipelz tu dhe sii: and a greit màltitiud from Galilii foloud him, and from Judiia, 8 And from Jerusalem, and from Idumiia, and from biyond Jordan; and dhei abaut Tair and Saidon, a greit màltitiud, wen dhei had hœrd wot greit thiŋz hii did, keim àntu him. 9 And hii speik tu hiz disaipelz, dhat a smool ship shud weit on him bikooz ov dhe màltitiud, lest dhei shud throŋ him. 10 For hii had hiild meni; insoumàch dhat dhei prest àpon him for tu tàch him, az meni az had pleigz. 11 And ànkliin spiritz, wen dhei soo him, fel daun bifor him, and kraid, seiiŋ, dhau art dhe Sàn ov God. 12 And hii streitli charjd dhem dhat dhei shud not meik him noun.

16

13 And hii gouith àp intu a mauntan, and koolith àntu him huum hii wud: and dhei keim àntu him. 14 And hii ordeind twelv, dhat dhei shud bii widh him, and dhat hii mait send dhem forth tu priich, 15 And tu hav pauer tu hiil siknesiz, and tu kaast aut devilz: 16 And Saimon hii sœrneimd Piiter; 17 And Jeimz dhe sàn ov Zebedii, and Jon dhe bràdher ov Jeimz; and hii sœrneimd dhem Bounerjis, wich iz, dhe sànz ov thànder: 18 And Andriu, and Filip, and Bartolomiu, and Mathiu, and Tomas, and Jeimz dhe sàn ov Olfios, and Thadios, and Saimon dhe Kanenait, 19 And Juudas Iskariot, wich oolsou bitreid him: and dhei went intu an haus.

20 And dhe màltitiud kàmith tugedher agein, sou dhat dhei kud not sou màch az iit bred. 21 And wen hiz frendz hœrd ov it, dhei went aut tu lei hould on him: for dhei sed, hii iz bisaid himself. 22 And dhe skraibz wich keim daun from Jerusalem sed, hii hath Bielzebàb, and bai dhe prins ov dhe devilz kaastith hii aut devilz. 23 And hii koold dhem àntu him, and sed àntu dhem in parabelz, Hau kan Seitan kaast aut Seitan? 24 And if a kiŋdom bii divaidid ageinst itself, dhat kiŋdom kanot stand. 25 And if a haus bii divaidid ageinst itself, dhat haus kanot stand. 26 And if Seitan raiz àp ageinst himself, and bii divaidid, hii kanot stand, bàt hath an end. 27 nou man kan enter intu a stroŋ manz haus, and spoil hiz gudz, eksept hii wil fœrst baind dhe stroŋ man; and dhen hii wil spoil hiz haus. 28 Verili ai sei àntu yu, Ool sinz shal bii forgiven àntu dhe sànz ov men, and blasfemiz weerwidh souever dhei shal blasfiim: 29 Bàt hii dhat shal blasfiim ageinst dhe Houli Goust hath never forgivnes, bàt iz in deinjer ov itœrnal damneiſon: 30 bikooz dhei sed, hii hath an ànkliin spirit.

17

Bielzebàb, imiidiet, maitier: Where |ii| renders /iː/, the form |ie| can only be a hiatus: Bi-elzebàb, imiidi-et. To avoid confusion, a diaeresis may be used: Biëlzebàb, imiidiët.
Where |ie| renders /iː/, the hiatus must be indicated: imiediët.
In the comparative and superlative, |ie| never takes diaeresis: maitier, maitiest.

31 Dheer keim dhen hiz bredhren and hiz màdher, and, standiŋ widhaut, sent àntu him, kooliŋ him. 32 And dhe màltitiud sat abaut him, and dhei sed àntu him, Bihould, dhai màdher and dhai bredhren widhaut siik for dhii. 33 And hii anserd dhem, seiiŋ, Huu iz mai màdher, or mai bredhren? 34 And hii lukt raund abaut on dhem wich sat abaut him, and sed, Bihould mai màdher and mai bredhren! 35 For huusouever shal duu dhe wil ov God, dhe seim iz mai bràdher, and mai sister, and màdher.

Chapter IV

1 And hii bigan agein tu tiich bai dhe sii said: and dheer woz gadherd àntu him a greit màltitiud, sou dhat hii enterd intu a ship, and sat in dhe sii; and dhe houl màltitiud woz bai dhe sii on dhe land. 2 And hii toot dhem meni thiŋz bai parabelz, and sed àntu dhem in hiz doktrin, 3 Harken; Bihould, dheer went aut a souer tu sou: 4 And it keim tu paas, az hii soud, sàm fel bai dhe wei said, and dhe faulz ov dhi eer keim and divauerd it àp. 5 And sàm fel on stouni graund, weer it had not màch œrth; and imiidietli it spraŋ àp, bikooz it had nou depth ov œrth: 6 Bàt wen dhe sàn woz àp, it woz skorcht; and bikooz it had nou ruut, it widherd awei. 7 And sàm fel amàŋ thornz, and dhe thornz gruu àp, and choukt it, and it yiildid nou fruut. 8 And àdher fel on gud graund, and did yiild fruut dhat spraŋ àp and inkriist; and broot forth, sàm thœrti, and sàm siksti, and sàm an hàndrid. 9 And hii sed àntu dhem, Hii dhat hath ierz tu hier, let him hier.

18

10 And wen hii woz aloun, dhei dhat wer abaut him widh dhe twelv aaskt ov him dhe parabel. 11 And hii sed àntu dhem, àntu yu it iz given tu nou dhe misteri ov dhe kiŋdom ov God: bàt àntu dhem dhat ar widhaut, ool dhiiz thiŋz ar dàn in parabelz: 12 dhat siiŋ dhei mei sii, and not persiiv; and hieriŋ dhei mei hier, and not ànderstand; lest at eni taim dhei shud bii konvœrtid, and dheer sinz shud bii forgiven dhem. 13 And hii sed àntu dhem, Nou yii not dhiz parabel? and hau dhen wil yii nou ool parabelz?

14 dhe souer souith dhe wœrd. 15 And dhiiz ar dhei bai dhe wei said, weer dhe wœrd iz soun; bàt wen dhei hav hœrd, Seitan kàmith imiidietli, and teikith awei dhe wœrd dhat woz soun in dheer harts. 16 And dhiiz ar dhei laikwaiz wich ar soun on stouni graund; huu, wen dhei hav hœrd dhe wœrd, imiidietli risiiv it widh gladnes; 17 And hav nou ruut in dhemselvz, and sou endiuer bàt for a taim: aafterword, wen aflikſon or persikiuſon araizith for dhe wœrdz seik, imiidietli dhei ar ofendid. 18 And dhiiz ar dhei wich ar soun amàŋ thornz; sàch az hier dhe wœrd, 19 And dhe keerz ov dhiz wœrld, and dhe disiitfulnes ov riches, and dhe làstz ov àdher thiŋz enteriŋ in, chouk dhe wœrd, and it bikàmith ànfruutful. 20 And dhiiz ar dhei wich ar soun on gud graund; sàch az hier dhe wœrd, and risiiv it, and briŋ forth fruut, sàm thœrtifould, sàm siksti, and sàm an hàndrid.

Aflikſon, persikiuſon, imiidiet: Since the King James Version was written, an even greater number of Latin-Romance words with affixes has entered the language. The third draft proposes the following orthographic solutions:

19

Nominal Suffixes (unstressed)

20

Verbal Suffixes (stressed)

Prefixes

21

21 And hii sed àntu dhem, iz a kandel broot tu bii put ànder a bushel, or ànder a bed? and not tu bii set on a kandelstik? 22 For dheer iz nàthiŋ hid, wich shal not bii manifestid; naidher woz eni thiŋ kept siikrit, bàt dhat it shud kàm abroud. 23 If eni man hav iers tu hier, let him hier. 24 And hii sed àntu dhem, Teik hiid wot yii hier: widh wot meʒur yii miit, it shal bii meʒurd tu yu: and àntu yu dhat hier shal mor bii given. 25 For hii dhat hath, tu him shal bii given: and hii dhat hath not, from him shal bii teiken iiven dhat wich hii hath.

26 And hii sed, sou iz dhe kiŋdom ov God, az if a man shud kaast siid intu dhe graund; 27 And shud sliip, and raiz nait and dei, and dhe siid shud spriŋ and grou àp, hii nouith not hau. 28 For dhi œrth briŋith forth fruut ov hœrself; fœrst dhe bleid, dhen dhi ier, aafter dhat dhe ful korn in dhi ier. 29 Bàt wen dhe fruut iz broot forth, imiidietli hii putith in dhe sikel, bikooz dhe harvest iz kàm.

30 And hii sed, Weeràntu shal wii laiken dhe kiŋdom ov God? or widh wot komparizon shal wii kompeer it? 31 It iz laik a grein ov màstard siid, wich, wen it iz soun in dhi œrth, iz les dhan ool dhe siidz dhat bii in dhi œrth: 32 Bàt wen it iz soun, it grouith àp, and bikàmith greiter dhan ool hœrbz, and shuutith aut greit branchiz; sou dhat dhe faulz ov dhi eer mei loj ànder dhe shadou ov it. 33 And widh meni sàch parabelz speik hii dhe wœrd àntu dhem, az dhei wer eibel tu hier it. 34 Bàt widhaut a parabel speik hii not àntu dhem: and wen dhei wer aloun, hii ekspaundid ool thiŋz tu hiz disaipelz.

Spake: “Speik” is the modern realisation of “spake”. Note that at the time the word was pronounced /spɛːk/.

35 And dhe seim dei, wen dhi iiven woz kàm, hii seth àntu dhem, Let às paas ouver àntu dhi àdher said. 36 And wen dhei had sent awei dhe màltitiud, dhei tuk him iiven az hii woz in dhe ship. And dheer wer oolsou widh him àdher litel shipz. 37 And dheer arouz a greit storm ov wind, and dhe weivz biit intu dhe ship, sou dhat it woz nau ful. 38 And hii woz in dhe hainder part ov dhe ship, asliip on a pilou: and dhei aweik him, and sei àntu him, Maaster, keerist dhau not dhat wii perish? 39 And hii arouz, and ribiukt dhe wind, and sed àntu dhe sii, Piis, bii stil. And dhe wind siist, and dheer woz a greit kaam. 40 And hii sed àntu dhem, Wai ar yii sou fierful? hau iz it dhat yii hav nou feith? 41 And dhei fierd eksiidiŋli, and sed wàn tu anàdher, Wot maner ov man iz dhiz, dhat iiven dhe wind and dhe sii obei him?

Zahnpflege ist oft die einzige möglichkeit etwas dauerndes zu hinterlassen. jahrzehnte nach meinem tod wird mein grab dem metaphysischen beobachter bezeugen: bis heute glänzen diese zähne! aber selbstverständlich – ich putze sie nicht umsonst. der scheinbar makabre beitrag ist im grunde eine verewigte dankbarkeit für das leben, ja das greifbare opus magnum des unbekannten. und zwar nicht aus dem grunde weil ich mich à la Epikur ganz hedonistisch von der welt zurückgezogen hätte, nein! zahnpflege ist oft der einzige transzendentale beitrag den die welt einem gelten lässt: dank der bürste, der zahnpasta, der zahnseide – und der nebensächlichen umweltverschmutzung durch plastikentsorgung, die den guten zweck der zahnerlösung gewiss entschuldigt. die ägypter bauten ganze pyramiden für die selbstfeier ihrer leichen. ich bin da ein bisschen diskreter.

ich gedenke des ersten menschen der auf die idee kam, literatur könne einen verewigen. so ein schwachsinn. warum sollten wir durch irgendetwas verewigt werden? erstens ist ewige erinnerung rein kosmologisch nicht möglich: irgendwann geht die welt zu ende – wir auch. da wird es keine rolle spielen wer was leistete. die zeitspanne aller menschlichen existenz wird nur eine flüchtige sekunde sein.

1

zweitens haben sich die zivilisatorischen hoffnungen der weltveränderer nicht erfüllt. wer soll der grösste literat denn sein? Homer? aber der wird immer weniger gelesen, und die wenigen leser macht das lesen nicht besser. die demographie spricht für sich allein gegen jedes zivilisatorische ideal. die menschheit wächst schneller als es möglich ist alle menschen durch erziehung und kritische bildung aufzuklären. selbst der wille zur aufklärung ist nicht selbstverständlich – kultur, bildung, zivilisation sind abstrakte begriffe für wenige menschen. die ethischen und politischen prinzipien die sich aus ihnen herleiten sind für den grössten teil der menschheit nur vage greifbar – demokratie, menschenrechte, rechtsstaatlichkeit. was für eine resonanz haben diese worte in Afrika, in China, wo die meisten menschen geboren werden? selbst etablierte länder in Europa tun sich oft schwer mit edlen abstraktionen. man will einfache lösungen: jobs für alle, weniger ausländer, mehr netflix, ein bisschen facebook, und das wars. wer braucht denn zivilisation?

wer unter diesen umständen sich als »schriftsteller« verewigen will, der muss sich verkalkuliert haben: mit der demographischen explosion kommt das zeitalter des vergessens. in der überwältigenden masse des prekariats (früher hätte man proletariat gesagt) vergisst ein jeder sich selbst und ignoriert alle anderen. es ist die hektik des überlebens. das buch verwandelt sich in ein prähistorisches artefakt, an seiner stelle treten das smartphone und seine unterhaltungen.

2

drittens ist selbst die theologische rechtfertigung des verewigungswahns schwach. okay, vielleicht freut sich Gott dass du den nobelpreis kriegst, vielleicht ist das deine mission, dein schicksal sogar. aber ist das wahrscheinlich? im garten eden gab es nicht mal ein buch, mein lieber. und wenn du dich so freust dass du mit Gottes hilfe soviel verkaufst, woher weisst du dass Gott nicht eher die faxen dicke hat von deiner einbildung – dass du hinter all deinen kleinlichen erfolgen die nur dir selbst nutzen seine lenkende hand siehst? ich habe keine zeit für diese art metaphysik, und es ist sehr schwer ein ausgewogenes verhältnis zu pflegen. die meisten halten entweder nichts davon oder so viel dass sie sich als auserwählte sehen. sie brauchen keine selbstkritik weil sie schon im voraus wissen dass Gott sie sowieso billigt. mit gottbegnadeten kann man nicht debattieren. das sind also die kosmologische, die zivilisatorische und die theologische aporie des verewigtwerdens.

Im süssen hauch der irrelevanz

ich sass vor kurzem im garten als plötzlich ein rotkehlchen auf mein knie landete und mich anstarrte. gewiss ein wunder, für mich die göttlichste erfahrung, die kurzfristige verewigung eines vogels in mir selbst für den rest meiner tage. dieses unvergessliche gefühl – der griff der kleinen klauen auf meiner haut und meine quasi-träne: ein vogel berührte mich wortwörtlich, ein scheues wesen von dem man diese fast innige nähe nicht erwartet. ich blieb sehr ruhig, ja unbeweglich in der hoffnung auf das ende des endes: höre doch auf, du blöde zeit, lass dies der einzige augenblick meines lebens sein. auf meinem schoss lag ein buch – alles ist vergänglich, verlangen ist leiden, es gibt kein selbst. und plötzlich war der vogel hin.

3

ein akkord verblieb in meinem kopf – von Schuberts vertonung: »er ist hin, vergebens, ach vergebens«. schöne, wunderschöne grüsse von Schiller. die melancholie des edel naiven. ich müsste mich schämen dass ich den vogel erwähne und damit erwähne was schon so viele so oft vor mir erfuhren. es ist schon zu einem banalen bild geworden, klischeehaft und kitschig. mein trost ist dass meine worte nichts zählen. ich existiere nicht. ich schwebe im süssen hauch der irrelevanz. ich am schreiben gleiche dem wind am wehen. was wird denn von uns bleiben? der wind ist auch trost wenn er ganz leicht die blätter eines grossen baumes bewegt und niemand es merkt. was kann ich wahrheit nennen? mir scheint zuweilen, die wahre schönheit der dinge existiert um unbemerkt zu bleiben. zu versinken in metaphysischem vergessen.

es wird abend. erzähl einem menschen in Afrika, er soll weniger ficken. erzähl einem der jungfrauen vergewaltigt weil das angeblich AIDS heilt, er soll kondome benutzen. die demographische explosion wird nicht aufhören. vielleicht ist unverhüteter sex die einzige freude, wenn auch eine krankhafte, in den erdteilen ohne bildung und infrastruktur. vielleicht ist das die rache der elenden an einer zivilisation die nichts für sie übrig hat: fuck that. abstrakte argumente helfen nicht weiter, auch wenn die konzeption der menschheit als etwas edles und würdiges nur abstraktem denken entspringen kann.

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es gehört zur aporie der zivilisation: die aufklärung soll alle erreichen, doch die gesellschaft kann nur funktionieren wenn möglichst viele von der aufklärung ausgeschlossen werden. denn jemand muss die strasse fegen, am besten einer der nicht zu viel kritisiert. es gibt aber keine aufklärung ohne gesellschaftskritik. die politische hoffnung auf bevölkerungszuwachs ist eine grausamkeit. sie grenzt an menschenverachtung. wenn menschen gezeugt werden sollen damit sie autos bauen, dann ist es eher menschenliebe als verachtung zu wünschen, sie sollten gar nicht gezeugt werden. menschenliebe wäre die erwartung, sie mögen geboren werden um sich im bewusstsein ihrer würde aufzuklären. der wunsch nach bevölkerungszuwachs als eine raffiniertere art viehzucht für industrie und dienstleistung ist verstörend. wenn der endzweck dieser industriellen menschenzucht ist menschen zu zeugen damit sie sich wie pferde und roboter benehmen, dann ist es pragmatischer pferde und roboter zu züchten.

Ihr regime ist die demokratie der Sokrates-mörder.

die alternative ist viel gefährlicher. der ungehinderte zuwachs einer desensibilisierten masse ohne jeglichen kulturellen ehrgeiz, deren indoktrinierter lebenszweck bloss ein guter job und ein bisschen facebook ist, und die zugleich volle politische rechte im staate wahrnimmt, kann sich nur als eine demokratiezerstörende kraft erweisen. ihr regime ist die demokratie der Sokrates-mörder. ja, die griechen hatten keine gerechte gesellschaftsordnung, aber zweierlei können wir von ihnen lernen:

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erstens, demokratie ist nicht nur eine verfassungsrechtliche technikalität. stabile gesetze, regelmässige wahlen und volksentscheide. sonst wäre ein volksentscheid über die todesstrafe legitim. hauptsache, die technische prozedur stimmt. es wäre legitim jemanden zu wählen der verspricht jüdische bürger in einem KZ zu sperren. das ist volkstyrannei. demokratie hingegen ist eine freiheitliche gesinnung: der mensch ist frei und der staat ist die bühne seiner freiheit. aber freiheit darf nicht fremde vergasen, denn:

zweitens, demokratische freiheit darf nicht verstanden werden als die blosse möglichkeit sich durch handel zu bereichern. sie ist die freiheit anders zu sein und zu denken und sich entsprechend zu äussern. aus dieser freiheit zum pluralismus erwächst das bewusstsein einer freiheit sich aufzuklären um sich in der vielfalt der meinungen zu orientieren. diese orientierung ist aber so wichtig dass die freiheit zur aufklärung zu einer demokratischen pflicht wird, ohne welche jede demokratie untergeht.

so gibt es zwei arten von demokratie: eine bedienungsemokratie, in der eine tyrannische masse nur mit rechtlichen technikalitäten wie regelmässige wahlen und volksentscheide bedient wird; und eine gesinnungsdemokratie, der darüber hinaus eine freiheitliche gesinnung zugrundeliegt, eine haltung zur würde des menschen aus der in jedem eine bürgerliche pflicht zur aufklärung erwächst.

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das unglaubliche war dass mein vogel kurz danach zurückkam. diesmal landete er auf die spitze meines schuhes – ich sass nämlich mit gekreuzten beinen. mein herz war naiv und selbsttrügerisch und voller hoffnungen über die natur des vogels. aber rotkehlchen sind sehr besitzergreifend. die wunderliche nähe, die ich so gern als liebeserklärung aufgefasst hätte, war im grunde eine herausforderung. der herr des gartens trat an und blickte mich gebieterisch an: alter, was machst du in meinem revier? verpiss dich!

Eine lange strasse im mondschein

der herr des gartens, der geliebte freche herr meines gartens der nur ihm, nur ihm gehörte! was wäre denn aus seinem garten ohne ihn? ich erinnere mich gerne an jene bank unter den duftenden bäumen, an die stillen nachmittage und abende da ich Dowlands laute hörte – ich nannte sie frühlingsmusik, die Lachrimae, die Seven Teares für laute und violen, wobei Lachrimae Verae mein lieblingsstück war. sooft ich den duft des jasmins und des geissblatts spüre, denke ich an die musik. früher ging ich zu spaziergängen unter den bäumen mit dem kontrapunkt im kopf. eine lange strasse im mondschein bis zum see, an der grenze vom tag zur nacht.

eines tages schrieb ich einen musikgelehrten an, inspiriert durch die frechheit des rotkehlchen. dieser musiker hatte eine imposante webseite in der die kunst des klavierauszuges so leicht erschien dass ich ihm sofort eine e-mail schickte, zwei zeilen nur. ach, wenn ich mindestens einen klavierauszug von Lachrimae Verae hätte. es gab überhaupt keine aussicht dass jener unbekannte mir einen klavierauszug des kontrapunkts schenkte aus reiner menschenliebe, nur weil der kontrapunkt mir so viel bedeutete. und dennoch wollte ich diese unzumutbare bitte verewigen. es war ein heroischer tag, und auch ein ironischer. es gibt eine erhabene ironie in allem was aussichtslos und zugleich edel ist. es ist eine stoische ironie die ich in mir trage und mit dem notargument zusammenfasse:

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es ist völlig aussichtslos das edle projekt P anzufangen.
also fange ich das edle projekt P an.

denn es ist viel schöner an einem edlen unterfangen zu scheitern als ein unedles ziel zu erreichen. der erlösende scherz hat mich mehr erfüllt als mancher sieg. zynismus ist keine option – auch nicht in der schlechtest möglichen welt. daher meine eitle zahnpflege und meine worte für den wind. und meine gedanken zur demokratie. ich bin sehr privilegiert in der abendmusse meines gartens, versunken unter hohen bäumen und menschlichem vergessen, wandernd im schatten meiner kindheitserinnerungen.

und dennoch habe ich ein metaphysisches mitleid mit meinen nicht-existierenden mitmenschen die gefahr laufen in einer welt jenseits der aufklärung gezeugt zu werden. ich kann keinem europäer mit reinem gewissen zugrunde legen ein kind zu bekommen. der nachschub aus Afrika und Asien wird ohnehin für demographischen ausgleich sorgen. oder haben wir kein mitleid mehr? ich gedenke auch jener menschen in ihrem leideszug durch wüsten und meere, den unbewussten kreuzzug der verzweifelten gegen ein Europa der gleichgültigen, das elend der ertrunkenen und anderer die das leben verloren in der billigen hoffnung autos für deutsche strassen zu bauen.

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kinderwunsch gehört auch zum verewigungswahn. manche fühlen sich zu schwach um die welt zu verändern und gönnen sich die faule vorstellung, sie müssen als sühnenden beitrag für die welt kinder zeugen. sie lullen sich in die hoffnung ein, die welt warte nur auf ihre kinder. andere sind so von sich überzeugt dass sie denken, sie brauchen kinder um ihren gesellschaftlichen erfolg zu bezeugen – reich werden, heiraten, kinder kriegen: automatisch, selbstverständlich, tut sowieso jeder.

ist es nicht ein akt der grausamkeit dass ein mensch gezeugt werden soll um im strudel menschenverachtender erwartungen aus der gesellschaft und des egoistischen verewigungswahns seiner eltern instrumentalisiert zu werden? ist es nicht eine existenzielle verschwendung in eine welt geworfen zu werden in der alle zivilisatorischen ideale gescheitert sind? wenn einem schon die wahl gegeben ist, eine vermehrung des menschlichen leidens, individuell und kollektiv, durch einfache verhütungsmethoden zu vermeiden, dann ist es grausam solch eine wahl zu verwerfen.

Von massenhafter menschenverachtung

zur aporie der aufklärung gehört auch die demokratie. ich wiederhole: unsere gesellschaftsordnung funktioniert nur wenn möglichst viele menschen von der aufklärung ausgeschlossen werden. aber eine nur halbwegs aufgeklärte gesellschaft ist nicht demokratiefähig. ihre bedienungsdemokratie fördert massenhafte menschenverachtung. dabei galt die demokratie als die grösste politische errungenschaft der zivilisation – je länger ich die strasse fegen muss je weniger zeit habe ich um Immanuel Kant zu lesen.

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es müsste nicht so sein dass einige nur strassen fegen und andere nur Kant lesen. fifty-fifty würde auch gehen. für mich wäre das eine art meditation, eine selbsttherapeutische tätigkeit. aber in einer welt voller Kallikles findet der gedanke wenig resonanz. populärer ist das motto: reichtum, ruhm und vergnügen. so viele kinder wie möglich. und so neigt sich die zivilisation, wenn es noch eine gibt oder je gegeben, ihrem ende. zu viele menschen. konflikte. zu viel gewalt. am ende die gewissheit und das paradoxon: im untergang der aufklärung, der zivilisation, ja der ganzen menschheit triumphiert der tiefste überlebensinstinkt in all seiner brutalität.

und dann wundert man sich wenn leute wie Schopenhauer dem volk gegenüber misstrauisch sind. wenn Hitlerjugend-veteranen anfangen parteien zu gründen, wenn reichstagsbrandstifter einzug in den reichstag finden, dann ist es so weit. erzähl mir bitte nicht, ich solle mich freuen auf die geburt eines menschenlebens am rande der aufklärung zur blossen perpetuierung einer destruktiven masse. onaniere lieber vor einer mülltonne und entsorge dort deinen samen.

ich hatte vor kurzem einen traum: das friedliche und allmähliche absterben des homo sapiens durch kollektiven verzicht auf fortpflanzung. wir gaben uns die hände und sangen:

imagine all the people...

doch plötzlich erschien Paul VI in einer wolke, eine kopie von Humanae Vitae unter dem arm, und ich lauschte seinem gespräch mit dem Chor der Letzten:

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PAUL VI: warum hört ihr auf, ihr kinder, euch fortzupflanzen?
CHOR: die kiste ist voll.
PAUL VI: vermehrt euch, vermehrt euch!
CHOR: wie jetzt? sind die ganzen milliarden nicht genug oder was?
PAUL VI: nö, passt alles, alles passt.
CHOR: zehn milliarden auch?
PAUL VI: ja, locker!
CHOR: hundert milliarden?
PAUL VI: kriegen wir hin.
CHOR: hundert trillionen?
PAUL VI: keine obergrenze! macht weiter bis ihr einander erstickt!
CHOR: alter, das ist krank von dir.
PAUL VI: sag mal, leute, was für eine lebenseinstellung ist das? verdammt nochmal, vermehrt euch!

(der listige chor berät unter sich wie er des papstes plan sabotieren kann.)

CHOR: weisst du was, opa Paul?
PAUL VI: ja, was denn?
CHOR: wir treten der kirche bei.
PAUL VI: och Gott, das ist aber hübsch von euch!
CHOR: jopp! wir werden alle mönche und nonnen. nie wieder ficken. wir schaffen das!
PAUL VI: ihr könnt mich doch mal! (ab.)

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(und so ging die spezies friedlich und kirchenkonform zu ende. ja, gut, ein paar seitensprünge mit den nonnen gab es ab und zu, ja, aber die hatten sowieso kondome, alles ganz diskret und so weiter und so fort.)

es gibt ja träume die man nicht vergisst. aber die realität ist: « il faut cultiver notre jardin ». vielleicht ist Gregory Names siedlung doch eine voltaire’sche antwort auf die aporie der zivilisation. gartenpflege ist die beste therapie. du reisst unkraut aus und es wächst wieder. was willst du denn gegen giersch tun? es ist ein zyklus. er schlägt wieder aus, du reisst ihn dann aus. es bleibt immer raum für gemüse, heilkräuter, zierpflanzen. man muss es nur wollen. aber wenn unkraut schon den ganzen garten übernommen hat, mein lieber, dann ist es schwer. schade um die keime die du dort pflanzen willst.

mein beitrag ist zahnpflege und ein bisschen geschwätz: nicht das gepränge der preisträger, sondern die worte derer die nichts zu verlieren haben. ich frage immer noch warum alles erhabene den meisten einerlei ist. es ist aber so gewiss wie der tod dass deine zähne dich überleben werden. pflege sie gut – oder spare fürs krematorium.

O incêndio do Museu Nacional no Rio de Janeiro, que tem me entristecido mais do que a morte, também me lembrou duma passagem de Totila. Quando em 547 d.C. o rei dos (ostro)godos decide destruir Roma, incendeia parte da cidade e manda despovoá-la. Fato único na história, Roma ficou desabitada por dois anos. É nesse contexto que imagino o drama dum fiel cidadão tentando salvar do fogo uma estátua de Fídias, e é esta reflexão sobre a história das pedras que quero dividir com o leitorado.

Aproveito um ensejo que esperava ser, confesso, muito mais feliz, para explicar algumas das formas épicas que porventura não tenham ficado claras à primeira vista. Incluirei, portanto, umas notas de rodapé para anotar tanto as formas (a) arcaicas, que ocorrem e estão documentadas no português antigo (muitas das quais se pode consultar no Glossário da Poesia Medieval), quanto as formas (b) arcaizantes, que são licenças épicas eufônicas (descritas no ensaio Prosódia e Grafia, 2017) sem ocorrência histórica.

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EXCERTO ANOTADO DE

TOTILA

Eustácio de Sales

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KAROLVS, gratia Dei rex Francorum¹ et Langobardorum ac patricius Romanorum, Baugulfo abbati et omni congregationi, tibi etiam commissis fidelibus oratoribus nostris in omnipotentis Dei nomine amabilem direximus salutem.

Notum igitur sit Deo placitae devotioni vestrae, quia nos una cum fidelibus nostris consideravimus utile esse, ut episcopia et monasteria nobis Christo propitio ad gubernandum commissa praeter regularis vitae ordinem atque sanctae religionis conversationem etiam in litterarum meditationibus eis qui donante Domino discere possunt secundum uniuscuiusque capacitatem docendi studium debeant impendere, qualiter, sicut regularis norma honestatem morum, ita quoque docendi et discendi instantia ordinet et ornet seriem verborum, ut, qui Deo placere appetunt recte vivendo, ei etiam placere non negligant recte loquendo. Scriptum est enim: “Aut ex verbis tuis iustificaberis, aut ex verbis tuis condemnaberis.”

Quamvis enim melius sit bene facere quam nosse, prius tamen est nosse quam facere. Debet ergo quisque discere quod optat implere, ut tanto uberibus quid agere debeat intelligat anima, quanto in omnipotentis Dei laudibus sine mendaciorum offendiculis cucurrerit lingua. Nam cum omnibus hominibus vitanda sint mendacia, quanto magis illi secundum possibilitatem declinare debent, qui ad hoc solummodo probantur electi, ut servire specialiter debeant veritati.

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Nam cum nobis in his annis a nonnullis monasteriis saepius scripta dirigerentur, in quibus, quod pro nobis fratres ibidem commorantes in sacris et piis orationibus decertarent, significaretur, cognovimus in plerisque praefatis conscriptionibus eorundem et sensus rectos et sermones incultos; quia, quod pia devotio interius fideliter dictabat, hoc exterius propter negligentiam discendi lingua inerudita exprimere sine reprehensione non valebat. Unde factum est, ut timere inciperemus, ne forte, sicut minor erat in scribendo prudentia, ita quoque et multo minor esset quam recte esse debuisset in sanctarum scripturarum ad intelligendum sapientia. Et bene novimus omnes, quia, quamvis periculosi sint errores verborum, multo periculosiores sunt errores sensuum.

Quamobrem hortamur vos litterarum studia non solum non negligere, verum etiam humillima et Deo placita intentione ad hoc certatim discere, ut facilius et rectius divinarum scripturarum mysteria valeatis penetrare. Cum autem in sacris paginis schemata, tropi et caetera his similia inserta inveniantur, nulli dubium est, quod ea unusquisque legens tanto citius spiritualiter intelligit, quanto prius in litterarum magisterio plenius instructus fuerit. Tales vero ad hoc opus viri eligantur, qui et voluntatem et possibilitatem discendi et desiderium habeant alios instruendi. Et hoc tantum ea intentione agatur, qua devotione a nobis praecipitur.

Optamus enim vos, sicut decet ecclesiae milites, et interius devotos et exterius doctos castosque bene vivendo et scholasticos bene loquendo, ut, quicunque vos propter nomen Domini et sanctae conversationis nobilitatem ad videndum expetierit, sicut de aspectu vestro aedificatur visus, ita quoque de sapientia vestra, quam in legendo seu cantando perceperit, instructus omnipotenti Domino gratias agendo gaudens redeat. Huius itaque epistolae exemplaria ad omnes suffragantes tuosque coepiscopos et per universa monasteria dirigi non negligas, si gratiam nostram habere vis.

INDEX

Lingua Torta Lingua Pulcherrima

Aesthetica nostrae aetatis vertitur tamquam sub umbra paradeigmatos originalitatis, quod nomen adhibeo secundum consuetam proprietatem. Gregorius Advena

Aspés d’une Orthographe Accordée

Les langue n’on pa de propriétère. Elle sont un phénomène o-dessu des peï e des institution. Chacune èt un patrimoane universel. Georges Louis

Contingency in Nogueira’s Poetry

Literature has often been a perfect field for sensibility to meet contingency. Why should human beings be so exposed to strikes of fate? Gregory Name

Als das Kind Musik Entdeckte

Beethoven kam als ich zehn war. ich sah die schallplatte und ging einen moralischen vertrag mit meinem onkel ein: wenn er sie kaufe, müsse ich sie hören. Georg Solz

Sessenta e Seis Variações em Bilac

A variação é uma prática musical. altera um tema original por diferentes repetições e reiterações, como no opus 13 de Schumann, os Estudos Sinfônicos. Gregório Barbosa

Midel Kàltſur, Midel Reis

For meni piipel, dhe wœrld shud bikàm a set ov skaterd houlz weer peti traibz haid in heitrid and kontempt ov iich àdher. Gregory Name

The Carolingian 2018 I: Articles and Essays

The contributions from the last edition are still available. This is a good chance to read them if you haven’t yet. The Carolingian

Les langue n’on pa de propriétère. Elle sont un phénomène o-dessu des peï e des institution. Chacune èt un patrimoane universel que sœlemen l’espri d’idéologie pourrèt identifier avec un concept de nation. Ocune nation n’è le segnœr de la langue qu’elle parle: Ce n’è pa la nation qui définie la langue, mème quan c’è la langue qui définie la nation.

Ce que l’on appelle langue francèse è quelque chose de plu viœs que la France: Elle étè déja parlée avan que le concept de France n’existà. Il èt impréci de l’appeler francèse simplemen parce qu’elle è parlée en France. Il y a différence entre langue de France e langue francèse. Francèse serè la langue créée par la France.

Ce qui existè d’abor, c’étè la Gole de l’Empire romèn, don la langue étè le bas Latin. Cet ancien Latin Gallique è devenu contemporèn, c’è tou. France e francè son des concept politique. Le pœple des Franc qui s’établi en Gole, e don le nom origina le nom de France, ne put imposer sa langue francique. Celle-ci serè la sœle à laquelle l’épithète “francèse” sorè s’appliquer. E pourtan, ce pœple-là adopta le Latin Gallique.

Il fo convenir de la prémisse essentielle don nou devon partir: Les langue moderne sont écrite ossi que parlée, et il fo lœr conférer une écriture qui reflète lœr réalité orale. Si l’on di A, on ne doa pas écrire B. Si l’on di B, on ne doa pas écrire A.

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L’oralité è le phénomène original oquel l’écriture doa se soumettre. Fère le contrère serèt artificiel. Il serè prétendre que cœs qui dise A soudèn doave dire B – soa parce que l’on trouve B plu bo ou parce que l’on disè B dans un age archéologique. Mè la vie des langue è l’oralité: La langue écrite mè non parlée è censée morte, tandi que langue non écrite e pourtan parlée èt censée vivante. Le devoar de l’écriture è celui de fournir un appara fiable à la conversion graphique.

La première objection è compréhensible: Soumettre l’écriture à l’oralité serè rendre l’écrire ossi volatile que le parler. L’orthographe doat ètre un appara plu rigide e capable d’orienter l’oralité. Lorsque des mode nouvelle surgisse, l’orthographe serèt encore là pour avertir l’oralité et empecher des changemen frivole. Ènsi l’écriture donnerèt-elle stabilité à l’oralité.

L’argument è pertinen. Il è question de savoar, pourtan, s’il s’applique à notre cas. L’oralité a besoan de la stabilité que l’orthographe lui offre, e la bonne orthographe ne doa pa se soumettre o premier changement oral. Néanmoan, les changemens en question ne son pa de frivilotés. Il s’agi de fets accompli provenan du moyen age, réalité que l’on ne pœt effacer. La disparition du |s| ou la métamorphose de |oi| en |oa| ne son pa de vices passager. Conserver ces forme perdue ne fera pa les gens revenir à prononcer le |s| de hommes ou à dire loi comme en Italien se di voi.

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C’èt ici que se pose la seconde objection: L’orthographe doa respecter l’histoare de la langue. Elle doat enregistrer des piste sur l’origine des mot, afin qu’il y è un dialogue entre présent e passé de la tradition. L’écriture ne doa pa se réduire à une transcription phonétique. Pour cela, il y a déja l’alphabé phonétique international (API).

Encore une foa, il y a pertinence. La question ici n’è pa l’argument en soa, mè la mesure de son application. Il ne fo pa fère de l’orthographe un accordéon phonétique, pret à changer à tort e à droat avec le moandre changemen sonore. Mè il ne fo pa non plu transformer l’orthographe en musée archéologique. Ce son dœs attitudes extreme. L’espri muri èt apellé à en trouver l’équilibre. L’orthographe doa fère justice à l’histoare de l’écriture, mè le pris de cet effor ne pœt ètre une discrépance irrésonnable entre l’oralité e l’écriture. Le pris ne pœt ètre celui d’écrire B où l’on dit A. Si la priorité è rendre un service à l’histoare du Latin Gallique, on pœt ensegner le Latin classique e l’ancien Latin Gallique en toute les école. Quaqu’il soa résonnable que la graphie des mot révèle quelque chose de lœr origine, il ne fo pa lesser un juste souci devenir une obsession esthétique.

Je m’adresse à vou, bien sûr, qui condamné tou changement e ne voulé pa que l’on écrive « ils étè » o liœ de « ils étaient » comme vous écrivé. Pourtan, résonnés un pœ: Si le but èt enregistrer des pistes historiques à tou pris, il ne fodrè pas écrire « j’ai vu la table », mè pluto « j’abe vuseam la tabuleam » tout en prononçan / ʒevyla’tabl /. Ça serè pœt-ètre le rève du parti archéologique: « J’abe désjàm vuseam la tabuleam, messeigneoures, adsediéts-vous toutos avecques mohi s’ille vobus plaîsit ». Voala une orthographe plène de conscience historique ! E vou savé trè bien que l’orthographe actuelle n’è pa trè loan de cette caricature. C’è pourqua je vou propose: « J’é déja vu la table, messiœr, asseyé-vou tous avec moa s’il vou plè ».

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En d’otres terme, je propose une orthographe accordée à la réalité orale des dernier siècle. Cet accord orthographique se fèt en troas étape:

Valœr formelle: Les lettre n’on pa de valœr sonore naturelle. Elle son des signe graphiques oquel, par convention, l’alphabé attribue des valœr formelle: Telle e telle lettre s’appelle ceci e cela. Ça fésan, l’alphabé lœr donne un son. La fonction de l’alphabet è celle d’attribuer à chaque lettre une valœr sonore unique. Voaci la valœr formelle. La fonction de l’orthographe èt appliquer à chaque lettre sa valœr formelle, e sœlemen la valœr formelle.

L’ajustemen vocalique

L’ajustemen vocalique consiste à accorder les voayelle à lœr valœr formelle. Ce qui è prononcé /a/, ne doat ètre écri qu’avec |a|; /e/ avec |e| etc. Mè c’è dan les diphtongue (e digramme) que surgisse plusiœr problème, car lœr valœr formelle doa représenter la valœr de chaque voayelle.

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La tradition a établi la graphie des diphtongues e digramme suivan: ai, au, ei, eu, ie, oi, ou, ue, ui. Ènsi, l’union formelle de |a| e |i| doa produire |ai| comme il è prononcé en travail. Tout otre usage èt erroné. Or il n’è pa coéren d’ajouter |a| e |i|, qui on des valœr trè distincte, pour les fère prononcer comme |e|. C’èt écrire A où l’on di B.

Par l’ajustemen vocalique, l’orthographe accordée réserve |ai| exclusivemen pour les cas d’accord avec la valœr formelle: bataille, maille, travail etc. Dan les otre cas, la graphie subira l’ajustemen proportionnel:

maison	méson
faire	fère
mais	mès
Romain	Romèn
pouvait	pouvèt
liaison	lieson
maître	mêtre

Suivan le mème principe, il fot appliquer o diphtongue du Latin Gallique les ajustemen qui suive:

I. Les diphtongue |ai| e |ei| demeure où prononcée comme en bataille, travail, oreille, soleil. Otremen, on écri |e, é, è|, selon les règle d’accentuation, oquelles il fodra ajouter les terminéson -è e -èn en certèns cas.

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II. Le digramme |au| è remplacé par |o|. III. La diphtongue |oi| è remplacée par |oa|. IV. Le digramme |eu| è remplacé par |u| dan le verbe avoar e |œ| dan les otre cas. V. Les forme |ie, ou, ue, ui| restent.

Concernan |au| e |ai|, noté les formes ancienne cler, povre, per que la Renessance refi clair, pauvre, pair (lat. clarus, pauper, par), tout en lessan oreille, mer, or o liœ de aureille, mair, aur (lat. auricula, mar, aurum). L’orthographe accordée fini avec cette inconsistance.

L’ajustemen ne s’applique pas à |ou|, don la valœr formelle è /oy:/, qui n’existe pas en Latin Gallique. Ce digramme è la meillœre option pour rendre /uː/, car |u| à déja la valœr /y:/. Pourtan, dan l’écriture manuelle, il è permi de rendre /uː/ avec |ū|: ūvrir, pūvoar, fūrnir, amūr, hibū, Lūis, Strasbūr. Noté que “amur” è la forme utilisée dan les Sermen de Strasbour.

Les règle d’usage des accen égu e grave reste. Avec l’accen grave, -èn tradui l’ajustemen de -ain e -ein: sènt, mèn, romèn, pèndre, pèntre. Les terminéson contenant un |ai| ouver devienne |è|, mème si cela marque la fin du mot: parèt-il, il parè; savèt-il, il savè; francè parfé, francès imparfé, francèse; tu chanterè la chanson, tu chanterès une chanson; les fille chanterè volontier, la fille chanterèt alor.

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L’accen circonflexe comme marque de disparition d’une lettre disparè: Paques, ame, age, epitre, hopital, role, théatre, diplome. Sur |e|, il devien grave: connètre, mème, prètre, fenètre. Il reste comme discriminant orthographique: mètre [mesure], mêtre [savan], dû, crû, mûr, sûr, jeûne.

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12

Literature is a perfect field for sensibility to meet contingency. Why should a being capable of so much compassion be so exposed to strikes of fate? The Greeks’ φθόνος θεοῦ, the envy of fate, the Romans’ ruthless fortuna will rage, and what we call “human dignity” has no claim to lay upon this brutality. “What happens to one may happen to any”, warned Seneca, and in relation to the hours of human life, the old saying adds: “All strike, the last one kills”.

The conflict between fate and sensibility is one of the existential paradoxes of literature. On the one hand, literature that ignores it is so trivial that it becomes self-defeating. On the other hand, literature that focuses on that is bound to become repetitive and redundant – repetitive, because every great writer has treated this question and few answers, if any, were found; redundant, because there is no way out of contingency, no matter how loud you lament.

Érico Nogueira seemed unimpressed when he staged another encounter of fate and sensibility in his narrative poem Farra do Boi – A Merriment of Bulls, or, more freely if I may, Avenida Paulista: São Paulo’s prestigious street becomes the theatre of an explicit existential debate when a nameless Job loses everything at once and brings his despair to the pedestrians.

1

Luckily enough, he finds interlocutors! Luckily, because in a world of strangers dealing with strangers nobody owes anything to anybody. It is a rare victory of compassion that this victim of fate finds an audience at all.

What follows is a judge, a priest, a girl and a duo of guitar players engaging in a sometimes surreal debate on the conditio humana – a very old debate, argued from the perspective of people from different backgrounds. It is remarkable that, for this exchange of arguments, Nogueira chose the chaotic urban setting of an extremely pluralistic society, a city where socio-cultural differences often lead to tension and mutual contempt among citizens. In this setting, where all kinds of inequality meet, the brutality of contingency becomes most visible.

The poem begins with a strike: Suddenly, a rich and erudite man “wanted more without more, something more, a something-know-not-what” (line 6-7) expressing an existential longing for purpose that comfort could not fulfil. And he is given what he asked for, “when the dog howled to the moon” and something “urinated a fire from heaven” (l. 10-11) that struck his head. He loses everything and finds himself homeless in the Paulista. Understandably, his first lament refers to those who, after being poor and becoming rich, find it difficult to become poor again: “Beware the horn of a goat on a donkey’s head” (28). Here, the judge intervenes: those who fail, fail on their own account. Contingency in terms of social inequality is justified by the immoral lack of initiative of the poor, a recurrent argument in the theology and teleology of capitalism.

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The homeless man will hardly take that: those who prosper, answers he, do not always deserve it, for “there are deaf people who live in the flute”¹ (54), while those who claim but little lack even the hat to cover their heads from the fire of heaven. Yet his claim begs the question: Is such a hat really little, or would it not be rather the triumph of human agency over contingency?

Ironically, it is a priest who, stopping by, suggests that there is no explanation for the strikes of fate: “I understand when you say ‘why me’, but there is no why” (76-77). The only thing that is left is “to be silent, droop your head and listen” (80), perhaps a modern version of medieval resignation. The argumentative climax is achieved in a young woman’s speech which, concluding from the previous ones, states our condition of existential equality inasmuch as we are all being “crushed by an invisible hand” (91) and this is nobody’s fault. Yet if this is true, this bitter equality is such that social inequality can no longer be teleologically justified, as if some had a claim to be more equal than the others, as if the “the disconcertion were well-concerted” (97).

The later appearance of a duo of guitar players reminding the public of Job’s patience does not change the bitter taste left by the woman’s words. Not because patience is useless. But because in the book of Job, God’s answer does not do justice to Job’s lament. Job wants to solve the theodicy insofar as it touches his own life, while God’s speech only presents a cosmological argument. Job and God are talking at cross-purposes. It is ironic, indeed, that Job’s friends’ advice proves more useful, and it is as Job’s friends that the guitar players arrive.

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After an exchange of banter with the young woman, the players appear bemused by the fact that genetics makes all of us different: “Fingerprint is fate, and no two people’s thumbs are equal!” (129-131). It is the judge who concludes, from this premise, that all are equal inasmuch as all are subject to the same contingency that makes all different – genetically and socially. Here the debate ends. This, however, is where fortuna strikes and the poem’s action is played. When a spell of torrential rain begins, the interlocutors run around looking for shelter, and in the confusion of storm and thunder the homeless man is overrun and deadly injured. He dies while the priest is still calling for an ambulance. The whiteness of his eyes “made up for his confession” (177). His last anointing was a mix of “blood, rainwater, and that limy black slurry so true of São Paulo” (177-179). The body is removed for the relief of the traffic and everybody goes back to their business.

The topic is not unusual in urban literature. Chico Buarque’s famous Construction (1971) deals with a builder who falls from a scaffold and “died in the wrong way disturbing the traffic.” Instead of a proper debate leading up to the tragedy, Buarque’s song ends with a sequence of pseudo-blessings including: “For all the hanging scaffolds we have to fall off from, God reward you!” In these words of despair, the powerful “you” addresses not only the whole world, but also contingency and God itself. Contingency when it is too powerful. God when it is too powerless. The world when it is both.

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Two passages caught my attention. The first relates to a canary bird: After the “fires of heaven”, the homeless man is left with a canary bird that he brings to the Avenida Paulista. After his death, the guitar players sing about “a canary who lost his owner and fled, and this was a song of life and death” (191-193). This bird is the homeless man himself, and the owner he lost was the comforting belief that the world is there to provide us with a happy existence. Once he becomes free from this teleological belief, he flees to his own death on the street, because a canary always held captive is too fragile to experience and survive its own freedom. Behind the urban vitality of a colloquial style that is over-abundant in the poem, there is a deep echo of Schopenhauer throughout the entire structure and especially at the end, a voice that I may quote in Schopenhauer’s own words:

“There is only one innate misconception, namely, that we are born to be happy. (...) [Indeed,] it is the successive satisfaction of our will that we understand under the concept of happiness. As long as we dwell in this innate misconception (...), the world will appear full of contradictions. For at every step, small or big, we are bound to experience the fact that the world and life itself are not at all devised to contain a happy existence” (the World as Will and Representation, Volume 2, Ch. 49, my translation).

The second passage comes from the guitar duo as well. While the injured man is agonising, the players discuss the human longing for perfection and realise that “perfect is the hippopotamus, which is horse and whale, and writes no poetry” (173-175). And yet, what is intended to be a criticism of perfection turns into a criticism of poetry – because it reminds us that poetry is a longing for verbal beauty, which is a kind of aesthetic perfection. The hippopotamus, in its ugly truth, is greater than poetry: It is just what it is and is true to itself. It lives beyond any craving for happiness and aesthetic flattery. It is in the realisation of the aesthetic monstrosity of perfection that perfection reveals its transcendence, which is also transcendence of form. Note that the perfection of the hippopotamus is not even utilitarian. It consists of the natural state of a creature that simply is what it is.

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Beethoven kam als ich zehn war. ich sah die schallplatte und ging einen moralischen vertrag mit meinem onkel ein: wenn er sie kaufe, müsse ich sie hören. so fing ich mit drei sonaten an: Mondschein, Les Adieux, Waldstein. täglich, fast ritualistisch. bis mein grossvater meine mutter fragte ob es richtig sei dass ich »diese traurige musik« höre. am ende genoss er das auch.

Dann kamen die symphonien: eine kassette mit einem satz von jeder, eine emotionelle sensation die nur nicht länger anhielt weil die kassette nach einigen monaten verloren ging. aber Beethoven hinteliess ein gefühl der ersten liebe die mich noch heute an eine einzigartige intimität mit Les Adieux erinnert. ich sass vor dem schallplattenspieler und mein intellekt wie auch mein herz verwandelten sich in eine einzige frage: wie? in diesem musikstudium das selbststudium war – denn die grenze zwischen musik und selbst war plötzlich offen – begriff ich dass mein leben ohne die musikalische kontemplation meines selbst nicht mehr denkbar war. da fand sich ein kind das sich öfter fragte wie das unsichtbare, das unberührbare so erfüllend sein kann.

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Mit zwölf besuchte ich meinen onkel auf dem lande. wenn ich heute an die schauplattensammlung denke weiss ich: so gross war sie gar nicht. ein bisschen grösser als der durchschnitt vielleicht. aber für mich war sie ein ozean der das schifflein meiner neugierde umfing. und ganz allein am nachmittage fand ich Chopin: polonaise op. 26 nr. 1... ja, ich musste mich hinlegen und meine augen schliessen. ich musste mich fragen ob es richtig war »diese traurige musik« zu hören. aber die wahrheit jener tiefen erfahrung zu unterbrechen wäre ein feiger rückzug, die kapitulation vor einer lebenslüge. ich ergab mich also der musik als ob ich in den abgrund hineinspränge, hoffend auf erlösung oder mindestens auflösung.

Die eine polonaise ging zu ende und die andere begann: opus 53. was dann folgte war die offenbarung, eine ästhetische tranzendenz, eine schönheit, eine wahrheit jenseits von paradies und hölle, eine erfahrung die in alle geheimnisse meiner seele durchdrang und sie offen legte. ich konnte nur mit tränen antworten und dies erwies sich als das ehrlichste. ich weinte den ganzen monat. ich hatte das leben in einer grösse erfahren die kaum ein mensch so jung erfahren. meine kindheit war zu ende.

Denke nicht dass du musik entziffern kannst weil du gut spielst: ich erinnere mich an ein video in dem Lang Lang versucht das nocturne op. 27 nr. 2 zu »erklären«, und wie mir dabei die haare sich sträuben: »it’s just like flying, or swimming, or kind of you are in... in the water«. es gibt momente da man sich als publikum gern erlauben würde zu sagen: mein lieber, halt den mund, setz dich hin und spiele! überlass die poetische deutung der musik den dichtern! – es überrascht mich auch nicht dass virtuosen schreiben, man könne über musik nicht schreiben: ein virtuose ist auch nicht derjenige von dem ich eine poetische erklärung der musik erwarte (Thomas Mann konnte das schon eher). schön und gut ist es tatsächlich wenn jeder das seine macht – auch im musikleben. zufälligerweise ist aber Lang Langs video über op. 27 nr. 2 ganz mysteriös aus YouTube verschwunden. das leben ist zu kurz um musik gut zu spielen und zugleich gut zu verstehen.

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Meinen dreizehnten geburtstag feierte ich am strand. dort erschien ein schweizer bekannter meiner familie mit einem gewissen Debussy unter dem arm. ich bedankte mich für die schallplatte und fragte mich: was soll das? ich kannte die grossen komponisten, ich wusste schon alles. das war gewiss ein ganz obskurer musiker, aber ich musste ja höflich sein. also nahm ich den Debussy mit nach hause und hörte: Suite Besgamasque, Children’s Corner, Pour le Piano (mein Gott, die so unromantischerweise dramatische toccata!). eine skurrile beziehung bahnte sich an. Beethoven und Chopin waren nach wie vor götter. aber Debussy war nicht mehr wegzudenken. nach einigen monaten hatte ich sein ganzes klavierwerk auf kassetten. ich wusste gar nicht was ich daran mochte. das herz war definitiv nicht dabei, dafür war das meiste noch zu befremdend. aber der intellekt dürstete nach dissonanzen und einzigartigen akkorden. wie kann das so komisch klingen und mir trotzdem gefallen? das kindliche bedürfnis nach gefälligkeitsästhetik war schockiert – und praktisch überwunden. der verstand konnte es nicht glauben und im hintergrund war immer seine bitte: spiel das nochmal, es kann doch nicht wahr sein dass ich dies und das gehört habe. und so hat sich Debussy allmählich durchgesetzt. ich führte kriege gegen ihn, und ich verlor sie alle.

Mein paradebeispiel sind die préludes. Danseuses de Delphes hinterlassen heute noch ein erfrischendes gefühl und die erinnerung an das erste hören: der unprätentiöse trost der akkorde gleich im dritten takt ist immer noch gültig, während Chopins polonaise op. 53 mich nicht mehr wie früher rührt. vielleicht habe ich mich zu satt gehört. Debussy bietet ein weniger dramatisches, aber nicht weniger transzendentales rätsel.

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Als viertes prélude kommt im ersten buch Les sons et les parfums tournent dans l’air du soir, genannt nach einem vers von Baudelaire der an sich alles von Chopin evoziert. was Debussy daraus macht beschäftigt seit jahren meinen geist – und inzwischen auch mein herz, das anfangs nur eine mysteriöse morbidität daran erkannte. eine seltene affinität mit diesem prélude ist in mir erwachsen, ein stück das als musikalische kindheitserinnerung mir eine eleganz, eine unwahrscheinliche lebensbejahung offenbart.

Dann folgen im zweiten buch La terrace des audiences du clair de lune und Ondines, und das gefühl einer schönen, in mir noch unerklärten – soll ich sagen: skurrilität? die ersten takte von La terrace und ihre melodische linie sind in meinem emotionellen musik- und selbststudium in ihrer unbeschreiblichkeit ja völlig »unadjektivierbar« geblieben. es ist ohnehin ein schlechter brauch musik mit adjektiven zu beflecken. auch Ondines mit den exzentrischen, fast grotesken bögen des elften taktes regte mich immer wieder an und auf: ich hasste es und ich liebte es. takte 15-16 kompensierten wahrscheinlich alles andere, und alles zusammen war die überwindung des schönen durch das erfrischende jenseits des schönen.

Aber kein prélude hat mich beschäftigt wie Canope. viele jahre betrachtete ich dieses musikstück als einen hort der ruhe. die akkorde der einleitung klangen süss und unbedenklich. ich muss hier eine kleine parenthese machen: oft verspürte ich in meinem musikalischen selbststudium eine melancholie und die kindliche enttäuschung darüber, dass die menschen nicht hören konnten was ich hörte. du entdeckst eine welt in der es keine ansprechpartner gibt: du bist allein auf dich gestellt, gefühle sind unkommunizierbar. selbst in der eigenen familie. meine kleinere schwester ist so klein dass sie erst jetzt das alter erreicht hat in dem ich einst meine Chopin-epiphanie erlebte. vor kurzem unterhielten wir uns über musik und ich spielte ihr Canope mit der bitte: sag einfach was du fühlst.

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Ich wusste natürlich um die symbolik des titels, und die erfahrung überraschte mich am anfang: kanopen waren ägyptische gefässe in denen bei der mumifizierung die eingeweide separat von der leichname beigesetzt wurden, meistens vier – für magen, leber, lungen und gedärm. das gehörte sich einfach, die organe hatte man doch fürs ewige leben nötig. seitdem ich das weiss höre ich das sich wiederholende cis vom siebten takt als ägyptischen totentanz, auch wenn der tod hier quasi nicht mehr stattfindet. er wird durch die mumifizierung und die kanopenkrüge aufgehoben und aufgeschoben auf ein ewiges warten auf ewiges leben. aufgehoben, ja, in einer pragmatischen entmystifizierung des makabren. das ist vielleicht der grund warum die todesspannung dieses cis, die keine wahre spannung ist, in die ruhige eleganz des themas mündet: die ungestörte aufbewahrung in kanopenkrügen. dann wiederholt sich das stück und endet unvollendet. die letzte note der melodie, obwohl eine vorhersehbare, bleibt ungespielt, denn die ewigkeit des wartens ist noch nicht zu ende.

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Manches stück bleibt am besten unbetitelt. mein langer versuch Canope anhand seines titels zu deuten hat mein ganzes verständnis dieses werkes verändert. wozu denn titel? es tröstet mich jedoch, auch wenn nicht zu sehr, dass Debussy mindestens einen suggestionsmächtigen titel sich aussuchte.

Ich komme aber zurück: da sass ich vor meiner schwester, ich und meine frage. die antwort war verblüffend, hat mich aber in einer gewissen hinsicht fast stolz gemacht: »ich stelle mir einen mann vor der verrückt geworden ist.« verständlich. die antwort der gefälligkeitsästhetik auf Debussys verrückte experimente könnte nicht anders ausfallen. ich unterdrückte ein lachen und dachte an mein eigenes ringen mit dieser musik. nur, ich war offener, ich suchte die auseinandersetzung mit dem verrückten und der verrücktheit die mich ästhetisch bereicherte, ja, fast möchte ich sagen: befreite.

Aber dann kam die bombe: »das ist auch traurig.« das konnte ich nicht hinnehmen. und dennoch stellte auch der grossvater einst die geniessbarkeit des scheinbar traurigen in frage. ich selbst stellte mir diese frage als ich noch mit unschuldigen tränen Chopin erkundete. aber ich war mutig. ich nahm mir vor, die traurigkeit der musik unter die lupe zu nehmen. und die traurigkeit verschwand. es ist nur müssig und geistig faul, tiefgreifende musik traurig zu nennen. traurig kann nur das leben des hörers sein, und die musik ist nicht schuld daran wenn sie in ihrer transzendenz das leben eines jeden vor dem höchst intimen spiegel der seele widerspiegelt. indem musik die verborgenen wahrheiten der seele an die oberfläche bringt, wird sie zur offenbarung, ja, sie tut dem leben, vor allem dem traurigen, einen wertvollen gefallen.

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Und dennoch wollte ich »objektiv« feststellen was es mit Debussys Canope auf sich hat. also setzte ich mich ans klavier, die noten vor mir. bereits die tonart sah ominös aus: gilt denn d-moll nicht als die tonart des ernstes und des todes? aber Beethovens neunte ist eines der lebensbejahendsten werke die ich kenne – trotzdem d-moll. also bitte, sagte die innere stimme, lass uns die tonarten von vorurteilen befreien! na gut, dachte ich erwidernd, ich spiele. aber ich spiele schlecht. kein wunder also dass meine harthändigkeit alles an die oberfläche brachte was Debussy mit den vielen pianissimi verbergen wollte: der tod selbst kletterte meine hände und arme hinauf als ich die akkorde der einleitung spielte, ein lebendinger tod, ein widersprüchlicher überbringer des makabren. das war furchteinflössend und könnte nicht anders sein: ein amateur der ein solches stück zum ersten male spielt – ein stück das er technisch gar nicht in der lage zu spielen ist – sollte wissen dass seinen händen das geschick der intensität fehlt. es gibt nichts schwierigeres – für mich mindestens – als ein pianissimo mit ausgewogenen fingern zu spielen. das ist training für ein ganzes leben. was ich mir selbst zu bieten hatte war weder »très calme« noch »doucement triste«. das war der bare tod, und ich hatte angst. ich musste aufhören. und doch wieder an meine schwester denken: »doucement triste«. hatte sie doch recht mit dem traurigen? mein leben lang hatte ich nur das »doucement« gehört. ich musste das stück selbst spielen um das »triste« zu spüren, und dennoch ein falsches, in meinen händen nicht »doucement« gespieltes.

Meine furcht war eine offenbarung. immer wenn ich versuchte Chopin zu spielen, stellte sich eine rührung im wege. zu viele erinnerungen. nocturnes die den ohren schon banal und trivial klingen berühren mich wie zum ersten mal wenn ich nur einen akkord spiele. eine verhängnisvolle intimität verhindert den technischen fokus. mit Debussy war das anders. die ersten akkorde von Canope bereiteten mir keine träne, sondern etwas unheimliches, noch nie gespürtes, etwas noch weiter jenseits des adjektivbaren als das unadjektivbare selbst. nein, ich bin kein pianist, und manchmal ist es gut so.

Als ich vor dem plattenspieler sass und Les Adieux hörte (gespielt übrigens von Ashkenazy), da war mir schon klar dass mein musikstudium eher kontemplativ ausfallen sollte. es wäre anders gewesen wenn ich im 19. Jh. lebte. ich denke oft an die musikliebenden aus jener zeit die vielleicht nur zwei- oder dreimal im leben Beethovens neunte oder selbst ein nocturne hörten. die mussten selbst musizieren wenn sie mehr wollten. ich aber gehöre zu den verwöhnten kindern des technischen komforts. an einem einzigen tage hörte ich Chopins op. 53 öfter als die meisten seiner zeitgenossen in ihrem ganzen leben. das ist irgendwie unfair, und auch vulgär. dafür wurde diese musik gar nicht komponiert. ich sollte diese besondere, »diese traurige musik« nicht zu oft hören, ich, der ich so oft meine musik und mein selbst trivialisiere. gewiss war derjenige der ein nocturne nur dreimal im leben hörte doch besser gestellt als ich und meine sinnlosen wiederholungen.

A variação é uma prática musical. Altera um tema original por diferentes repetições e reiterações, como no opus 13 de Schumann, os Estudos Sinfônicos, ou nas variações de Beethoven sobre um tema de Diabelli. Foi esta prática que adotei, ou melhor, importei para a nova antologia que apresento ao público: Sessenta e Seis Variações sobre um Tema de Olavo Bilac.

O contexto é pertinente. 2018 marca o centenário da morte dum poeta querido, odiado, reconhecido, condenado, mas que não deixa de ser destaque. Homenagem? As variações representam mais uma celebração crítica do que um elogio. Evocam a memória de um poeta importante sem assimilar, necessariamente, vicissitudes formais de sua obra. Celebram, sim, a grandeza dum tema que, a meu ver, mostra um Bilac algo além dessa aparente preocupação com formas que lhe é atestada amiúde.

Vem bem a calhar que, semanas antes de sua morte, Bilac tenha terminado a antologia Tarde: É de fato uma coleção de poemas tardios refletindo, no crepúsculo duma vida, uma certa maturidade. É nesse entardecer que se encontra o soneto “Sperate, creperi!”, do latim “Esperai, vacilantes!”, uma reflexão sobre a morte muito ao gosto metafísico dum século XIX entardecido em Bilac. Poema que, nos anos que o sucederam, só poderia passar despercebido. Ora, a filosofia e todo o gênio do século XX são um manifesto contra a metafísica. Mas a verdade é que a metafísica, em suas questões aparentemente inúteis, improdutivas, infrutíferas, nunca entardece. Está aí, vivíssima, apesar do homem em toda a sua revolta pragmática. Bilac esconde, em seu soneto esquecido, aquela pergunta tão inútil e tão profunda: A vida então é esta coisa ordinária e sem nenhuma transcendência? Ali se revela e se confessa uma angustiada busca por sentido e esperanças, a hesitação das certezas e da fé. Fé em quê? “Quero clamar de horror, porque duvido: Mas, porque espero, – espero, e fico mudo.”

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Eis o tema, grave, ingrato e grandiosamente intratável. As variações que compus são de gêneros vários. Algumas têm uma relação formal com o poema de Bilac: São paródias, alterações, inversões incorporando parte do corpo semântico e estilístico original. Outras evocam apenas passagens numa releitura crítica, debate onde prepondera ora a confirmação, ora a rejeição do conteúdo e forma. Outras variações, por fim, são poemas livres que, em princípio, nada têm a ver com o tema, mas que, lidos como variações, podem ser percebidos como respostas ou parte dum diálogo fragmentário.

Por serem diálogo livre com tema e forma, as variações abraçam elementos do português antigo ao coloquialismo urbano. Deixam transparecer, sem nenhuma censura estética, a “última flor do Lácio” em todo o seu pluralismo estilístico. Ao menos os poemas concretamente escritos em português. Encontrareis certas composições que ultrapassam a forma de um idioma em particular, como em alguns casos o poema-programa.

Não há como ser de outro modo. A transcendência que o poeta busca no tema original está além de qualquer forma. De certo modo, a aporia estética da poesia consiste no fato de que nenhuma forma é capaz de acrescentar-lhe valor em termos de verdade e busca da verdade. Tanto que, no poema de Bilac, o entardecer da perfeição parnasiana é incapaz de dar respostas. Faz parte da dor da poesia: A forma é irrelevante. É uma contingência, um fenômeno fortuito. Não há verdade em clássico, popular, bonito, feio. A verdade, se houver alguma, é o que está ou deixa de estar por trás da forma, é o que nega a forma, é a forma que só se forma por falta de algo melhor para expressar o que não tem nem pode ter forma.

2

Talvez se ache irônico ler isto de mim, que dediquei tanto tempo ao hexâmetro datílico e outras formas distintas. De certo modo é irônico mesmo, é paradoxal. Mas a verdade é que o verso só se liberta da forma pela forma. É assim que, propondo novas à poesia vernácula, busco sim libertá-la de outras no que têm de repetitivo. Não por amor àquela que apresento ou ao fato de ser nova. Antes, amor à superação.

Outra ironia: A maior parte destas variações pode-se ver como sonetos transcendentais, porque evocam em tudo a forma do soneto, mas de tal modo que em evocando transcendem e em transcendendo destroem. Redimem. O fato é que, em princípio, o soneto nem foi concebido para a realidade do português. É uma forma que só atinge a sua perfeição no italiano de Petrarca. O resto, essas importações para o francês, inglês etc. são caricaturas, são assimilações desnecessárias. Algumas de fato bem artificiosas. Mas caricaturas, bem como o tema de Bilac, que se redime não por ser soneto, por ter rima ou decassílabo, por ser 4-4-3-3, mas por ser forte no que tem a dizer e não dizer. Esvai-se à surpresa de Sócrates quanto aos poetas que »dizem coisas belas sem saber o que dizem« (Plat. Apol. 22c).

3

O poema ideal não é para ser bem-escrito, e direi por quê: O que se diz bem-escrito é bem-escrito de acordo com algum critério de perfeição. Perfeição porque, onde algo bem-feito é concebível, é concebível algo muito bem-feito, e, além do bem-feito e do muito-bem-feito, o per-feito. Mas como o perfeito em si é inacessível à ideia, será perfeito apenas de acordo com critérios, conceitos, opiniões que, no entardecer das coisas, nada mais são que obsessões estéticas. É importante reconhecê-las. Ninguém venha me dizer que, ao rejeitarem a estética parnasiana, os sucessores de Bilac libertaram-se: Simplesmente trocaram um fetiche por outro. Ora, enquanto for possível escrever um poema “bem-escrito” e enquanto houver critérios haverá fetiches de perfeição, porque critérios são fetiches.

O poema ideal está além do belo. Sem para isto reduzir-se a prosa, essa outra desgraça existencial e decerto mais venenosa: Porque na prosa existe uma ingênua ilusão de que o escritor, ao escrever as palavras “como lhe vêm naturalmente à boca”, está por isto mais perto da verdade. A prosa é uma coisa perigosíssima. Principalmente a prosa “bem-escrita”. A poesia ao menos desilude: Nenhuma palavra vem “naturalmente” à boca. É tudo fetiche, é tudo artifício, é tudo imitação de estilos. Clássico, popular, bonito, feio. Nenhum uso da palavra é intrinsicamente original. Bonito mesmo, se houver bonito, é não ser nem bonito nem não-bonito.

É deste modo e sob estas premissas, creio, que as minhas variações em sua truculência cabal não foram, nem poderiam ser, bem-escritas. O que, por sinal, não deixa de ser fetiche e requer um certo olhar indulgente, mas atendei: É poesia doutro século. É tarde! A velha tarde numa roupagem mais arrojada e monstruosa, como requer por aí a voz do mundo e da mentira. Não seja por isto.

For meni piipel, dhe wœrld shud bikàm a set ov skaterd houlz weer peti traibz haid in heitrid and kontempt ov iich àdher. Eni praktis dhat houldz a klan tugedher, no mater hau aksidental or trivial, iz rigardid az a pruuf ov superioriti. Dhiz atityud sœrvd a beter pœrpoz in prihistori, wen egzajereitid biliifz kud motiveit dhe survaival ov a smool gruup in hostail pleisiz. Bàt tu sei, in tudeiz wœrld, dhat aur kàntri iz dhe best bikooz wi lisen tu Lady Gaga and draiv a Mercedes iz les-dhan-konvinsiŋ.

Dhe lojik ov hyuman evoluuſon iz a gud tiicher: survaival rikwaierz interakſon. Yet interakſon liidz tu disoluuſon: kàltſurz disoulv intu wàn anàdher. Wot imœrjiz in dhe end iz a kàltſur dhat, biiŋ nàn in partikular, haz elementz ov ool: A midel kàltſur az a rizàlt ov gloubal disoluuſon. Ool oltœrnativz liid tu kontempt and wor amàŋ and widhin neiſonz. Bikooz dhei meik às difain aur aidentiti bai aisoleitiŋ and alieneitiŋ aurselvz. Itz a greit falasi tu argyu dhat kàltſural aidentiti iz a statik fenomenon laik a fiŋgerprint. Kàltſur iz an ever cheingiŋ sistem ov biliifz and praktisiz wich evri indivijual manifestz in a yunik wei.

Midel kàltſur shud bi dominant, bàt dominant kàltſur dàznt miin kàltſur ov domineiſon. It shud imœrj natſurli from dhe disoluuſon ov kàltſurz intu a biger miksiŋ wœrk. Dhou dhe disoluuted apierz tu vanish, it iz perpechueitid widhin a biger sistem.

1

Bikooz interakſon liidz tu disoluuſon, dher iz no àndyu aproprieiſon. Dhatz wot kàltſur iz dher for. Eni krieiſon iz a heritij ov ool. Ov kors, aproprieiſon kan bi dàn in a frivolos spirit. It kan riflekt a trivialaiziŋ atityud. Yet wedher gud or bad, aproprieiſon krieitz ekspouʒur, ekspouʒur krieitz interest, and interest liidz tu daialog and kritikal prosesiŋ. Dhe biznes-man weeriŋ an indijenos wor bonet in a parti iz stil duiŋ a sœrvis tu dhe kàltſur hi trivialaiziz: bikooz dhe trivializeiſon iz pàŋkchual, wail dhe objekt kan spiik for itself. Moust piipel dont jàst teik nout ov an objekt – dhei wont tu nou wot it iz, weer it kàmz from and wot it riili miinz.

Midel kàltſur shud not bi konfyuzd widh dhe mas konsàmpſon ov komœrſal art. Wot iz prodyust for kwik and waidspred seil iz jàst an artifis tu teik advaantij ov dhi esthetik obseſonz ov gruupz. Akseptans bai sàch gruupz iz dherfor esenſal. Yet midel kàltſur kanot bi difaind az mas kàltſur, bikooz mas iz bouth a komœrſal and politikal konsept. Komœrſal wen it implaiz dhe leveliŋ ov indivijualz tu a homojenos gruup ov konsyumerz. Politikal wen it embelishiz mas az a heroik-demokratik fors ageinst a dimonaizd eliit. Midel kàltſur iz mor abstrakt dhan dhat. It dàsnt imœrj az a komœrſal prodàkt, bàt kan ounli riflekt loŋ-tœrm disoluuſon.

Midel kàltſur iz not popular. Dhe definiſon ov popular iz politikal and implaiz a definiſon ov non-popular, wich iz konstruud az elistist. And yet, it kan ounli bi a politikal taask tu sei wedher and wich kàltſur iz demokratik or àndemokratik, popular or elitist, and dherbai krieit an artifiſal opoziſon, a souſal wor ov kàltſurz. Midel kàltſur iz not wor.

2

Popular kàltſur beerz an ekskluzivist aideologi, and dhiz iz itz greitest paradoks. Konsider dhe wœrldwaid infachueiſon widh The Beatles and itz inhiirent kontradikſon: A houl jenereiſon rijektid privios myuzikal praktisiz az impierialist or elitist jàst tu bikàm dhe kàltſural satelait ov yet anàdher British faſon. Yet no myuzik haz sœrvd dhe komœrſal pœrpos ov impierializm az pœrfektli az dhe so-koold “pop-myuzik”. In itz aideologikal kleim friili tu ekspres “dhe piipels” myuzik, it kràshiz eni àdher kaind ov myuzik.

Interakſon oolso liidz tu reiſal disoluuſon: Reisiz disoulv intu wàn anàdher kàltſurali and fizikli, and wot imœrjiz iz dhe midel reis. In fakt, dhe midel reis iz imœrjiŋ and ekspandiŋ natſurli thruu dhe grajual inkriis ov riprodàkſon amàŋ reisiz. Dheer ar tuu kontraastiŋ senarioz for dhe ethnik fyutſur ov hyumankaind. In dhe fœrst, ethnik gruupz segregeit dhemselvz from iich àdher in myuchual kontempt. Liviŋ in enmiti, dhei wil end in a Hobbesk steit ov wor in wich nàthiŋ wil hould dhem bak in dher dizaier tu destroi. Dhei wil hav no komon valyuz and no sens ov souſal kohiiʒon wil priveil. Dhe order ov dhe dei wil bi keios.

In dhe sekond senario, myuchual akseptans and riprodàkſon wil streŋthen dhe midel reis, in wich vizibel ethnik difrensiz wil bi leveld. Ooldhou piipel wil not luk aidentikal, dhe midel reis wil meik it imposibel tu segregeit eniwàn on akaunt ov fizikal apierans. Àdher pritekstz ov heitrid and segregeiſon mei araiz. Bàt dhe midel reis wil meik wàn ov dhe moust pauerful tuulz ov segregeiſon ridàndant: reisizm.

3

Ooldhou hyumankaind woz not krieitid widh a prikonsiivd pœrpos, wi shud meik evri efort tu fait reisizm, dhat ànhinderd interakſon mei streŋthen dhe midel reis – not az a beter or iiven a partikular “reis”, bàt az dhe fainal autkàm ov disoluuſon, dhe autkàm dhat niidz tu priveil in order tu difiit wot iz wœrst in dhe biliifz and praktisiz ov modern sosaietiz. Ounli reiſal disoluuſon kan giv às dhe koŋkriit fiiliŋ dhat wi biloŋ tugedher az a hyuman famili. Dhiz iz not a kondemneiſon ov daivœrsiti. It iz a konstràktiv paradoks dhat akseptans and selebreiſon ov daivœrsiti liid tu disoluuſon ov daivœrsiti – az dhe veri risàlt ov dhe enhaanst interakſon and myuchual riprodàkſon dhat a pozitiv atityud tu daivœrsiti ineibel.

In a wœrld weer reis and kàltſur ar often ikweitid and sœrtan reisiz kleim tu bi ounerz or sleivz tu a given kàltſur, ànneseseri konfliktz araiz. Dhe fakt dhat a biliif or praktis iz waidspred widhin an ethnik gruup dàznt miin dhat 1) dhe biliif or praktis iz an ekskluuziv properti ov dhe gruup dhat shud privent eni form ov ekstœrnal asimileiſon, or dhat 2) dhe memberz ov dhe gruup shud bi priventid from asimileitiŋ difrent biliifz or praktisiz. Dhe riizon dhat dhiiz ar falasiz folouz from aur hyuman kondiſon: wot iz praktist bai wàn kan bi praktist bai eni. Itz a hyuman rait tu praktis wotever kàltſural laif wàn siiz fit, rigardles ov wedher dhiz wil meik às a majoriti or mainoriti in aur ethnik and souſal gruup.

4

Àdherwaiz, ethnisiti bikàmz an instrument ov kàltſural detœrminizm – tel mi wot yu luk laik, and ail tel yu wot myuzik yu shud laik: if yur blak, yu kant laik Bach bikooz Bach iz wait kàltſur. If yur wait, yu kant laik Bluuz bikooz Bluuz iz blak kàltſur. Or oolso: If yur Yuropiian yu shudnt laik enithiŋ Yuropiian in order not tu apier kolonialist and impierialist. – Dhiiz falasiz araiz bikooz, wen wi thiŋk ov hyumankaind, wi thiŋk ov blak and wait bifor wi luk eni fœrdher. Wi diskrimineit in advaans.

Aisoleiſon and alieneiſon wil liid tu mor konflikt and wor amàŋ ethnik and ethnikli konstruud gruupz. Dhe mas komunikeiſon ov aur gloubalaizd wœrld wil ounli akselereit dhi eskaleiſon. Opresorz wil fiil dhei hav nàthiŋ tu giv, and dhe oprest dhat dhei hav nàthiŋ tu luuz. Dhei wil charj ageinst iich àdher at wil. For dhe seik ov a lai.

Wen it kàmz so far, Hobbes wil bi pruuvd roŋ – agein: Itz not dhe komon oo ov an ouverpauerful kiŋ dhat wil kiip sàch wor ov reisiz ànder kontrol. Sosaietiz wil kolaps and giv raiz tu feild steitz ruuld bai dhe wor ov reisiz ageinst reisiz.

5

Kool às misijineiſonistz if yu màst: Dhe greitest posibel misijineiſon wil bi a blesiŋ. It wil meik it iisier for dhe midel kàltſur tu bikàm az dominant az it shud. Insted ov bikàmiŋ satelaitz ov a komœrſal faſon, wi wil kàltiveit aurselvz amàŋ dhe best kritikal input ov ool kàltſurz. Siŋgel ekspreſonz wil no loŋger egzist az jeografikal barierz bitwiin yuu and mii, bàt az an intelekchual reservoar aksesibel evriweer tu evriwàn.

Wot wud a laif ov midel kàltſur luk laik? Sàdenli, yor frend wil lisen tu Bach in dhe morniŋ and Bluuz in dhe iivniŋ, and weer a tai for dhe ofis and a poncho at houm, and a Rouman tyunik, or a Maori dres ooldhou hi livz in Finland. Hi mei yuz an indijenos shampuu from Sauth Amerika and kaam hiz heer in an 18^th sentſuri Taitus-stail. In dhe morniŋ, hi wil riid Aristotel and mediiival poetri, and in dhi iivniŋ stàdi Japaniiz prouz wail driŋkiŋ Indian tii.

An ekstœrnal obzœrver mei thiŋk yor frend iz kros-aproprieitiŋ elementz from “àdher” kàltſurz in a frivolos wei. Bàt du wi riili nou dhe kritikal riflekſon dhat gouz bihaind wot wi sii? Mor importantli: Hu ar wi tu tel piipel wich kàltſur iz huz? Hu ar wi tu sei dhat dhouz wi rigard az sitizenz ov nouweer ar not in fakt sitizenz ov evriweer? Wi shud bi frii tu asimileit dhe best ov iich àdherz biliifz and praktisiz evriweer.

INDEX

Junonis ob Iram

Anno bis millesimo quarto ab excessu divi Augusti fauste feliciter incipiente, haud inutile fuerit denuo consulere, atque de principiis perpendere. Luc Barbulesco

Konzeptkunst: Sein oder Nichtsein

Betrachtet man die gegenwärtige konzeptkunst, stellt sich die frage nach ihrer andersartigkeit: gibt es einen bruch im hinblick auf die traditionalle kunst? Mylène Cura

Was there an American Revolution?

History is full of events we call revolution, a claim that arises together with the event or emerges later. Gregory Name

Von Dubiosen Mädchenträumen

Das Metropolitan Museum of Art (NY) wird Balthus’ Dreaming Therèse trotz einer petition feministischer aktivisten nicht entfernen. Georg Solz

Senatus Deest, Fiat Senatus

Langobardi vastantes terram iam diutius ruinatam nunc Romam depopulatam obsidebant, cum Gregorius papa Magnus manus vocemque extulit. Gregorius Advena

Aristóteles e a Ironia Estoica

Vamos gozar dum texto estranho e confuso? meus escritos são compostos num espírito de ironia estoica: é tão improvável serem lidos que portanto escrevo. Eustácio de Sales

Aspects of a Better Spelling

Let’s admit it: the Latin alphabet wos not divaisd tu accommodeit the phonetic appareitus of modern Inglish. Gregory Name

The Carolingian 2017: Articles and Essays

The contributions from the 2017 editions are still available. This is a good chance to read them if you haven’t yet. The Carolingian

Anno bis millesimo quarto ab excessu divi Augusti fauste feliciter incipiente, haud inutile fuerit magnis coeptis denuo consulere, atque de principiis, vel semel in anno, perpendere. Ultimi anni exeuntis eventa, ut solet, mentibus valde impressa sunt, simulatque janua primi mensis pedetemptim, nec sine fragore celebrantium, aperiebatur.

De mortuis nihil nisi bene, at cum illi sepulti sunt, tempus venit opportunum ab eorum vitâ doctrinam trahere. Ut illius qui Iohannes Festus (Johnny Halliday) nuncupatus abitu suo populo Francogallorum lacrimas et gemitûs excussit, qui quidem parum musicus et americanus nimie fuerit. Nonne hoc potius concludamus Francogalliam jamdudum omnem potentiam sui perdidisse, nec tantum in musicâ, quae paene tota americana facta’st, sed etiam in moribus, et vitae quotidianae cultu, et cibis et vestitu… Huc adde ignorantiam plus quam boeotiam undique pervadentem.

At certe inutilius fuerit haec omnia recensere quae ab origine unâ derivantur, i.e. arbitrio amisso, abhinc aliquot decennia – etiamsi quis usque ad annos quadraginta praeteriti saeculi reversus illuc originem mali petierit. Utcumque post brevem narrationem hoc argumentum nobis sit explicandum: democraticum dictum regimen tamquam currus usque ad calcem cursum peregit. Nunc autem de altero (vel potius alio) regimine perpendendum, quod non sit dictatori cuivis consentaneum, nec dominationi, neque porro publici ordinis eversioni faveat. Hoc renovatum regimen – neque de rebus novis loquor, quod procul absit – antiquo principio benevolentiae inniti debebit, siquidem democratia dicta, vel popularis respublica, certatione omnium, invidiâ, bello civili perpetuo freta videatur.

1

Huc adde scientiarum negligentiam, vel potius doctam ignorantiam omnium de omni re scibili, bella tandem indesinenter gesta, in Afros et Saracenos praecipue, tamquam in imbelles neque debellatu difficiles, falso libertatis conscientiae defendendae nomine. Quid autem Europaeos attinet Orientalesne Trinam credant an Unam esse divinitatem, religionemve ad publicam civium vitam pertinere annon? Siquidem ipsi, Europaeos dico, abhinc circa quadringentos annos caelum, Galileo, Keplero, Copernico juvantibus, omnino vacuaverint, desertumque ab omnisgeneris numine effecerint. Istos demum musulmanos docere qualis sit civitas hodierna quidve dolens Respublica poenas ex eis exigere cupiat!

Atque hoc etiam negligunt – etenim oritur negligentia a negatâ vel amissâ religione, ut aiebat Marcus Tullius – principium benevolentiae in Evangelio ipso (Lc 2/14) inveniri, siquis saltem Evangelium legerit lectumque intellexerit: «Pax in terrâ hominibus bonae voluntatis!» (quod inscribitur supra portam templi cuiusdam parisiensis Sancto Nicolao dicati). Hic intelligendum: homines quibus Deus benevolentiam suam (vel εủδοκίαν) praebet – genitivo casu objectivo. Nos autem homines Summi Numinis benevolentiâ omnes pro virili parte frui conamur, vel etiam solâ fide eam adipisci tendimus. Orbis mediaevalis, vel dixeris: carolingium, totus circum nomen Omnipotentis et imaginem volvebat, sicut conus aliquis parabolas et hyperbolas et elleipseis in spatio describens. Simulatque mathematici, ut supra diximus, axem mundi mutarunt, illa bona voluntas, unâ cum potestate et auctoritate in populos, ad Europaeas nationes, vel potius regna-nationes, translata’st.

2

Unde fit quod hodiernis temporibus publicae potestatis est (i.e. Europaeae foederationis) talia decreta proponere quae bono publico inserviant, nec tantum eis qui, nomine falso democratiae suis ipsorum commodis consulunt. Ex istis inveniuntur qui «democratae Christiani» nuncupari solent, quia scilicet Evangelium – perperam – quotidie meditentur… At reverâ populorum, nec suis, aerumnis uti noverunt, ut recenter dixit Praeses Francogalliae, homo notus τῇ παρρησίᾳ.

Nunc in mentem subvenit titulus narrationis parum brevis, immo vero longissimae, necnon et jucundissimae, a Julio Romano scriptore compositae: Homines bonae voluntatis, quâ partem priorem saeculi vicesimi nobis scriptor explicat et interpretatur, sub signo societatis hominum extendendae et fraternitatis augendae. Quis scit annon operetur Numinum benevolentia atque eis annuat coeptis, quae ad illam fraternitatem tendunt? At contra fames, pestes, bella, hodiernae segetes aetatis, pro certo non accreverint nisi malignitate quâdam hominum et daemonum, quasi haec omnia perpetiamur – nec tam nos Europaei, qui simus plus minusve incolumes, quantum illi praesertim qui nuper Tertiae partis Orbis dicebantur – «saevae Junonis ob iram».

Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum! At irreligio majora et plura…

Tali modo denique concinnari res hominum publicae, ne de privatis loquar, videntur ut optimae regulae, aptissima mechanismata, sollertissimi cuiusque artificia nihil paene efficiant, nisi supplementum quoddam ex ope Caelestium sibi asciverint.

3

Num exercetur in his rebus principium illud dictum «insufficientiae» a mathematico Curto Goedelo repertum? Quippe qui asseruerit rationem humanam nihil efficere posse si tantum algorithmis quibusdam operetur, Turingi machinae instar, immo vero non sufficere ad simpliciores operationes perficiendas.

Porro cuivis scriptori rerum constat illam Atheniensium civitatem democraticam dictam tum floruisse cum Pericles deorum benevolentiâ frueretur, cito autem clade, peste, civili discordiâ oppressam esse cum dei eam deseruerunt. Si quis vero historiam occidentalis regionis inspexerit, videbit easdem vices semel et iterum ubique contingere, cunctis aetatibus, atque exempli gratiâ in Britanniâ et Francogalliâ, anno quadragesimo praeteriti saeculi. At de his rebus amplius disserendum si forte occasio detur ulterior.

Hoc demum, benevolentiam Superorum dico, in hodiernis «democratiis» desideratur. Hoc etiam nobis exquirendum, sin autem fieri non potest, at saltem ea benignitas ex praepollentibus huius saeculi adipiscenda’st quae nos proprias cuiusque res tranquille administrare sinat.

Epilogus tandem huic nugarum seriei sit exhortatio: agedum limites nationum audacter transsiliamus, romanamque nec tantum latinam, carolingiam (nec mediaevalem, nec westphaliam) Europam denuo condamus, quae pacis et mutuorum inter cives beneficiorum exemplum ceteris orbis terrarum populis, atrocia patientibus, benevolenter ostendat.

Betrachtet man die gegenwärtige konzeptkunst, stellt sich die frage nach ihrer andersartigkeit: gibt es einen bruch im hinblick auf die traditionalle kunst, eine neue kunst oder gar ein ende der kunst? oder lässt sich kontinuität feststellen wobei die kunst nur ihre kleider gewechselt hat? um die frage von kontinuität oder bruch zu behandeln lohnt es sich in der kunstgeschichte zurükzugehen, und zwar zum beginn der moderne. es gilt zu verstehen wie die realität dargestellt wird und welche rolle die schönheit als idealisierung oder gipfel dieser realität spielt.

Ich vertrete die these dass schon mit beginn der moderne die realität gebrochen oder verfremdet dargestellt wird, und dass in diesem zusammenhang von einem idealisierenden schönheitskonzept abstand genommen wird. schönheit wird nicht länger als mitglied der trias vom schönen, wahren und guten begriffen, als sinnliche verkörperung der übrigen zwei. Baudelaire fasst dieses misstrauen gegenüber dem schönen in seinem gedicht Hymne à la Beauté:

« Sors-tu du ciel profond ou sors-tu de l’abîme / Ô beauté? »

Der dichter betrachtet die blumen des bösen, das amoralische, wollüstige schöne, denn mit seiner irdischen materialität kann sich das schöne auch in den dienst des bösen stellen und es als schöne larve verkörpern.

1

Zugleich mit der infragestellung des schönen wurde auch die naturalistische darstellung, deren höchste ausformung das schöne ist, aufgegeben und abgelöst durch eine zunehmend gebrochene alternative die das idealisierte moment am dargestellten zerstört und das dargestellte schliesslich auflöst. das darstellen selbst wird reflektiert als selbstbefragung zum dargestellten thema.

In diesem prozess wird die illusionswirkung der malerei, die eine mittelbare ist – man denke an rahmen und bildausschnitt –, immer stärker kontrastiert. der pinselstrich, somit das material und das herstellen, wird sichtbar. die illusionistische perspektive wird zerstört, umrisse werden schwarz umrandet oder lösen sich ganz auf. insgesamt wird die malerei dadurch subjektiver und entfernt sich vom schönen ideal.

Aber kunst besteht nicht nur aus illusionistischer schönheit, sondern aus einem geistigen gehalt der vom bild symbolisiert wird und nicht davon abzulösen ist. eine einheit von inhalt und form. für den neuen inhalt den es zu transportieren gilt, für die neuen tendenzen von subjektivität und gebrochenheit wird eine sich immer mehr entgrenzende gegensätzliche form entworfen bis hin zur blossen geometrischen form. nach dem ende der fixierten akademischen bildsymbolik wirken die bilder unverstellter auf den betrachter. kulturelle und subjektive assoziationen helfen das bild zu verstehen. sie wurden durch die früheren bilder ebenso hervorgerufen, nur waren sie teilweise durch die festgeschriebenen symbole überdeckt.

2

Der bruch mit dem schönen schein liegt teilweise im aufkommen der industriellen massenproduktion die der schönheit in der kunst konkurrenz macht. die antwort auf die herausforderung durch die maschinell erstellten schönen gegenstände war die behauptung, kunst biete mehr als blosse schönheit in perfektion, nämlich den authentischen ausdruck von etwas lebendigem, subjektivem: der seele des künstlers. im dialog mit erfindungen wie photographie bestimmte sie ihre position neu und verglichen mit der glatten oberfläche der massenproduktion kam sie mit etwas brüchigem, unvollkommenem, subjektiv empfundenem daher. es spielt dabei auch eine kritik an der bürgerlichkeit die eine schöne oberfläche und gefälligkeitsästhetik vertritt, die nicht reflektiert sondern das schöne bloss konsumiert. die kunst besinnt sich auf ihre eigentliche stärke, die symbolisierung eines geistigen gehalts in ästhetischer form, wie Cassirer sie und kultur überhaupt bestimmt. nach den erfahrungen der weltkriege und insbesondere des holocausts hat das misstrauen gegenüber der blossen schönheit noch eine existentiellere dimension angenommen.

1. History is full of events we call revolution, a claim that arises together with the event or emerges later. Since most revolutions took place in the past, it is no surprise to see historians write about them. Yet researching in the capacity of an historian implies performing an exclusive task. Is it the task of historians to define revolution?

A revolution is a political and social phenomenon, and if it be the historian’s task to define it, then this task and the task of philosophers, political scientists and sociologists is quite the same. None will argue that a political philosopher and a political scientist should not be entitled to define revolution. But if historians can do exactly what those others can, what is the difference between them? On the other hand, if it is not the task of historians to define revolution, how can they call a past event a revolution? If you want to talk about something you have to know what it is.

You need a concept. Unless we assume that revolution is whatever be traditionally called as such. Then we should leave the understanding to fate and randomness. It is indeed a widespread view among historians that there are no universal concepts, that the same concept cannot be applied to different times since, apparently, different times had a different understanding of the same concept – what some call relativism.

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Yet the reason for different understandings is that every time people were looking for reliable concepts and, as disagreements arise in the course of centuries, the concepts evolve. But from the fact that concepts evolve does not follow that the purpose of concepts is blindly to serve the assumptions of every time, that any change can go unchallenged and that concepts should be devoid of intrinsic reliability. Else philosophy would have no purpose. Even those who say it is not, or no longer, the task of philosophy to provide conceptual analysis, even they agree that in a world where communication is conditioned by words and words lead to concepts, an effort to analyse concepts is legitimate, whether we call the effort philosophy or something else.

2. Analysing the concept of revolution with a view to achieve a reliable definition is legitimate. Reliable means resilient and applicable, if not to all, at least to as many contexts as possible. Thus let us begin by looking at the general qualities and narrow the analysis until we reach a specific core.

Nobody disputes that a revolution is a political change of some kind. The Greeks used the neutral expression metabolé, or metabolé politeías, as seen in Herodot, Plato and Aristotle. Although it means literally a change of government, or of constitution, the way it is employed by Plato and Aristotle often implies a major and sometimes violent change, even if Aristotle also ranks court intrigues about love affairs among the elements that can lead to a political metabole. Be that as it may, the Greeks did not have the urge further to specify metaboles with different terms for palatian and popular revolts, coups from inside and outside or revolutions. Neither did the Greek concept have the romantic aura that now hovers over the word revolution.

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Despite its Latin origin, revolutio does not occur in classical Latin. It arose later in Christian Latin to signify a return of mystical times or of souls by metempsychosis. The word was used in medieval astronomy in reference to planetary orbits as well. Since at the end of a literal revolution an object finds itself in the same place as before, this meaning would make little political sense.

The current meaning arose in the 18^th century and its first wide employment was during the French revolution. It was the French urge to refer to their metabole as something unique, and the element that created uniqueness was this: There was a claim of universal benefit, a claim that despite a less-than-precise loftiness became an object of fascination. This is probably the main core that differentiates a revolution from other kinds of metabole. It’s not just a change of government, it’s about changing the world. It was partially in pursuit of this claim that wars were waged during the French revolution.

3. Since we are taking the French revolution as the model, further qualities should be added. Revolution as a specified metabole will have the following attributes: a) a sudden outbreak; b) a political overhaul; c) an overwhelming and violent social participation; d) a claim of universal benefit. Whether this be a useful kind of metabole or in the end things go back to the same place in the older sense of the term, is a matter for another enquiry.

Did people just go about their business?

Consider the American metabole. Was there a sudden outbreak? Was there a storming of the Bastille or similar? We should not expect, of course, that an historical event occur in order to fit our concept, and yet if we cannot even agree that the American metabole had a sudden outbreak, we begin a bet with bad cards. Yet one could argue this is just a minor criterion. Very well, for the sake of the argument, we continue: Was there a political overhaul?

By overhaul I mean not simply a change of government, since this is common to all metaboles, but a fundamental change of constitution and political institutions. Looking at the Declarations of 1776 and the rising of new states, it would be reasonable to affirm such an overhaul was the case. Yet a fundamental change of constitution and institutions can also be imposed by a military coup, so that on its own it does make a metabole a revolution.

Thirdly: Was there an overwhelming social participation, or did people just go about their business while regular armies fought in remote battle-fields? Did the average citizen regard the metabole as a matter of life and death, or was it a well-intentioned hobby of the enlightened well-to-do? Revolutions leave a nasty trail of blood behind them, a trail that does not spare any class. Was there a civil war with regular street battles in the major cities? Were there peasants and slaves setting fire on farms? Were there sacred temples vandalised and mass guillotinations? Was there a formidable social trauma that divided and marked society for generations? From this angle, the later American civil war appears much closer to a revolution than the wars of independence. Yet these questions must be asked. Those who claim there was a revolution have the onus to prove that social participation was overwhelming and traumatic, and that the political overhaul was not just a commercial rebellion against an authoritarian king.

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4. The commercial aspect is important. Was there also a claim of universal benefit? The main reason for emigration to the colonies was the prospect of making money. As the sociologist James W. Loewen argues in his new book Lies my Teacher told me, it was not about religious liberty. That could be found in the Netherlands. It was about setting up a theocracy for ambitious traders. It is not a surprise that the birth of America coincides with the birth of a particular kind of capitalism where, in opposition to Aristotelian ethics and the medieval thinking of cooperation, ambition of unlimited profit became morally acceptable. This was facilitated in the frame of a confessionally fragmented, unacademically protestant setting providing a theological legitimation for profit maximization and untoward competition.

Such is the opposition of worlds we find in Shakespeare’s King Lear: Edmund against Edgar. Ambitious capitalism against self-restrained Aristotelianism. From the very beginning there was a commercially rebellious element in the colonies. Nothing was more predictable than a rebellion. The Declarations of 1776, however, especially the Virginia Declaration of Rights, are attempts to mitigate theocratic tendencies which, if left unchecked, would prove detrimental to a new state. The same aspects of a commercial theocracy weaponised against the crown’s authority could be turned against any new state. Since the wars of independence there has been an underlying struggle between theocratic and democratic tendencies in America.

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The Virginia Declaration, while acknowledging that all men are created equal, by lack of reference to natural freedom implies that only those born free are equal. Slavery remained a theocratically legitimate institution. Under such premises, it can hardly be argued that the metabole had a fundamental claim of universal benefit. Moreover, there was no attempt to export the metabole to other countries. There were attempts to conquer British territory, yet these were acts of war. No expedition was sent to Mexico or other countries to make them free and independent, as revolutionary France did in Europe. The claim was a claim of local benefit. Obviously, these events had a great impact on France. But in France the Enlightenment had seeped through all parts of a society now ripe for taking the input much further.

Opposition to slavery in Britain was greater and more vocal than in America. In the early 19^th century, slavery was abolished in all colonies. Ironically, had the American colonies remained under the crown, the abolition might have come sooner. Or much worse: The wars of independence would have been all about slavery.

5. But these are speculations, and even not knowing what the historian’s task is, we know that it is not to ask what-if questions. Was there an American revolution? Is the word revolution a self-assumed term used by the protagonists of the metabole, or a later epithet? This is a good enquiry, but we are not dealing with single “historical facts”. We are asking questions of principle.

Patriotic embellishment is the term.

Why is it that, while only a few metaboles amount to a full scale revolution, most countries are tempted to present at least one of their metaboles as a revolution? The term is emotionally loaded, and it is an ideological term. It is a subtle way for nations and national historians to claim importance for their metaboles. Patriotic embellishment is the term. This is not helpful for any scientific research, and American history, as any country’s history, should be researched without embellishment. These are the historians we need, but who will they be? Patriots trying to judge their own past in their own cause?

It should be a convention among historians not to write about their own country’s history. This should be left to external observers, whose approach is more likely to be dispassionate. This is important when it comes to preventing “historical truths” from being weaponised. It happens all the time. In the psychopathology of political life in America, embellishment is recurrent. It reveals itself, for example, in the discourse of an establishment still struggling to accept that America is not a Northern European country. It’s a country of black people, of Indians, Hispanic immigrants and, yes, a few Nordic types who came as lords of land. Once upon a time, but: Was there not an American revolution?

There is a social group that will never be happy in America. It is those who regard themselves as Europeans, a kind of Post-British race trying to live as if theirs was a Scandinavian promised land. They feel deeply ashamed about America. Ashamed because at every step, in every corner they will see a Black, an Indian, a Latino, a thorn in their eyes reminding them, shouting: You’re living a lie! Why should a country be a cultural satellite of Britain if, acknowledging its diversity, it has much more to offer?

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6. The roots of psychological obsessions are deep, also when it comes to aesthetic obsessions: like racism. An obsession with physical features always bears an underlying psychopathology. It will appeal to the unstable, to those who nurturing a complex of inferiority look for an outlet, a flight from reality: As if not being European despite being white was not being white enough.

Generations of citizens are bred in an environment where racism is the sociopathological norm. How else? Psychological disorders can be socially acquired, by means of common obsessive thinking and behaviour. When racism becomes part of a national identity, and be it just the identity of an elite ashamed of its own country, it is difficult to prevent the past from being weaponised for shameful purposes. Do I say weaponise? Are we still talking about revolution? During the French revolution, slavery was abolished in the colonies. Only for a few years. But this shows an intention of making the metabole work for all, a claim of universal benefit.

How was that in the American metabole? Thomas Jefferson, we were taught by President Trump, was a major slave owner. George Mason would not be happy to see his daughter marry a black man. Abraham Lincoln’s wish was to send the freed slaves back to Africa.

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Underlying these attitudes is the understanding that America is a Nordic country. Slaves and natives are a detail, a marginal problem to be dealt with in due course. A pluralistic country, a society pervaded by racial miscegenation does not fit the theocratic idyll of a Scandinavian promised land. Yet this was the first American dream. The dream of the commercial establishment that led the metabole. Their dream didn’t work out, and this still haunts their descendants.

It makes more sense to speak of evolutions.

7. I would suggest a different approach to Aristotle. Although defenders of slavery felt confirmed in their bigotry by reading the Politikon, where Aristotle defends slavery in the first book, the premise of his argument could be reinterpreted: The common good should be based on a cooperation between an element that works and serves and an element that guides and protects. Yet from this golden premise Aristotle draws the wrong conclusion: Slavery cannot be regarded as a legitimate means of implementation. Cooperation must not be used as a pretext for a society of lords and slaves. Fair cooperation is free cooperation among equals, an activity in which the boundary between serving and guiding is fluid, a dynamic in which the same people may serve and guide each other in different tasks according to natural abilities.

The premise entails a question: Is it good that in a so-called free country all business models and all forms of livelihood should be guided by untoward competition and profit? Is this the American dream: a society of ambitious Edmunds where Edgar has no place? There is a banality, a vulgarity, a tremendous trivialisation of human dignity in this money-making mindset that Aristotle rightly denounces. It is our task, I affirm, to search an enhanced implementation for his golden premise: Make society work not only for Edmund. Make place for cooperation besides competition and exploitation.

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Is Aristotle dreaming? Then let it be a dream. America has always been full of dreams. In the 19^th century, the dream was slavery. Now the dream is to bear arms, allegedly a constitutional achievement. Enlightenment? You would hardly hear Voltaire advocating such a right. The intention of the first legislators was not to turn the country into a den of uneducated vigilantes. In a country that lacks a proper standing army and has to defend itself from a powerful enemy, it is noble, it is appropriate to the spirit of civic virtue to allow and even require that every citizen should bear arms in order to defend the nation if need be. But once you have the world’s best standing army, the argument becomes less convincing. The second amendment is based on the premise that there should be no standing army, and that it is the lack, and only the lack, of a standing army that justifies an industrial-scale arming of citizens.

8. These are my impressions: The American metabole had a limited social participation and the claim of universal benefit was meagre. Many might think I am trying to diminish the importance of the event. They will argue it is legitimate for such a term to evolve from national tradition and be kept. It may be alleged that revolution here means rather the fact that Americans became aware of their national identity. But who are you calling Americans? Rich traders and slave owners? If whenever a region of the world deems itself a nation and fights for independence we have a revolution, then almost everything is a revolution. When Namibia became independent from South-Africa and its citizens felt proud and patriotic about it, this was a revolution. The fact that Latin-American countries became aware of their national identity in opposition to Spain must be called a revolution. And since the people of Brittany have become aware of their national identity, they made ipso facto a revolution against France.

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From a long-term perspective, it makes more sense to speak of evolutions rather than revolutions. An evolution is a long series of loose social and political transformations, including metaboles, that fundamentally change a country. We can speak of an American Evolution from 1765 to 1865, from the first challenge against the British crown to the abolition of the last major colonial institution: the long transition between colonial and modern America. Apart from the French revolution, there was also French Evolution between 1776 and 1871, from the beginning of Louis XVI’s reign to the end of the Paris Commune. Between 1846 and 1965, from the beginning of Pius IX’s papacy to the end of the Second Vatican Council, there was a Catholic Evolution which fundamentally changed the administration of the Catholic Church as a political institution. Finally, what we call industrial revolution is in fact an Industrial Evolution reaching from the 18^th century to the present day.

There is no such thing as a pure historian.

9. Is it such a taboo to ask what the historian’s task is? One might say it is to research the past. But what is the past? Does the past exist as a self-sufficient concept or should we rather admit that when we say past we mean the past of a certain thing? Why, if the past is a self-sufficient concept, then historians must define the concept of past. Yet the past is part of time, and the concept of time is an object of philosophy, which often has asked whether time exist at all. Thus, if the historian’s task is to define time in order to define past, the historian is a philosopher. But even philosophers might argue that the attribute of past needs a reference point. The past is the past of a certain thing. If this be the case, the historian’s task is to focus on this certain thing, to which the fact that it is now or in the past is only an attribute.

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The historian has to know the thing itself and not only the fact that it is in the past. If my object is the past of politics, first I need to know what politics is and how it is understood now. Yet this, it appears, is already the task of a political scientist. The struggle we are facing is to find a scientific task exclusive to the historian. Analysis and criticism of sources? Yet analysing sources is analysing their words, and this requires sensibility for language and linguistic knowledge. The historical analysis of sources is a particular linguistic approach to documents. If this be the historian’s task, the science of history is a particular branch of linguistics. It is not so that being a linguist makes you an historian. But an historian is in fact a specialised linguist. Highly specialised. But still a kind of linguist. Similarly, a dentist is a highly specialised doctor. Knowledge of medicine does not make you a dentist, but being a good dentist implies knowledge of medicine.

It appears that the historian has no intrinsic and particular task. This is probably so because the task is more subtle and complex. There is no such thing as a pure historian. The task cannot be simply and naively knowing the past, for everything has a past, and thus one would need to know everything to be an historian. Perhaps, those we call historians need much longer and more comprehensive training before they can claim the term. I should say that first an historian needs to study philosophy, sociology, psychology, economics and political science, for anything that has a past will be related to these disciplines. After this, one should study linguistics (I am assuming the historian is already a polyglot). Finally, a specialised instruction in the analysis of documents from the past would follow.

This is a long way, but only this can ensure that historians become not just alienated technicians of source criticism but also able to draw legitimate political, economic and philosophical conclusions from their analysis. For example the conclusion as to whether a particular series of events amounts to a revolution. Such conclusions should not be left to political scientists, philosophers and economists, for theirs is the general but not the specialised approach. I am sorry to say an accomplished historian needs both. Yet I know of none with such accomplishment, neither can I claim it for myself. There is only a question left: Those who might go through all these long studies and become accomplished historians – will their final judgment be truly better than our wretched impressions?

II. Archäologie einer grossinstitution

Kunst ist eine existentielle zumutung. sie dient nicht dem körperlichen erhalt und überleben. sie darf sich erlauben zweckfrei zu sein. doch die welt – man verzeihe mir die verallgemeinerung – ist eine zusammenkunft von zweck-, gewinn- und leistungsbesessenen gesellschaften. angeblich geht das überleben nicht anders. so verwundert es nicht dass kunst in all diesen gesellschaften ein fremdkörper ist, eine quelle des unbehagens die nur dann als akzeptabel erachtet wird wenn sie irgendwie geld bring. möglichst viel geld.

Plötzlich entsteht ein kunstmarkt, so dass kunst sich diesem markt einfügen muss um als berechtigt zu gelten. auch der staat spielt hier seine rolle, denn staaten brauchen steuern. arbeit, so der staat, ist eine moralische pflicht des bürgers. stimmt das? plausibel klingt es. aber hat der staat ein definitionsmonopol auf den arbeitsbegriff? nach dem motto: wer kunst schafft und viel geld verdient, der arbeitet als künstler. wer einer künstlerischen beschäftigung nachgeht und nichts verkauft, der arbeitet nicht. warum denn nicht?

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Ist eine schöpferische auseinandersetzung mit der welt nicht mehr arbeit? philosophisch ist die aussage bedenklich. ich weiss nicht ob es viel übereinstimung unter philosophen über die frage gab was der bestmögliche zweck der kunst sei. aber an einem punkt herrscht von Plato bis zu Adorno konsens: der begierde eines marktes zu dienen, sich zum kommerziellen gewerbe herabzudegradieren – ja kurzum: geld zu bringen – kann nicht als endzweck der kunst gelten. kunst ist kein geschäftsmodell. trotz leistungsgesellschaft. vielleicht ist es kein zufall dass der alte Aristoteles diese obzession mit gehalt und gewinn in seinem Politikon verwirft als vulgär, als blosses banausentum, als etwas was leib und seele von ihrer areté als bestmöglicher verfassung nur entfernt und entfremdet.

Unter all diesen prämissen kann zum beispiel die sogenannte pop-kunst ihr demokratisierungsversprechen nicht einlösen. in ihrem drang zugänglich zu sein und massen zu erobern wird sie zum geschäft. der ästhetische gehalt spielt eine untergeordnete rolle. es geht darum alles zu bieten was verkauft, was im grunde eine abstraktere erscheinung von prostitution ist. ich sage prostitution weil sie keine ehrliche ästhetische aussage bietet, sie lässt sich nur für alles mögliche bezahlen. man stelle sich die karriere einer ambitiösen musikgruppe vor: alle sechs monate ändert sich der geschmack des publikums und das angebot muss sich anpassen. jedes lied wird im voraus auf geschäftstaulichkeit geprüft. das will nicht heissen dass die lieder schlecht sind. aber das heisst, die ästhetik beugt sich dem geschäft.

Grundsätzlich sollte man nicht von der kunst erwarten was von der lotterie zu erwarten ist. indem kunst, und gerade die pop-kunst, zum geschäft wird widerspricht sie ihrem versprechen, sie perpetuiert die kunstfeindlichen obsessionen von leistungsgesellschaften, sie tut aller demokratischen gleichberechting und sozialer kohäsion eintrag: weil ihre werke nur darauf zielen konsumenten abzuzocken.

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Diese geschäftswerdung der kunst bringt viele probleme mit sich. das erste heisst institutionalisierung. der markt braucht ja stabilität. er braucht einen ganzen apparat von einrichtungen um das geschäft abzuwickeln. so entstehen museen, galerien, feuilletons, verlage, konzerthallen, kinos, filmkonzerne und ihr spezialisiertes personal von agenten, kuratoren, lektoren, gutachtern und so weiter, also eine ganze verflechtung von einrichtungen die künstlerisches schaffen institutionalisieren und den anspruch erheben autoritative urteilsinstanzen zu sein. sie bringen eine diskriminierung zwischen institutionalisierter und nicht-institutionalisierter kunst zustande. legitime und gute kunst ist demnach nur die institutionalisierte, d.h. die von autoritativen instanzen geprüfte und empfohlene.

Diese verflechtung von institutionen, diese grossinstitution oder Kulturindustrie wie Adorno sie nannte ist nirgends wirklich transparent. mancherorts ist sie ein geschlossenes system, andernorts eine mafiöse seilschaft. das heisst nicht dass sie nirgends vom wunsch beseelt ist der kunst einen dienst zu erweisen. oft ist das personal ehrlich darum bemüht die spreu vom weizen zu trennen. und dennoch schwebt über dieser grossinstitution und ihrem personal ein gigantisches und ominöses fragezeichen: wer seid ihr denn? guckt euch doch an! denn unabhängig vom kriterium des ästhetischen urteils setzt der anspruch »die streu vom weizen zu trennen« einen gewissen überblick voraus, da das gewissenhafte urteil gerecht sein und möglichst alles berücksichtigen will. aber inzwischen leben sieben milliarden auf der erde, von denen die hälfte sich wahrscheinlich als künstler dünkt. wer kann den überblick über das schaffen von milliarden halten?

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Aber seien wir wohlwollend. nehmen wir für den zweck des arguments an, der überblick sei gegeben. es stellt sich nun die frage des kriteriums: nach welchem kriterium soll entschieden werden welche kunst die fragwürdige ehre der institutionalisierung verdiene? wer hat genug ästhetische autorität um dies zu bestimmen? die karriere der meisten vermeintlichen kunstrichter ist oft nicht beeindruckend. an der universität besuchen sie vielleicht ein kompaktes proseminar zur ästhetik und lesen sich ausgewählte stellen von Plato, Kant und Adorno an. dann folgen sechs monate praktikum im museum oder verlag. zum schluss schreiben sie fristgerecht eine arbeit über ein thema das sie nie wieder beschäftigen wird. soll dies als vorbild für die bildung eines ästhetischen urteilsvermögens gelten? oder braucht das urteilsvermögen keine bildung? vielleicht ist kunst so subjektiv dass man als kunstrichter und erlauchter bescheidwisser nur braucht sich vor ein gemälde zu stellen und seinen senf dazuzugeben. aber dann braucht man keine institution.

Wenn hingegen das ästhetische urteil bildung benötigt und es sich trotz aller schwierigkeiten lohnt die frage wiederholt zu stellen und zu untersuchen was das schöne bedeute, wenn all dies zutrifft stellt sich heraus dass spontane proseminarlektüren und ein ehrgeiziges praktikum nicht ausreichend sind. kein gelehrter künstler, kein intellektueller ist von diesem rezept des schwindels, von der aktuellen oberflächlichkeit der erkenntnisvermittlung an universitäten beeindruckt. vielleicht hat kunst einen gewissen kern der zumutung der jedes urteils spottet. vielleicht ist es wirklich unangebracht dass der coole 19-jährige verlagspraktikant vom germanistikinstitut nun plötzlich entscheiden soll welche bücher er geil findet und einer veröffentlichung würdig sind. universitäten sollten die institutionalisierung der kunst nicht fördern, sondern denunzieren.

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Deinstitutionalisierung ist das wort. wer ein buch schreibt soll sich nicht an verlage wenden. wer ein gemälde malt soll von galerien fernbleiben. man soll diese institutionen und ihren anspruch kunstwerke zu legitimieren nicht akkreditieren. warum tun das trotzdem die meisten? weil die grossinstitution eine aura von legitimität um sich kreiert, einen fetisch der dem ego schmeichelt: the world is waiting just for you! die botschaft ist klar. künstler werden von einem dubiosen leuchtturm ermutigt einen personenkult als mass des ruhms für sich anzustreben, denn genau das macht die propaganda der institutionen: sie kreiert einen personenkult um ihre geschäftstauglichsten künstler, und so zieht sie eine gewaltige masse von menschen an, die dem markt schmeicheln wollen um von der masse geschmeichelt zu werden.

In diesem schmeichelhandel wird die grossinstitution zum narzistensammelbecken. wie denn nicht? die meisten künstler haben eine ausgeprägte persönlichkeit und es ist ein leichtes dieses bedürfnis nach lob auszunutzen und für kommerzielle zwecke zu verformen. und dennoch ist narzismus nicht das problem. kunst entsteht oft als eine lebensbejahende wirkung des narzismus als schöpferischer kraft. das problem ist die bewusste förderung des narzismus in all seinen destruktiven aspekten, eine manipulation die unter dem vorwand das werk eines künstlers zu würdigen dessen persönlichkeit verwöhnt und verdirbt. der zumutungskern der kunst wird damit verniedlicht, das werk tritt zurück, die person kommt in den vordergrund. in diesem prozess, in dem sich alles nur noch um die person des künstlers dreht, vollzieht sich der endgültige untergang der kunst. und dennoch wird diese ohnmacht meistens billigend in kauf genommen, denn allzu oft ist ein kunstwerk nur ein mittel zum zweck, das alibi eines selbstbesessenen schaffenden für ein unterschwelliges bedürfnis nach verehrung.

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Anonymisierung ist das andere wort. den fokus wieder auf das werk zu bringen ist der grösste dienst den wir einem künstler erweisen können. grundsätzlich verdient jeder künstler respekt. einige verdienen auch bewunderung. aber lob braucht keiner, denn lob ist im grunde ablenkung, entfremdung, gift für die persönlichkeit. wer kunst liebt bietet ihr sogar die möglichkeit der entpersonalisierung. ich kenne sammler die ihre werke komplett anonymisiert ausstellen. man sieht nur gemälde: keine titel, orte, jahre, keine namen. das privileg der kontextfreheit. was wunder? das ästhetische urteil soll nicht durch äusserlichkeiten beeinflusst werden. zukunftsmusik? wer kunst retten will muss sich eine welt vorstellen in der es berühmte werke aber keine berühmten künstler gibt, eine welt also in der die person des künstlers existiert um in der gegenwart ihres werkes nicht zu existieren.

Institutionalisierte kunst ist alles andere als das: sie ist die perpetuierung von obsessiven teufelskreisen. brauchen wir noch mehr beispiele? na gut, ich habe ein buch geschrieben. ich sehe die korifäer der literatur in ihrem ruhm und verspüre das bedürfnis mein werk institutionell legitimiert und berühmt zu sehen. ich wende mich an agenten, agenten empfehlen mich an verlage, verlage an die presse, die presse an den leser und an preisjurys, und dann kommt der preis. der leser bewundert meine person und der verlag möchte noch ein buch von mir haben, ein kommerzielles auftragswerk, und so entsteht ein buch nach dem anderen. wer sich dieser institutionalisierten kunstwelt unterordnen will muss auch verstehen dass er im grunde mit einer kommerziellen diktatur zu tun hat, die keinen überblick hat und deren autoritätsanspruch kein angemessenes urteilskriterium vorweisen kann. in dieser massenlotterie des ruhms, in der kein ästhetisches urteilskriterium legitim ist, müssen letzten endes auch dubiose elemente die entscheidende rolle spielen: die kommerzielle erfolgsaussicht, der einfluss der agenten, die persönlichkeit und kontakte des bewerbers. was soll denn gleichberechtigung in diesem szenario heissen?

14

Was oft vergessen wird muss oft wiederholt werden: dieses ist ein szenario das menschen zu einem merkwürdigen wettbewerb ermutigt. wer sich hochschläft, wer insistent und permanent schmeichelt, wer eine gewaltige armee von agenten um sich hat, der triumphiert. was bleibt von der kunst? frauen und jegliche minderheiten die ausgegrenzt werden und zu integer sind um sich anzupassen, sollen nicht auf eine reform der institutionen hoffen. wir haben die verantwortung kunst zu deinstitutionalisieren damit es zwischen kunst und betrachtern keine illegitimen zwischeninstanzen geben muss. wie wird eine galerie in diesem fall aussehen, wie wird der galerist vorgehen? ganz einfach: wozu denn galeristen? wir brauchen einen hausmeister der den öffentlichen termin vorschreibt. diejenigen die ihr werk zuerst anmelden stellen es aus. anonym. am tag der ausstellung werden sie gar nicht dabei sein. und wer soll denn müll vom meisterwerk unterscheiden?

Das publikum selbst wird entscheiden. das sind erwachsene menschen die keine ästhetische institution brauchen um sie in ihrem urteilsvermögen zu entmündigen. da wird es vorkommen dass das werk eines unbekannten und das einer berühmten diva nebeneinander hängen, und dass jenes des unbekannten mehr zuspruch findet als das der diva, weil die werke kontextfrei für sich allein sprechen. wenn man aber von vorn herein wüsste, das eine gemälde stammt von Picasso oder ähnlichem und das andere von einer schwarzen frau aus dem getto, würde die psychologie der urteilsbildung sofort beeinflusst. am besten sollen maler sich am mittelalter orientieren und ihre werke nicht unterschreiben. wenn ja, dann nicht als Hans Müller oder Maria Meier, sondern anonymer: Kalter Wald, Nr. 237, Waschmaschine. so kann man gleichberechtigung fördern.

15

Auch die rolle der presse muss untersucht werden. wenn man sich die praxis der heutigen feuilletons anschaut, in denen rezensionen und wertende stellungnahmen zur tagesordnung gehören, stellt sich unumgänglich die frage: ist es die aufgabe der presse kunstwerke zu empfehlen? eines ist sicher: sobald die presse ein ästhetisches urteil ausspricht übt sie ein de facto urteilsmonopol aus, denn kein anderes urteil hat die möglichkeit so viele menschen zu erreichen. indem die feuilletonpresse ausgewählte werke empfiehlt nutzt sie ihr urteilsmonopol aus und missbraucht das vertrauen des lesers, der sie ja nicht in der rolle des bevormünders oder einer ästhetischen institution sucht. seriös ist das nicht. seriös ist es wenn das heft auf theoretische fragen der ästhetik in ihrer gesellschaftlichen aktualität fokussiert statt den leser durch direkte ästhetische suggestion zu entmündigen. jemand mag entgegnen, kunstkritik sei für die presse durchaus legitim. aber es gibt einen unterschied zwischen kunstkritik und ästhetischer suggestion. kritik ist debatte. eine kunstwerkempfehlung, eine wertende und leserentmündigende rezension ist keine kunstkritik.

Vor augen sollte die presse immer eines halten: die debatte ist zwar frei, aber ungleich. ein feuilletonsartikel mag zwar eine debatte entfachen, aber räumlicher vorrang hat die stimme des verfassers. auch wenn von hundert lesern ja zwanzig da sind die etwas besseres zu sagen hätten. deren stimme wird nirgends gelangen. es müsste denn jeder bürger seine eigene zeitung betreiben damit alle stimmen sich proportionell gleich zu äussern vermöchten. dies ist nicht der fall. die presse sollte rücksicht auf diese soziale tragik nehmen: oft haben die fundiertesten meinungen keinen medialen grossaparat hinter sich. daher heisst rücksicht eine gewisse bescheidenheit, ja mässigung des urteils. im bewusstsein dass man seine stimme am schnellsten und am lautesten verbreiten kann ist es edel dieses mediale privileg nicht zu missbrauchen.

16

Bei politischen urteilen sieht das vielleicht anders aus. ihr gegenstand ist nicht so abstrakt und subjektiv wie der des ästhetischen urteils. der anspruch auf politischen überblick ist zwar auch problematisch aber weniger anmassend als der anspruch auf ästhetischen überblick. wie denn nicht? institutionalisierte kunst repräsentiert nur einen bruchteil des kunstlebens einer gesellschaft, und selbst das institutionalisierte ist beinah unüberschauber. hier wiederholt sich die frage: nach welchem gerechten und gleichberechtigenden kriterium soll ein buch oder gemälde empfohlen werden? manche zeitungen betreiben sogar eine robotisierung des urteils indem sie ein fünfsternchen-system benutzen. wer sind denn die kunstrichter die hinter diesen wertungen stecken? ist das der alte student vom proseminar der »mal Adorno angelesen«? ist dies das standardprofil?

Ich will nicht sagen, um Gottes willen, dass nur ein ästhetikprofessor urteile aussprechen sollte. aber oft ist die diskrepanz zwischen der bildung des richters und der verantwortung des urteils zu gross. wir möchten ja das szenario vermeiden in dem es als etwas selbstverständliches gilt nur über die günstlinge der grossinstitution zu schreiben. um aber einen deinstitutionalisierenden blick auf die kunst zu werfen braucht ein feuilleton eine gewisse sensibilität für die fragilität der kunst – nicht als ware sondern als zumutung –, also die bereitschaft diese fragilität zu suchen wo sie wirklich ist, wohlwissend dass sie bei der grossinstitution kaum zu finden ist. insofern überrascht und verstört es dass feuilletons nunmehr öfter das gegenteil machen und für ihre kunstwerkempfehlungen online sogar geld verlangen.

17

Die problematik lässt sich auf drei hauptaspekte reduzieren: (1) die unmöglichkeit des ästhetischen überblicks und somit gerechten vergleichs, (2) die ungenügende sensibilität und bildung des urteilenden und (3) die kommerziellbedingte verstrickung mit der grossinstitution. das sind die gründe warum kunstwerkempfehlungen durch die presse grundsätzlich keine gute idee sind und dem aufklärerischen anspruch der presse nicht gerecht werden. natürlich ist dieser anspruch paradoxal. er ist wichtig. aber auch paradoxal. denn oft betreiben die wichtigsten presseorgane eine messianisierung ihrer aufgabe: das edle opfer der volksaufklärung. nur sei die frage erlaubt, auch wenn sie puritanisch klingt: passt das alles zusammen? ist es nicht widersprüchlich den anspruch einer messianischen volksaufklärung zu erheben und zugleich eine bezahlung für seine mission zu verlangen? soweit ich weiss verlangte Jesus Christus seinerzeit kein geld für seine predigten. die ganzen kosten für die er aufkommen musste wurden ja als teil seines opfers aufgefasst.

Ich habe nie den anspruch erhoben menschen aufzuklären. eine kritische auseinandersetzung mit einem akutellen thema ist keine volksmission. zuweilen reagiere ich auf aktuelle ereignisse in der hoffnung eine debatte zu ermöglichen, damit leser anhand einer bruchhaften einleitung die auseinandersetzung fortführen und sich selbst aufklären. anders funktioniert das nicht. im falle der gedruckten presse kann man die kosten der messianisierung verstehen: es gibt druckkosten, leser sollten auch finanziell dazu beitragen. aber online ist das anders.

18

Wenn ich jetzt sehe dass man für zwei drittel der feuilletonsartikel von sonst respektablen zeitungen online etwa 1,99€ zahlen muss, da muss ich den kopf schütteln, denn es sind ja zeitungen von denen man solche praxis nicht erwartet. plötzlich sehr unmessianisch. und dennoch fördert ihr online-journalismus nunmehr eine zwei-klassen-leserschaft. es ist aber die kleinkariertheit des denkens die am meisten überrascht. gerade in zeiten autoritärer gefahren für die demokratie gehören kunst und kultur zu den fragilsten elementen der gesellschaft, die es also zu schützen und möglichst zugänglich zu halten gilt. stattdessen wird nun eine weitere barriere der entfremdung errichtet, als ob kunst ein exklusiver luxus wäre. gerade jetzt. was hat denn diese praxis für eine aussage? soll dies die leser davon überzeugen dass für 1,99€ gelehrsamkeit und kritisches ästhetisches denken zu erwerben sind? Sokrates hätte das für sophisterei gehalten.

Wer den goldpreis ganz bequem und rund um die uhr verfolgen möchte, der könnte zur kasse gebeten werden. doch in bezug auf einen fragilen feuilletonsartikel ist das eher feige. oder wird jemand einwenden, die journalisten müssen bezahlt werden? aber wofür? niemand hat sie gebeten über kunst und ästhetik zu schreiben. natürlich verdient ein guter dienst an der gesellschaft belohnung. aber wer an seinen dienst glaubt geht davon aus dass die eigentliche belohnung eine bessere gesellschaft ist, denn das war ja der zweck des dienstes. doch zusätzlich geld für den dienst zu verlangen heisst dass der zweck in erster linie nicht wirklich das wohl der gesellschaft war. mit dem finanz- oder politikheft siehts anders aus. ich sage nicht dass geld für ein feuilletonsartikel zu verlangen moralisch illegitim ist. aber eine moralische selbstverständlichkeit ist es auch nicht. kunst ist zumutung, und zu dieser zumutung gehört dass ein für die kunst engagiertes leben sich auf langfristige finanzielle verluste einstellen muss. als annehmlichkeit ist zumutung nicht gedacht.

19

Um der kunst einen besseren dienst zu erweisen brauchen wir zwei elemente: (1) deinstitutionalisierung und (2) anonymisierung. das ist die antwort auf die frage nach gleichberechtigung: warum ist gleichberechtigung in der kunstwelt viel schwieriger zu erreichen als im arbeitsmarkt? weil die kunstwelt noch von einer grossinstitution dominiert wird die in sich selbst ein unlösbares problem ist. reform geht hier nicht. reformieren kann man den arbeitsmarkt. dass eine frau Deutschland vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte verklagt, das ist nur eine frage der zeit, denn der wortlaut der 48er erklärung ist klar und steht nicht zur debatte: gleicher lohn für gleiche arbeit. aber die grossinstitution in ihrer zweifelhaften praxis und ästhetik kann kein gerichtshof reformieren.

Der grundsätzliche fehler der new-yorker petition liegt darin dass sie einem museum die autorität überhaupt zuerkennt streu vom weizen zu trennen. warum denn nur? jeder von uns kennt mindestens zwei lebendige maler deren gemälde eine vergleichbare qualität haben und dennoch wahrscheinlich nie in einem museum aufgehängt werden sollen. die intrinsische aussage des balthusgemäldes überzeugt mich persönlich so wenig wie ihre technik. das alte ominöse fragezeichen schwebt über dem gemälde, dem maler und dem museum.

Soll aber gleichberechtigung heissen dass frauen und minderheiten das recht haben sollten vergleichbares in vergleichbaren institutionen auszustellen? das wäre nur ein kriteriumswechsel des günstlingtums, eine rafinnesse der grossinstitution. gleichberechtigung wäre eher die grossinstitution als vermittler zwischen werk und welt abzuschaffen. mindestens von nun an. die werke der vergangenheit können in ihren museen bleiben – nicht dass uns jetzt an wohlwollen fehlt, auch Balthus gegenüber. ansonsten gilt es diese wörter nicht aus dem auge zu verlieren: deinstitutionalisierung. anonymisierung.

Entmystifizierung.

Ecclesia etiam institutio imperii

At secundum, inquit, theologos Christiana ecclesia non est hominum, sed Dei institutio. Neque impugnamus, sed duas differentes res oportet discernere, alteram Christianam ecclesiam quae, ut aiunt fideles, a Deo confecta est neque ex imperio pendit, verum alteram ecclesiam quam imperium religionem suam agnoscit. Hic non spectamus ad spiritalem identitatem, quae prima Ecclesiae essentia est, sed tantum ad iuridicam. Nam quamquam clarum est spiritalem supra iuridicam esse, oportet intellegere iuridicam. Quoniam iam satis theologi de spiritali tractant, nobis de iuridica disputandum est. Itaque imperatores pontificis maximi magistratum ad papam transtulerunt, qui pontifex antiquissimus magistratus iam ante Christum natum aderat tamquam dux religionis Romanae.

Sane, responderit, sed pagana religio non in ecclesia constituebatur, potius officium ecclesiae pontifice inerat! Verum dicit. Pagana fide autem paulatim desueta, imperatoribus Christianam adoptantibus, primum Constantinus eam tolerare mandaut, deinde Theodosius plenam institutionem imperii agnovit. Quae adhuc tantum theologico sensu universalis ecclesia, nunc iuridico actu ecclesia imperii constituta est.

3

Ne mihi veneritis dictum, quaeso, imperium deesse sed adesse institutionem imperii. Qui ecclesiae caput tantum Romanus episcopus fuerat, nunc quoque pontifex maximus factus erat. Papam quem appellamus distinctas institutiones duas adhuc vestit, alteram ecclesiae Christianae ut summus episcopus, sive papa, alteram imperii Romani ut magistratus, sive pontifex maximus.

3. Summus, inquiet, pontifex papa est nec se maximum vocat. Sed quod summum est, est maximum, et ille, utrum summus an maximus, qui est pontifex pontifex est Romanus: solum Romanum imperium hunc magistratum habet. Quia omnis pontifex nihil nisi Romanus est, summus pontifex et pontifex maximus sunt eadem imperii institutio, quem magistratum Valentinianus imperator III. officiali decreto ad Leonem papam I. et successores in perpetuum transtulit. Magistratus iste non tantum antiquus, verum etiam antiquissima omnium institutionum Romanarum est, quoniam cum nondum erat imperator iam erat senatus, et pontificis officium tam vetus quam senatus.

Nec potest papa quidam aliquando expergisci «nolo, mi fili» dicens, «nolo pontifex esse, esse papa solus volo», et audite rationem: Papa caput est non tantum ecclesiae Christianiae cuiusdam, sed etiam Ecclesiae Romanae, nec potest ecclesia Romana sine pontifice adesse, quo si caput non pontifex est, ecclesia quoque non est Romana. Quae sic vocatur non quia caput ortum sit Romae, sed quod institutionem et magistratum imperii Romani patefacit.

Imperium Romanum universale

Catholicam, interpellat, ad nationalem ecclesiam reducis. Sed male confert qui imperium Romanum rem publicam quandam nationalem vel statum vocat, quandoquidem imperium Romanum non ista vel illa natio, non singula res neque exercitus regio vel terra: imperium est totum universum. Neque increparitis, rogo, nos speciem imperii novam ac novum conceptum fingere, quod non ego, non pontifex, non porcorum quidam rex, sed Octavianus Caesar Augustus cum senatu optimam speciem imperii maioris et infiniti ovante populo elaboraut.

4. Iuridica entitas imperii continuata identitate e tempore Valentiniani imp. III. ac Leonis pp. I. nulla intermissione usque ad nostrum perpetuata est. Nam quamvis Bonaparte dux Pium pp. VI. captivum in Galliam abduxerit, dempsit ille vero temporalem potestatem, identitatem pontificis iuridicialem tamen non dempsit, quia pontifex ubique pontifex manet. Praeterea, quam potestatem tenebat ille clarus Gregorius cum pauperibus suis dum Langobardi violentissimo impetu urbem obsidebant?

Senatus deerat, aberat exercitus atque imperatorum purpurea pompa, sed non aberat Gregorius pontifex, Ecclesia Populusque Romanus. Impavida stabat, dum fugiebant alii, non violentorum leonum grex nec sumptuosa gens togata superbae potestatis cupida, sed placidae oves vigilante pastore suo. Ecce vera civitas Dei ubi mundus tantum ruinas videbat, verum imperium quod demum nascebatur dum in hominum oculis mori videbatur.

5

Imperium Romanum est humanitas redempta. Mundus ubi humana iura respectantur, omnis res publica in pace et cives Deum bonumve amantes in amicitia mutua firmique se adhibent, hic verum imperium, universalis publica res quam Gregorius in nomine Dei et hominum bonae voluntatis amavit, fortis defendit, ex animo toto praestavit.

Nequit pontifex senatum convocare?

5. Servaut et sustulit e mortuorum ruinis melius imperium. Deerant senatores non quia noluisset pontifex convocare, verum quod non erant homines optimo senatu digni qui et Spiritui et cordi verorum civium placuerint. Veri cives sunt homines bonae voluntatis ubique orbis terrarum dissipati. Quibus a senatu serviendum est, cum Gregorii adhuc vox conclamat, reverberat, convocat. Ubi «senatus deest» plangit, quaerit «fiat senatus universali populo dignus!» Fiat redemptus senatus.

Figuris pulchris, inquiet aliquis vestrum, loqueris! Mentimini, Quirites, senatus non est loquendi figura neque ullam loquamur si verbo veritas defuerit figuris pulchrior. Quodsi veritatem quaesieritis, comperite: Institutiones imperii ius tenent convocandi aliae alias. Nam eodem modo quo rex populusque olim «fiat» iusserunt «senatus,» ac «fiat pontifex,» eodem quo senatus «fiat» decreut «imperator» et imperator «papa» tandem iussit «fiat pontifex,» quo postea pontifex «Carolus rex» decrevit «fiat imperator,» eodem modo pontifex ius tenet «fiat» imperandi «senatus Romanus!»

6

Quam generosum pacis imperium cuius magistratus se iuvantes convocant pro bono populorum conventuri. Curia, inquiet, Romana curia senatus est! Curia Romana, id est administri pontificis in compluribus collegiis congregati, non est senatus Romanus, quod isti operant pro pontifice et sub eius imperio, dum officium senatorum magistratus, quamquam si bene factum ad universale bonum confert, non est religiosum.

Pax Romana senatus officium

Quid erit officium renovati senatus? Vera, Quirites, pax Romana. Futurus senatus non institutio theologica, sed concilium fiet ad pacem fovendam, neque aliam vocemus Romanam pacem nisi perfectam inter nationes.

6. Pacificus omnium dissensionum exitus est propositum. Senatum conclamamus qui nationum odium dirimat et bella sistat, qui praesentia firmet foedera inter paciscentes, pugnantes suadeat ad dialogum belligerosque pactor de pace persuadeat, qui unitatem gentium foveat pacificam, a detrimento defendat humana iura, pro destitutis belli victimis cuiuscumque terrae valeat et vincula humanae familiae servet, qui pacificatorias ubique legationes emittat et cohortes amicorum permanentes apud nationum principes vel praesides promoveat.

7

Fiat senatus hodierno sensu diplomatica sui iuris institutio. «Sui iuris» valet libera, neque oportet conventus sub imperio rei publicae cuiusdam vel ecclesiae teneri, quod, quamvis Romana ecclesia et senatus Romanus institutiones sorores sint filiae eiusdem imperii, non decet alteram se in alterae negotia interponere. Quod enim adhuc arguimus non est id quod pontifex papa debeat senatum convocare ut ministerium suae curiae, sed tantummodo dicimus nullum senatum futurum esse legitimum nisi a pontifice vocatum, qui senatus autem post a pontifice constitutus a pontifice liber erit, alio modo non est senatus.

«Diplomatica institutio» valet libere pro pace adeo operans ut senatores tamquam legati statu diplomatico fruantur. Quamquam non est consilium imperii temporalem potestatem restituere, senatus loca, praedia et aedificia nullius status territorium erunt, sed sicut Romae Civitas Vaticana liberam civitatem etiam senatus bona Patrimonium Res Publicae Romanae component.

7. Ubinam mundi, rogarit, praedia ista et aedificia invenientur? Candidati vero non desunt, praecipue Castrum Gandulphi, quod territorium pontifex maximus cesserit senatui. Res publica quoque Itala poterit Romae loca quaedam cedere, quod gestum illi conveniret post perpetrata flagitia in Dicionem Pontificiam, pacificum statum quem sub simulatione voluntatis populi faciendae violenter invasit per militares expeditiones quas si hodie mitterentur universus mundus atque internationalia cuncta pacta vero unanima voce ut violationem iurum gentium condemnarent.

8

Sed Lateranensia pacta adsunt pacis concordiaeque conatus quos oportet benevolenti animo honorare, eodem modo quo generosum cor vocatur ad ignoscendas sibi contumelias gratuito odio perlatas pro vera spiritus conciliatione. Nam satis scimus, Quirites: utrum gallicae an italicae, res publicae sunt fortuitae institutiones, ventus qui venit et abit, status post statum, constitutio post constitutionem, neque dignae sunt immodico amore neque invidia. Dicant quicquid volunt: sola Ecclesia permanet. Quapropter, Quirites, ignoscamus semper! Quamvis deploremus hodiernae rei publicae Italae originem, bona voluntas necesse est tristitiam superare ne parvi tantum queruli videamur, nec nobile fuerit Italo statui nisi optimum optare, quod si id detrimenti ceperit et vacillarit, populus quoque vacillabit.

Sed iam videmus amicos duos status conciliatos, quo certe voluntas Dei manifestatur, quoniam ecclesia nunc, cum huic non temporalis potestas sit, curà temporalium negotiorum est liberata et ad spiritalia melius spectat ut Christo spiritali regi placet. Signum etiam melius conciliationis fuerit quod et pontifex maximus et res Itala publica laborarent pro senatu Romano restituendo, cui pontifex convocans legitimitatem et Italus status Romae collocans firmitatem conferret. Sunt autem alii candidati ad senatum locandum ut senatoriae civitates, e quibus Massilia, Athenae, Alexandria, Carthago, Constantinopolis, dum nihil impedit quominus istae etiam senatoriae fiant.

8. Cum iam satis tractarimus de locis, spectemus rursus ad officia, quod primum erit, ut diximus, concordiam inter gentes fovere, quamobrem magna egebit diplomatica industria. Secundum officium, e primo inferendum, erit conciliatio ita ut senatus optima omnium fiat institutio dissensionum mediatrix. Belligerantes vel certantes nationes querelas retulerint ad senatores qui pensatis rebus senatus consultum decreverint ac tamquam pacis intercessores omni aequitate foedus paraverint.

Quis est merito senator?

Et consensus etiam hoc est: Quod homines his diplomaticis in rebus periti non tantum legati alicuius rei publicae diu magistratus, verum etiam nonnulli quos non assessus in rem publicam nec pomposus longo cursu magistratus, sed ipsa vita et difficultates peritiam docuerunt. Vivunt enim viri et mulieres quas acerba fortuna magis quam artificiosa quaedam schola legatos, amicos gentium et pro bono intercessores fecerunt, qui magnis belli flagitiis permoti valuerunt vel maiores bello operas facere et sudorem, lacrimas, ipsam vitam pro gentium pace profundere. Isti sunt veri ac vita firmati senatores, isti extra magistratus legatos ubique mundi sunt quaerendi, homines maximo merito quos non patriciatus sed vitae opera naturaliter senatores fecit.

Si quis rogarit ubi illos inventuri simus ac quales sint, liceat veritatem dicere: Quos bona voluntas ad maximas omnium operas perduxerit, illi senatores erunt, sane homines cuiuscumque partis, classis, generis, populi, immo vero cuiuscumque religionis. Quid? Quos omnis una causa fratres fecerit, erunt illi de quibus «quam pulchri,» inquit propheta, «super montes pedes annunciantis, praedicantis pacem».

Neque ingrati quaesiverimus qua religione sint pro pace laborantes, cum etiam apostolus «non est enim» inquiat «personarum acceptio apud Deum!» Iam immo Concilium Vaticanum II «Nostra Aetate» ac «Dignitatis Humanae» declarationibus religiosam libertatem atque oecumenicum amorem agnovit inter homines omnis fidei habendum.

Quid enim mirabilis? Cum iam psalmus «benedictus» canat «qui venit in nomine Domini,» quis dubitat quin in nomine Domini veniant qui in pace facienda elaborent? Nam ubi Deum alii «Domine, Domine» loquentes proclamarunt, illi tacentes sua vità Spiritum manifestant Sanctum patrem omnis pacis spiritalem.

10

Neque in cassum docuit Filius «ubi enim» inquiens «sunt duo vel tres congregati in nomine meo, ibi sum in medio eorum». Congregentur immo duo vel tres in nomine pacis et Deus in medio erit. In nomine pacis conventi scilicet venerunt in nomine Christi, quod leges evangelii si minus in confessione vel magis cordibus suis ostendunt.

Senatores non sunt vicarii.

9. Nationes Unitae, inquiet, iam constitutae sunt pro nationum concordia. Sane, et Senatus cupiet collaborationem, sed negari differentia quaedam inter institutiones non potest. Nam delegati Unitarum Nationum sunt vicarii tantummodo nationum eos mittentium. Quae nationes non sub delegatorum imperio, sed imperio capitis cuiusdam vivunt. Quod enim delegati defendunt apud concilium non est conscientia sua, sed aliena mittentis nationis negotia, quae modo iustissimi principis modo nequam dictatoris negotia sunt. Delegatis oboediendum est.

Verum senatores non sunt vicarii, contra suae tantum conscientiae oboediunt. Quod senator quidam ex ista vel illa natione venit nihil valet, quia libere decernet, in omni casu tantum ad aequitatis principium spectans neque tyrannum quendam timens cui rationes alioquin reddendae sint. Quid vero? Oratio nostra de senatoribus, non de servis est. Neque ullam senatores rem debent regi, praesidi vel cuicumque capiti rei publicae, quoniam sui iuris liberi magistratus imperii Romani sunt. Manifestum nunc est quod ius ac multo maiorem libertatem tenent defendendi quod defendendum est. Nam quamvis optimum sit quod in generali concilio Nationes Unitae inter se dialogum colunt nec sistere hic labor oportet, nemo iam mundi dubitat quin tyrannorum atque humanitatis osorum mandatu ibi ingens sequestrorum multitudo laboret et omnibus artibus et negotia exhibens impediat quominus pacis concordiaeque causa saepius prosperet, dummodo parvae dictatorum causae placentur. Sic resolutiones, sic sententiae, sic consulta iam tam multa, etsi non omnia, in cassum concipiuntur neque usquam eunt.

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Senatus consilium autem non est Nationibus Unitis potestatem demere nec sese imponere ut concilium melius restitutum. Senatus contra ponderosum erit Unitarum Nationum complementum, amicus, ita ut hic audiantur legitimae singularum nationum voces, ibi verum liberae voces conscientiae humanae.

Electuri inter se

Cum delegati autem variis modis a nationibus eligantur, quis eliget et quo bono modo senatores? Pontifex maximus primum conventum e duodecim senatoribus finget. Hi erunt cuiusque nationis agentes cives maximo pacis studio et merito, cum religiosis, legatis, politicis, laureatis et artificibus cuius vita optimam ostendat peritiam. Non erunt autem homines ex Ecclesiae Romanae clero ne senatus et ecclesia alter in alterum se interponant. Ecclesia vero iam suo modo pro pace operat. Primo conventu constituto, duodecim illi inter se consulentes decernent qui sint officio digni et alios duodecim convocabunt. Qui cum primis nunc viginti quattuor alios duodecim convocanto, qui triginta sex facti alios duodecim convocantes alios convocanto et simul faciunto donec duoseptuaginta senatores sint. Nam quamvis imperium olim centum, trecentos, sexcentos senatores habuisset, non necesse est senatus habeat restitutus plures quam centum senatores. Qui cum iam duoseptuaginta electi sint universum conventum constituent.

Sic ostenditur quo modo senatus e primo ad universum conventum optime sit instituendus, quo infertur senatores esse inter se electuros. Ne tempore autem pacis fovendae causa careant oportet omnis senator per omnem vitam officium exerceat, et quoniam hominibus maximo merito opus est quorum opera et vita optimae peritiae testes sint, ne quoque in vagis animis frivola ambitio inculcetur, minina senatorum aetas sexaginta fuerit anni. Quamobrem patet senatui eligendum esse novum senatorem cum senator quidam mortuus est.

Suo proprio sumptu est sustinendus.

10. Quamquam, provocat, quo sumptu sustentaturus est senatus, quis suppeditabit pecunias ad praedia atque aedificia ac senatorum collegium sustinendum? Certe non ei erunt, nec bonum fuerit, in perpetuum subventiones cuiuspiam status. In principiis spem decet quandam alere pontificem prima senatui subsidia praebere. Consilium autem non potest aliud esse quam id quod senatus demum suo proprio sumptu se sustineat. Operis enim caret ut reditus fontibus, qui sint fructus ex praediorum atque aedificiorum usu quodam.

Ex quibus aedificiis quidni stadium vel circus vel alius Olympicarum artium locus? Etenim ludos fovens generosam fovet industriae laetitiam ac spiritum amicitiae, qua de causa senatui nulla fuerit infamia e quorumdam fructibus ludorum reditus fontem facere. Plus ultra, scholas condiderit ubique pro scientiis ac liberalibus artibus ubi doceatur humanae dignitatis reverentia, erga omnes homines aequitas ac benevolentia, etiam amor democratiae, quae quamvis imperfecta sit politica species tamen malorum tam multorum minus illa gravis est et inspectis temporibus una iam bona. Et scholam diplomaticam condiderit superiorem in qua adulti legationis ac mediationis artem discant et tamquam privati diplomatae suis propriis inceptis pro pace laborent. Huc adde musea, theatra, bibliothecas quae senatus condens et reditus afferent et munus ad humanitatem quoddam etsi parvum praebent. Cum agri fructibus ex praediis commercium quoque facile fuerit. Operae non desunt quibus solo suo sumptu senatus iam sustentaturus sit.

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Senatores porro modestam mercedem accipient. Modesta hic valet satis ad sane bibendum atque edendum, sobrie vestiendum ac sub tecto versandum, ne merces maior sit quam meritum neve merito magis placeat. Praesumimus scilicet id quod tanti studii pro pace et hominum bono ac meriti vitam agens senator non est homo quem frivola moveant. Neque oportet, ut etiam mos erat in imperio, senatores extra senatum alios reditus quaerant. Si aetatis causa iam pensionem a re publica quadam accipiunt, teneant. Sed privata negotia, commercium, reditus, omnia alia relinquenda sunt, omni mentis et corporis industria senatui data.

Nec tantum casu Plato affirmaut in libro De Legibus quinto optimum omnium hominem nec pauperrimum nec divitissimum esse: minime pauperrimus quod industriose laborans numquam famem patietur, nec divitissimus autem quod necessarium tantum ac nobile cupit, sed nobile est inopes suis propriis pecuniis adiutare, quod gestum non potest vitari nisi virtute perdendo, ita ut fortunae multiplicari nequeant. Bonus ergo numquam praeter modum divitissimus est.

Rhetorica monumenta, cloacae morales

11. Bonus esse – tam facile dictu, victu quam difficile. Sed bonus sese non modo gestis verum etiam verbis ostendit, nam verbum principium omnis actionis. Malum dictum, etsi non gestum, maioris est memoriae quam gestum malum sed non dictum. Quid mirum? Ubi malum gestum malum verbum secutum est, ibi praemeditatio fuit quae malum gravius facit. Ubi autem malum gestum non malum verbum secutum, ibi repente gestum fit ac sine mentis praemeditatione, ergo minus grave. Quodsi gestum fons est criminis, doli vero fons est verbum. Quamobrem malus verbi usus multo gravior est amenti malo gesto.

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Senatui, cuius in concilio certe orationes erunt dicendae cum de variis causis disputetur, non est ferendum nisi modicum dicendi genus, nec patiendum est effrenatum verbum grandiloquens atque animi commotionem magis quam rectum argumentum quaerens. Veterrimus est Iaponicae gentis mos rhetoricam abhorrere calliditatem, nec politicum ullum huius artis usus ad cives persuadendos iuvabit ubi silentium, sincera haesitatio, verborum paucitas ac paupertas pluris valent. Ab istis capiatur exemplum neque ab antiquo vitio Graeco quod neque Lysian neque Demosthenen neque Romae Ciceronem ad veritatis virtutisque astra extulit. Ne fiat senatus histrionum concursus. Qui vero fuerunt oratores isti nisi demagogoi ac populi instigatores? Quid iam nostros docet moralis pulchrorum confusio verborum? An modicae nominarentur orationes in Catilinam?

Sed pro patriae, inquiet, amore ac salute severus fuit orator bonum Quiritium quaerens. Quid? Si quis orator in virum quendam, etsi pessimum omnium, tot contumelias dixisset apud hodierni status concilium publicum, num iste comprehenderetur et apud iudicem de calumnia ac populi seditione accusaretur? Nam nostrae aetati nondum est consentaneum sub patriae amoris simulatione elegantibus verbis caedem vel perditionem civis cuiusquam petere. Quod olim callida rhetorica dignitatem venenans efficiebat nunc leges de humanis iuribus ac civiles poenalesque codices et inter nationes foedera nullo homine vexato vel interfecto proficiunt. Qua de causa Ciceronis orationes, quamvis fere rhetorica monumenta, morales tamen cloacae sunt quas non oportet pueros Latinitatem discentes docere: legant contra librum De Officiis et Tusculanas disputationes, orationes verum ad mentem adultam relinquantur.

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Quod Ciceronis orationibus effugit est id quod scelesti, etiam rem publicam tentantes, respectum quoddam merentur. Quamquam iustum est criminis multationem petere et officium omnis rei publicae est scelestum punire, zelo puniendi non licet omnibus quae sint verbis vitam cuiusdam hominis pro rhetorica delectatione ad libitum et infinitum infamare ac peracriter abicere. An nobile est iactare ut orator «nulla iam pernicies» inquiens «a monstro illo atque prodigio moenibus ipsis inter moenia comparabitur»? Innata est omnibus dignitas, et malus homo nihilominus homo est. Non est monstrum, nemo est prodigium. Omni studio enim oportet cavere ne Ciceronis lectio Latinitatis scholas fascistorum scholas reddat in quibus politicum odium dummodo pulchris verbis ornatum iam venustum videatur. Si quis senator immodicum genus dicendi sibi consentaneum arbitretur statim ab aliis reprehendatur, ut omnes sciant senatum non esse theatrum.

12. Quoniam de modico verbi usu tractamus quo senatus immaculatum ut decet aequanimitatis speculum fiat, aliquis roget an senatores Latine locuturi sint. Latinitas certe ubique est veneranda et fovenda ut patrimonium imperii, sed differentes res sunt senatus et lingua Romana. Nam quamvis lingua possit usque ad gradum quendam senatus officialis sermo institui et senatores eam discere persuaderi, primum senatus officium tamen non est Latinitatem sed pacem fovere, neque exspectandum est variae vitae ac cultus homines undique mundi delectos repente esse doctissime Latine locuturos. Quia tempora concilium ad maximam attentam diligentiam urgent, quod est dicendum hoc dicendum est quocumque sermone videatur. Quamobrem interpretibus opus erit sicut apud Nationes Unitas accidit, quod, cum oratores atque interpretes cogantur ad cogitationes in argumentum potius quam in ornamentum dirigendas, minime malum erit. Etenim templum omnium sermonum senatus fiet.

Latinitas ne sit vexillum odii.

Et valde oportet cum de Latinitate tractemus haec dicere, nam ipsi sumus qui rerum gestarum memoriam saepe in maius celebramus non secundum humanitatis amorem sed ad alios a communi bono segregandos. Maxima enim cura caremus ne Latinitas ut vexillum odii contra aliter credentes ac vitam mentemque colentes usurpetur. Nonnulli sumus qui mahometanos detestamur et memoria classicae antiquitatis tamquam armis in eos utimur. Tantum est odium ut praeferremus in antiqua Graecia versari, ubi tertia hominum pars in dira vixit servitute, quam versari in hodierna Italia ubi ternae centesimae, si tam multae, mahometani sunt, quasi illa vita dignior fuisset nostrà. Ecce facile fuerit sub funesto Ciceronis exemplo rhetoricam antiquissimam imitari artificiosa voce concitantes: Cave, Europa, Saracenos qui veniunt cultum ac civitates nostras deletum, cave canes illos osores nostri quorum ex ordine modo factiosi, fanatici, seditiosi ac tromocrates proveniunt. Vexillum extollamus amoris morum maiorum et humanae dignitatis ad musulmanos cum eorum cultu odendos!

Haecne est oratio? Non, Quirites, nolite malam istam vocem audire quae nomen et humanitatis et Latinitatis offendit et bonos contristat. Non est ista benevolentiae vox, non est exhortatio quam ex Socratis ore audiremus. Contra, ille cum Callicle disceptans καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ inquit οὕτω χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει. Etenim senatus eget loquendi genere quod ad iustum ducat.

Sed ne pro iustitia loqui quidem satis est, quia et Ciceronis odium in Catilinam populum ad «bellum iustum» gerendum postulat, unde patet iustitiam, cum omnis homo id nomen pro suis commodis adhibeatur, definitu difficilem esse. Quia vitandus est abusus eorum qui sub «iustorum irae» simulatione facinora agunt, est primo agnoscendum quod nemo nostri praeter dubium novit quid iustum sit, qua de causa iustitiae studium non satis est ad alios persequendos, sed contra, cum omnes de iusto falli possimus, studium iustitiae etiam caret misericordiae studio. Non est ergo iusta oratio nisi maxima cum misericordia dicetur.

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Quod vero et Franciae et Galliae maiorum mos ac gravis memoria ac vox misericors dicit contristata, si quis ignorat, agnoscat: Audi, filia, Hugenotarum sanguis per civitates tuas ac vias vix aruit, a Deo et cunctis gentibus deploratum facinus, et iam machinaris in musulmanos proximam Bartholomei noctem? Nonne satis fuerunt lacrimae quas homines in terra et in coelis angeli profuderunt? Iam oblita es laborem multorum saeculorum esse necesse ad rei publicae fortitudinem erigendam, cum ad omnem virtutem delendam unius infamia diei satis sit? Muta istam mentem tuam quod pax quam diligis Romana nihil nisi Romana tolerantia est. Roma quae omnes religiones tolerans diu fortis fuit, debilitata est cum incepit Christianos persequi.

Populus Romanus sunt omnes.

Sed defendimus, inquiet, cultum religionemque nostram ab alienis barbaris. Quid vero? Repente Christiani sunt qui nuper sub patriae amoris simulatione Ecclesiam ex cuncta Gallia expugnabant, Catholicam fidem oderant et in rei publicae nomine monasteria debellabant antiquissima? Mirabilis conversio! Sed homines bonae voluntatis non sinent ut in Ecclesiae Romanae nomine mahometanos persequantur. Contra, Quirites, senatus eorum advocatus erit, senatus erit Romana tolerantia, conciliatio gentium erit senatus. Apud quem omnes sunt populus Romanus.

13. Ne proponamus vexillum odii ac belli cum iam melius habemus nec vero e temporum pulvere aquilas evocemus ac violentos leones, quod e Gregorii papae casu patet quomodo transeat gloria mundi. Non iam exercitu Romano caremus neque eius imperatore, nec cupimus Romanum pontificem adhortari ad tales institutiones convocandas. Senatus autem deest. Fiat senatus!

Vexillum aliud extollemus, quod vexillum supra pictum ostendit verum senatus animum, album quia pacem quaerens, purpureum quia continuitatem imperii et virtutis perpetuitatem illustrat. Is complectitur color nobilitatem, bonam voluntatem, pro bono studium, maximum immaculatum meritum. Senatus populusque Romanus: Purpurea inscriptio testatur ad nobilia spectantes. Fovent per saecula causam quae alba vexilli dextrà lucet, impavidum signum.

Os cargos se ocupam por mérito?

II. Mas falemos de política, pois quem escreve precisa de entretenimento. mesmo que seja um riso macabro às custas da credulidade, tragédia e do transtorno das massas. é irônico mesmo: pensam que é a literatura o entretenimento, quando a bem dizer o circo, o enredo, o verdadeiro teatro está na vida política. gostoso é rir. Platão dizia: o preço de não se envolver em política é ser governado por inferiores. é que na pólis de Platão valia mais a pena se envolver. a voz chegava em algum lugar. contanto que não fosse voz de escravo, pois era injusta a sociedade da pólis. mas hoje é mais difícil: tem país por aí com um bilhão de habitantes. é... virou aquele salve-se-quem-puder desastroso do sêmen.

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Eu se fosse Deus, confesso, teria organizado o aspecto logístico da coisa um pouco melhor: botava no sêmen só quem vai fecundar mesmo, porque assim o projeto era mais eficiente, econômico, livre dum desperdício teleológico torturador de teólogos. bom mesmo era se antes da gênese Deus tivesse lido um pouco de Aristóteles. coitado, Aristóteles ficaria arrasado se alguém lhe tivesse explicado os pormenores da origem. que grandes obras o mundo perderia!

Que em política o mérito se sobressai por si mesmo? questionável. mas o mérito vale, e já que estamos aqui vale a pena ver se de algum modo não possa valer mais, pois o correto é isto: que todo cargo público se ocupe por algum critério de mérito. é premissa de ouro, princípio de argumento, consenso, e quem não concorda pare de ler: contra principium negantem disputari non potest. como já estou desviando meu tempo imprecioso da arte para a política, o que me importa buscar não é o que seja simplesmente viável, real e pragmático. importa o melhor possível, independente de circunstâncias e dificuldades. se houver alguma busca, busque-se isto ou nada mais.

Uns chegam por concurso, outros indicação, outros por eleição. o ajudante da prefeitura passa em concurso, o ministro é indicado, o presidente é eleito. como os indicados são indicados por quem já ocupa cargos por concurso ou eleição, atenho-me apenas ao concurso e à eleição. e aí vai:

Genealogia do concurso

III. O que chamamos concurso é uma prova a que concorre (daí o termo) um grupo de competidores do qual apenas um ou poucos são escolhidos. bonito é perguntar, já que estamos aqui, qual a motivação de quem presta concurso. servir o Estado? deveria ser, pois o que está em jogo é um cargo público e com esse, por menor que seja, a salvação da coisa pública. quem quer entrar, mostre serviço. felizmente, grande parte dos funcionários concursados, em qualquer país, são pessoas ilibadas e em tudo dignas.

Complicado é quando a motivação se deturpa. há cenários em que o salário e a proteção do cargo são tão altos que por si só corrompem. mas dinheiro não pode ser incentivo maior do que o conteúdo do cargo. quem quer de fato servir deve servir com ou sem salário. o incentivo deve se originar da natureza intríseca do ofício. e no entanto, ouvi dizer de Estados em que pessoas querem passar em concurso «para não trabalhar». estudam para a prova não por amor ao conteúdo e ao cargo, mas pela ambição do salário, da estabilidade e duma certa impunidade inerente ao cargo. o melhor, portanto, é que o incentivo do salário seja sempre menor que o incentivo do ofício. que não se preste concurso a fim de passar a vida sendo pago para não trabalhar. idealismo? onde a ambição dos funcionários é trabalhar só por dinheiro, ou melhor, ganhar para não trabalhar, o Estado para. não se deve incentivar esta ambição. esses dois princípios devem guiar a oferta dos cargos: que o trabalho motive mais que o salário, e que a estabilidade não seja impunidade.

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Porém, dirão, se o salário for baixo ninguém prestará concurso. então que não haja concurso, haja conscrição. os cargos devem ser exercidos não por quem quer, mas por quem é capaz. não é para ser gostoso. do mesmo modo que o Estado conscreve seu cidadão ao serviço militar, conscreva ao público. ao invés de incentivar ambiciosos a decorar num cursinho algum pseudo-saber passa-prova, o Estado pode acompanhar o desempenho dos jovens e conscrever os mais aptos. Tem o direito de escolher, para o bem comum, o mais apto a um cargo. contanto que a conscrição se faça por tempo limitado: dois a cinco anos, salário mediano. depois, quem quiser fica, quem quiser sai. uma coisa é certa: para o bom funcionamento das instituições, é preciso equilíbrio entre concurso e conscrição.

O parecer dos fantasmas gregos

IV. Autoritarismo? Aristóteles chega ao ponto de afirmar, na Política, que o ser humano como cidadão não é dono de si mesmo: pertence ao Estado. mas não é o Estado fascista que Aristóteles tem em mente, e sim um Estado guiado por uma politeia, um governo constitucional, onde os «decretos da assembleia» não passam por cima da lei. como quer que seja, não havia a noção de dignidade inata da pessoa humana. a dignidade, no entendimento antigo, decorre da virtude e da vida que a prova e manifesta. apenas esta dignidade adquirida confere ao cidadão direito à vida. é por isto que certas passagens dos gregos assustam, por exemplo Platão, que postula em Nomoi pena de morte para o cidadão que roubar o templo. argumenta: quem cresceu e foi educado no seio dum Estado justo e disciplinado e nem por isto manifesta virtude, antes rouba do patimônio dos deuses, é cidadão incorrigível e não tem o direito de reclamar do Estado poder sobre sua própria vida. isto porque Platão, aqui, tinha em mente o seu Estado ideal em Creta, de cinco mil habitantes. Estado que, entre os gregos, seria justo e aceitável. é que não imaginavam os desdobramentos que o Estado totalitário, partindo dum princípio semelhante ainda que não idêntico, manifestaria.

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O que cabe é uma releitura dos gregos mais que rejeição. o ser humano, admitamos, possui dignidade inata anterior à sua condição de cidadão, dignidade que não requer legitimidade pela virtude, embora a dignidade adquirida pela virtude certamente engrandeça o ser humano, também como cidadão. o Estado pode não ser dono, mas espera a submissão de todos à lei. não deixou de ser o palco no qual os cidadãos se unem em busca do bem comum. é portanto razoável e legítimo que o Estado espere isto: que cada qual preste o seu concurso para o bem comum.

É neste sentido que, a meu ver, conscrever os cidadãos mais aptos a um serviço temporário, remunerado e consoante à dignidade humana inata não configura, por parte do Estado, agressão aos direitos humanos. ao contrário: quando os cargos se ocupam pelos mais aptos ao invés dos mais ambiciosos, a diligência do servidor honesto, a sua capacidade de dizer sim ao Estado que o chama e sacrificar ou pospor ambições pessoais para o bem comum, beneficia os concidadãos e fortalece o respeito às instituições e aos direitos do cidadão e do ser humano. isto no que se refere a cargos por concurso e conscrição.

A eleição é refém de partidos.

V. Não é diferente com a eleição. convém-se que a sua finalidade é proporcionar ao povo a maior participação possível à escolha dum cargo. razão pela qual a eleição se restringe aos cargos mais altos. ocorre que hoje em dia as eleições se reduzem a um modelo fixo que nem sempre cumpre a sua finalidade. primeiro porque, diferente da pólis grega, os Estados atuais são super-povoados, e nem seria exegerado perguntar até que ponto o Estado atual é praticável. de repente, meio bilhão de pessoas tem de escolher entre dois candidatos. não era este o cenário que Platão e Aristóteles tinham em mente.

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Por que cito tanto esses fantasmas gregos? porque nossos sistemas políticos pretendem-se herdeiros duma Grécia ideal, imitando estruturas e emprestando termos: sobretudo democracia. é importante ver, portanto, o que os gregos realmente têm a dizer de tantas imitações e distorções. vejamos:

No Estado grego, havia uma outra qualidade na relação entre o cidadão e os candidatos. porque eram poucos, porque se conheciam, porque a dinâminca do debate era mais intensa. e porque não havia partidos: não havia intermediários ideológicos entre o candidato e o povo. os partidos evolveram a partir do século XVII na Inglaterra. até então, havia o parlamento e as facções informais que surgiam e se desfaziam a depender da causa em debate. fora sempre assim. na república de Roma, havia sim os optimates de Cícero defendendo antigas tradições, e os populares de César exigindo abertura social, mas o limite entre ambos era fluídico, o entendimento geral sendo este: o eleitor não deve votar por filiação fixa a uma facção, mas decidir sempre de acordo com as circunstâncias ao tempo de cada eleição. há situções que requerem uma certa política, enquanto outras requerem a oposta.

O surgimento de super-estados encorajou a formalização de facções em partidos como meios de identificação ideológica em massa. este é o trunfo do partido como instituição: canaliza opiniões a um discurso comum e uniforme. apresenta candidatos como representantes, espelhos desse discurso. nada disso decorre do pensamento de Platão ou Aristóteles, nem poderia, porque ambos, em seu consenso denunciador de toda demogogia, teriam anotado o perigo conspícuo da instrumentalização do partido como arma retórica empobrecendo o discurso político, numa palavra: demagogia organizada. ocorre que o partido, ao mesmo tempo que canaliza, banaliza e trivializa o conteúdo político. envolve-o num invólucro que, no afã de se tornar consumível, recorre a simplificações e reduções impróprias: esquerda e direita. conservador e liberal. preto e branco. bem e mal. são dicotomias caricaturísticas. nada disto existe. a ironia estoica passa e profere em meio a demagogos: é lixo. é simplesmente lixo.

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VI. Vamos fazer um pequeno intermezzo? olha, quem disse, afinal, que dá para comparar espermatozoide com ser humano? talvez seja tudo lindo e maravilhoso: o espermatozoide não é uma entidade ética. é um ser vivo ou portador da vida, sim, dotado de instinto, sim, já que sabe instintivamente o que quer, mas não tem intelecto nem razão. nem sentimento. e se sentir a dor da morte, quem sabe se morre mesmo praguejando contra o vencedor do concurso? talvez não morra, talvez desapareça todo feliz da vida, contente em perder o concurso para encontrar o nirvana venéreo em região ilustre e cobiçada. pode ser, pode até ser.

Então salvamos Aristóteles do infarto? é complicado. o problema é que, mesmo que os filhos dessa coisa toda, que me perdoem o termo indelicado, não sejam seres éticos e morram todos felizes, uma coisa é certa: há desperdício. é por isso que digo: se Deus fosse alemão, faria como eu, botava no sêmen só o que vai fecundar mesmo e pronto. perfeito.

Conclaves eleitorais – por quê?

VII. Mas o que passa despercebido, em tudo isso, é que apenas partidos propõem candidatos. mais consoante ao espírito grego e pai do Estado de direito é reformar o instituto da eleição, e já que neste mundo tanta coisa se perde, perca eu o resto deste ensaio descrevendo um certo sonho da noite passada: conclaves eleitorais.

Se no tempo dos gregos tivesse havido um super-estado, as eleições para os cargos máximos seriam assim: sortear um certo número de cidadãos e convocar a um conclave eleitoral. formar dez conclaves a tomar lugar, cada qual, em diferentes cidades. em cada conclave, os eleitores sorteados debaterem, em privado, por um ou dois meses, quem é cidadão mais apto a exercer o cargo. nomear o cidadão escolhido pela maioria simples dos votos. os dez conclaves apresentarem portanto dez candidatos. o Estado apresentar esses dez à escolha do povo por sufrágio universal. ocupar o cargo o vencedor.

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Então é só sonho mesmo? mas doutro modo o que ocorre é isto: os cargos máximos são sequestrados pela força do mais ambicioso. partidos convertem-se em campos de batalha e a coisa vira um vale-tudo: as armas da influência e da retórica, promessas de vantagens, intrigas, compra de votos, sistemas fechados e outros fenômenos que, em psicologia, o estudo da dinâmica de grupo esclarece. que alguns, ao perderem uma eleição, passam o resto da vida numa canditatura após a outra. é por isto que, em países como a Alemanha, a prática dos partidos é diferente: só se concorre uma vez. o candidato que perde uma eleição nunca mais pleiteará o mesmo cargo. assim se evita que as mesmas faces passem vinte ou trinta anos dominando o cenário, aproveitando-se de sua posição no partido para cercear a oportunidade de outrem. fazem da campanha em causa própria uma carreira profissional.

Uma das maiores premissas da Política de Aristóteles anda um pouco esquecida: a constituição não deve encorajar ambições frívolas. a verdade é que o cidadão veramente mais apto é de caráter nobre e sendo nobre é modesto. em seu princípio de pudor e decência, jamais há de solicitar para si mesmo um cargo de envergadura, pleiteando e fazendo campanha da porta e porta. o artifício é grosseiro. toda campanha, toda ambição exacerbada, todo afã de persuadir multidões em causa própria revela um baixo caráter. porque toda ambição ambiciona o que é gostoso, proveitoso. ninguém ambiciona com tanto afã o que é custoso, e assim deveria ser o cargo de quem governa: não é para ser gostoso. não é para estimular a gana de quem busca no cargo o prêmio da loto.

É por isto que o dinossauro grego escreve: não é para quem quer, mas para quem é apto, pois quem é apto deve governar querendo ou não. do fato de serem os cargos máximos eleitos por voto popular não decorre que o cidadão deva ter o direito de solicitar esses cargos por si mesmo e para si mesmo. ainda que solicite por intermédio de um partido. para certos cargos é aceitável que partidos solicitem o cargo para o seu candidato, mas para outros não é aceitável solicitar o cargo nem em pessoa nem por intermédio de instituições. é nestes casos que se conscrevem conclaves.

Sorteio e organização dos conclaves

VIII. Mas o sonho continuou: O Estado provia todo cidadão com um título de eleitor. havia um registro nacional. eram dele sorteados cem eleitores para cada conclave. depois, sorteadas as cidades. o Estado notificava e escoltava os conscritos a seus respectivos conclaves, arcando com todos os custos. cada conclave debatia durante dois meses. para evitar influência externa, os eleitores permaneciam incomunicáveis, sem acesso a aperalhos eletrônicos. ao cabo do prazo, cada conclave apresentava ao Estado o seu candidato.

É óbvio que nenhum membro do conclave poderá ser nomeado, e que o nomeado não tem a opção de recusar a nomeação. aqui, também, o princípio é claro: quem usufrui do bem comum que o Estado proporciona deve estar disposto a assumir o fardo do cargo máximo, se o povo chamar. invenção minha? até 1860, a constituição da cidade livre de Hamburgo previa: os membros do Senado, que era seu corpo executivo, eram eleitos pelo próprio Senado e à revelia. o cidadão eleito tinha a opção de aceitar a nomeação ou deixar a cidade. pois quem recusa o cargo máximo do Estado não é digno de ser cidadão.

Critérios de aptidão

IX. Como reúne cidadãos de todo tipo, cada conclave é a própria sociedade em miniatura. mas como escolherão seus candidatos? que diz o sonho? num primeiro momento, os membros se familiarizam em debatendo o estado da coisa pública. vão emergindo cidadãos como opções de candidatos. num dado momento, cada membro terá em mente cinco pessoas. a escolha final emerge da comparação calma e criteriosa de nomes e dos que nesse processo forem ganhando a maior aprovação. passa-se aos poucos a séries de votação, alternadas com debate, até que um nome obtenha maioria simples de votos.

São critérios de aptidão: conhecimento e formação, experiência e engajamento, currículo penal. conhecimento é a educação formal em áreas importantes para a exerção dum cargo máximo: filosofia e humanidades, economia, direito como filosofia da lei, conhecimento de idiomas e bom domínio de matemática. quanto maior o conhecimento, maior a aptidão intelectual. aqui não se enquadra porém o conhecimento técnico: medicina, engenharia, ciências naturais, direito especializado não têm a mesma utilidade. mas não são inúteis. todo conhecimento adquirido por longo e disciplinado estudo enriquece o homem como cidadão.

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Por experiência se entende tanto a atividade permanente em área semelhante ou importante ao cargo, quanto o tato na lida com pessoas e grupos, o senso de responsabilidade, a capacidade de liderar com moderação, constância perante o caso adverso. engajamento é toda atividade permanente e não remunerada em prol do bem comum, iniciativa própria pelo que é nobre e portanto nobre em si mesma: manifesta a grandeza de quem não deve nada a ninguém mas se sacrifica por muitos. é aqui que o médico, o engenheiro, o advogado, o empresário, o químico, o professor podem fazer a diferença. é a diferença que a ironia estoica faz.

O currículo penal é a história dos crimes. em princípio, quem foi condenado não deve ocupar certos cargos. mas o ser humano é capaz de se redimir. é preciso olhar cada caso com uma certa compaixão cívica e encorajar em todos o desejo de renovação. é preciso honrar e reconhecer os cidadãos que se reabilitam. não crer na redenção do criminoso é não crer no Estado, pois é do Estado o dever de corrigir seus criminosos.

A perquirição deve ser severa.

X. Nomeados os canditatos, há um período de perquirição, momento em que o povo forma o seu juízo. os elementos da perquirição são o debate e o inquirimento. no debate, os candidatos se reúnem e discutem um problema em especial. pode haver vários debates sobre vários temas da administração pública. o inquirimento é um encontro entre os dez candidatos e os mil membros dos dez conclaves, no qual os eleitores dos conclaves questionam os candidatos, em grupo ou individualmente. para difundir as sessões de perquirição, o Estado utiliza o canal midiático mais efetivo.

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É na perquirição que se observa os critérios de aptidão: o conhecimento, a capacidade de negociar, de ceder, a civilidade, o engajamento, o currículo ético são elementos que aos poucos emergem. é obrigatório o voto do cidadão? em eleição por intermédio de conclave deveria ser, por respeito àqueles que foram conscritos, visto que cada um de nós poderia ter sido sorteado.

Já em eleição por intermédio de partido, o caso é questionável: porque nenhum cidadão tem a obrigação moral de legitimar, pelo seu voto, uma loteria de ambiciosos. ainda que o preço do abster-se seja ser governado por inferiores, e direi por quê: quem se abstém ao menos será governado à revelia, enquanto quem vai votar sanciona uma tal loteria da qual só pode sair um governo de inferiores. onde a eleição se reduz a isto, o cidadão deve advogar conclaves. há uma rebeldia cívica quando uma expressiva massa não comparece ao voto e recusa, exigindo coisa melhor.

Quanto ao segundo turno das eleições diretas, se a margem de vitória for mínima, por exemplo menos de 55%, ambos candidatos exercem o cargo em colegiado. dividem entre si as tarefas. um se ocupa da política externa, outro da interna. um atende à economia, outro à sociedade. assim são mais moderadas as decisões.

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É problema intrínseco dos super-estados o termos um bilhão de pessoas elegendo um candidato entre dois. extrapola a finalidade e a eficácia da eleição. ora, é impossível reduzir todos os impasses duma sociedade de tais proporções à existência de duas pessoas. quem num Estado de um bilhão vence uma eleição por margem de 1%, é ocupante aceitável do cargo, na falta de melhor método. será porém ocupante legítimo? é legítimo quem não foi eleito por meio bilhão de pessoas? o colegiado mitiga um pouco a dificuldade, embora não resolva.

Um dia os partidos se redimem.

XI. Desse processo o partido sai ganhando. privado da participação ativa nas três etapas (conclave, perquirição, eleição), tem mais tempo e energia para elaborar programas políticos. os quais, oriundos dum estudo mais calmo, têm maior qualidade e são mais úteis.

Antes do processo eletivo o partido, mesmo sem nomear candidato, pode divulgar um programa político. depois da eleição, estará disposto a prover aconselhamento. cabe ao governante, em cada caso, pesar e comparar argumentos.

Ademais, em certas eleições os partidos poderão nomear candidatos. é bom que as eleições para cargos máximos sejam por intermédio de conclaves. eleições para cargos menores, porém, por intermédio de partido. aqui se incluem cargos legislativos. também possíveis são métodos mistos: em Estados bicamerais, uma câmara se elege por intermédio de partido, outra por conclave. ou ainda, numa mesma assembleia, parte dos membros por partido, parte por conclave.

Assembleias cíclicas

O importante é que a constituição prescreva a dissolução completa da assembleia em períodos regulares. porque é natural que na assembleia, como explica a dinâmica de grupo, tomem lugar fenômenos como corporativismo e corrupção, que em certo grau sempre existem. quando o grupo é um sistema fechado, é impossível impedir essas práticas. as quais se perpetuam quando, por eleições, uns membros saem e outros ficam, visto que os que ficam contaminam os que entram com as más práticas.

A constituição deve prever mecanismos para dissolver a assembleia regularmente, por exemplo a cada vinte anos. terminado um vintênio legislativo, trocam-se os membros. mas é preciso que saiam todos, do presidente da casa ao faxineiro, para que em termos de dinâmica de grupo nenhuma conduta viciosa se perpetue. entra uma turma nova, refresca-se a assembleia com o ímpeto de pessoas sem ciência concreta de antigos vícios. durante o vintênio, por conta de eleições a cada quatro ou cinco anos, alguns membros ficam, outros saem, de modo que algo da dinâmica se perpetua. findo o vintênio, saem todos.

Ao ouvir um poema choraram.

XII. É o que escreveria Aristóteles, imagino, se houvesse a seu tempo um super-estado em busca de regime democrático e justa distribuição de cargos. isto porque Aristóteles tinha uma certa curiosidade pragmática. Platão decerto nem responderia. quanto a mim, escrevo. defendo: os direitos humanos. a paz entre os povos. o Estado de direito. a democracia.

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Mas é bom saber que, entre o modo antigo e o nosso, existiu uma era que redime o mundo. que maravilha, que grandeza e que transcendência existencial: aqueles dois vassalos, dois vassalos cuja vida ligada à terra era cuidar de gado e rezar até morrer. dois vassalos medievais cujo medo era medo do inferno e que nada cobiçavam e sem nenhum conforto tinham tudo. que vidas! esses foram os homens que, ao ouvir um poema, choraram. mas esses empresários de hoje, a multidão de impostores hedonistas, essa turba de ambiciosos, o lixo existencial de quem chafurda como mero vencedor de concurso venéreo, a massa magistral levando pelas ruas seus medos mesquinhos e medíocres, o sopro artificial dos superficiais, as vidas desses nossos bilhões não terão, que me perdoem, não terão jamais a dignidade de dois vassalos medievais. dois elementos em cuja obscuridade, em cujo drama místico tudo o que é humano alcançou seu zênite. o resto é viver em função de ganhar dinheiro.

É isto o que somos, a isto nos resumimos. e por isto são esses os homens que aparecem por aí em época de eleição pleiteando cargos, escrevendo em suas testas »eu sou o cara, eu sou o cara«: empresários espalhafatosos, gladiadores, justiceiros sem causa ou sem justiça, não sei qual o pior, apresentadores de televisão e outras pessoas ditas públicas. gananciosos que, sem nenhuma aptidão nem prévio engajamento, contam apenas com sua fama para tirar proveito da causa pública. então são esses os tipos? sim, são esses os tipos. virou isto. mas aqueles dois, ai, eles dois... esses foram os homens que trabalharam seu mundo sem nenhuma ambição maior. simplesmente porque o trabalho tinha de ser feito e era bom de fazer. vassalos. vassalos medievais em sua impossível ironia estoica.

Prisenting a spelling kie

2. It’s taim tu accept the consequences of the Greit Vauel Shift and cheingh the Inglish dress from an artificial post-mediyieval fashon tu a mor adequet attaier. from taim tu taim it’s quait helþi tu cheingh clouths. let’s meik this biutiful effort and rid Inglish of a rotting dress that bilongs in the greiv of King Jeims. and sinçs wi ar bieying ambitios let’s eim haih as wel: wi’l no longer rait as if wi’r stil living in 1400, wi’l no longer live a graphic lai. wi shal acknooledgh the vaeul shift in ful bai employing an accuret orthographic kie: for evri vauel or diphthong wi wil applai the classical Latin rendishon, viz. the rendishon of eni vauel wil bi ristord tu the original Latin valiu that is stil the norm for moust continental languiges.

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The niu clouths wil form a ristord Latin spelling. stil rimember the wei yu lœrnt tu pronaunçs Inglish vauels at scuul? a, e, i, o, u laik “ei, ii, ai, ou, yu”? forget abaut that. from nau on, wi’l cool thies vauels bai ther proper neims “a, e, i, o, u” as if wi wer lœrning Italian or German.

Ounli faiv letters won’t render 20 vocalic saunds, especialli if wi ar luking for a system of wôn saund, wôn letter. is that possibel? that’s not ounli possibel, that’s bien dôn. tu cût a long stori short, hier ar the twenti saunds wi nied tu accomodeit, and let mi sei this tu thous hu can’t ried the IPA phonetic alphabet: on Youtube, yu can lœrn them in faiv minuts. bihould nau the merri þrong of the twenti:

/æ, ɑː, ʌ, aɪ, aʊ, ɛ, ɛː, ə, əː, eɪ, ɪ, i, iː, juː, ɒ, ɔː, ɔɪ, əʊ, ʊ, uː/

Wot du wi meik of them? thei wil bi renderd bai the follouing letters and combineishons, iech letter bilou corresponding tu the abôv sains:

a, a, â, ai, au, e, ee, –, œ, ei, i, i, ie, iu, o, oo, oi, ou, u, uu

That’s it. obviosli, the kie gets rid of the difûnct and disfûnctional forms -ea, -oa, weeras the ridûndant endings -aw, -ew, -ow, -ay-, -ey, -oy ar absorbd bai the mor specific diphthongs -au, -iu, -ou, -ai, -ei, -ie, -oi.

3. Wot du thies cheinges mien? thei mien that a fiu þings ar bieying put rait. thei mean inôþ of spelling Latin -u- as -oo-. inôþ of spelling a long -i- as -ee-. inôþ of fossils, distorshons and graphic caricaturs meiking a fuul of the Latin alphabet. bût general objections nied tu bi anserd fœrst.

Wot is pronûncieishon?

It mait bi argiud that it is impossibel tu render “the” Inglish pronûncieishon uniformli bicoos theer is no sûch þing as “the” pronûncieishon. different wœrds ar pronaunçst differentli in different parts of the wœrld. this is veri truu. wail raiting this essei, ai am using the abôv spelling kie tu render wot ai cool the Winchester standard: the general standard of pronûncieishon hœrd in the ould capital of Wessex, a choiçs riflecting the fact that ai liv in this area. it is obvios that Inglish compraises a varaieti of standards, yet this dôs not affect the merit of aur spelling kie.

On the contrari, the common kie can bi used tu render eni riegional standard, nei, it meiks it possibel for thies standards tu stand aut. ai liv in a pleiçs weer the wœrd neither shud bi convœrted tu the spelling kie as naither, bût the seim kie ineibels ôther riegions tu render this wœrd as niether withaut coosing eni confiujon, bicoos ool spiekers, sinçs thei nou and use a common spelling kie, wud nou hau tu ried the wœrd and aidentifai the standard.

In the seim wei that wi use the spelling bût, spiekers from Northern Ingland mait fiel comfortabel raiting but. the ounli þing is this: the use shud bi consistent. if yu rait bût in yor text as in the Winchester standard, yu shud not rait niether as in Niu York, oolthou the Niu York standard wud spell bût as wel, bût not naither, wail a Liverpuul standard wud spel but and naither. far from impousing uniformiti, the common kie ineibels ool Inglish standards tu flôrish. the kie is less accuret than a piuer phonetic transcription (wich the kie is not suppousd tu ripleiçs) bût mor consistent than the ookword fossils wi cûrrentli use. its biuti lais in its flexibiliti.

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4. Is theer rielli no sûch þing as a standard pronûncieishon? wail wi shud not allau eni riegion tu impous a standard and discrimineit ageinst ôthers, gloubal interaction amông neitiv-spiekers of different pleices lieds tu different standards influencing and levelling iech ôther, so that iventualli a kaind of lingua-franca pronûncieishon araises wich dôs not intaierli fit eni particular riegion bût combains elements of different standards.

The ideal criteria of classificeishon for a standard pronûnucieishon wud be: a) the nûmber of spiekers; b) the geographical riech; c) the extent of tieching. the fœrst tuu criteria ar difficûlt tu assess and not oolweis helpful. a big nûmber of spiekers dôs not mien that a standand is geographicalli waidspred, and a hiugh geographical extent dôs not mien a haih nûmber of spiekers. it is mor rilaiabel tu ask wot pronûncieishon is moust often and moust waidli toot tu non-neitiv spiekers. for tiechers and tieching buks, follouing a didactic pœrpos, trai tu prisent a mor steibel and generalaisd viu of pronûncieishon. choices hav tu bi meid, and wot is chousen is þoot tu riflect a kaind of quintessençs, the broud chœrch of Inglish pronûncieishon.

It is rait tu luk for orienteishon.

Thûs, thou theer be no official internashonal standard, /bʌt/ is the standard moust waidli toot in the wœrld. ieven a scuul in Yorkshir that tieches /but/ insted of /bʌt/ tu non-neitiv spiekers wil bi baund tu tel its stiudents that /bʌt/ is mor waidspred and spouken. wot is mor waidspred shud bi acknooledghd in tieching. and idealli in raiting as wel. this is wai, oolthou wi ar orienteiting aurselvs on a Winchester standard, wi ar stil raiting spieker with a fainal R wich in Winchester is sailent bût is arguabli saunded bai moust spiekers in the wœrld, neitiv and non-neitiv. bisaids, wi ar peiying diu tribiut tu etymologi: the ristord Latin spelling is not jûst a phonetic transcription.

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Meni rieders wil faind it pedantic. wi faind it accuret and fit for pœrpos. it is riesonabel tu expect that an orthographi shud render the phonetic realiti of a languigh. thous hu hav an esthetic obseshon with the cûrrent spelling wil never bi happi. yet not ieven Jiesus cud plies evriwôn. wi shud rather þink of children and non-neitiv spiekers hu hav tu lœrn the languigh. hau greitful wud thei bi tu lœrn a spelling that truli riflects wot ther iers can hier.

It mait bi sed that the spelling kie wil crieit a greit nûmber of homonyms. so wot? if the miening of homonyms can bi distinguisht in spiech, wai wud it not bi recognaisabel in raiting? in the sentences “ai can sie them swimming in the sie” and “ai wud gou and cût sôm wud” the mienings of sie and wud ar shoun bai the context and the syntax. this and meni ôther exampels pruuv that the existençs of homonys dôs not meik spelling ûnintilligibel. homonyns ounli shou that wœrds spelt the seim wei ar oolredi homophones. wot abaut this: “ai kniu the niu spelling wud bi gud”? hier, thou the K not bi saunded, it mei bi kept tu pai etymologi diu homigh. yet “ai niu the niu spelling wud bi gud” shud bi acceptabel as wel.

5. Sinçs the kie is not jûst a phonetic transcription, not ool wœrds and letters wil bi affected. on the ôther hand, vocalic cheinges mei lied tu mainor consonantal cheinges. the ristord Latin spelling applais differentli tu wœrds from different origins. wi mûst distinguish Germanic, French, Latin and Griek ruuts and approuch iech gruup mor or less separetli with specific methods. thûs, the ristord Latin spelling applais tu ool Germanic ruuts, moust French ruuts, meni Latin ruuts and sôm Griek ruuts. it wil ounli tôch Griek ruuts tu ilimineit a sailent E as in taip, paier, stail for type, pyre, style and in veri fiu ôther ceises. this is wai idea, ideal, idealli rimein ûncheinghd. Griek ruuts that ceim intu Inglish via Latin mei bi olterd wen mainor cheinges du not distort the consonantal luk, thûs beisic miusic insted of basic music, bût rather ocean insted of oushan.

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This bieying sed, theer ar tuu tradishons of spelling Griek wœrds: the hiumanist and the Romançs tradishon. the former straivs for etymological rendishons, thûs systema, synergeia, mysticos, mythos, phantasia, technica, character. yet sinçs the 18^th centuri, meni of its practices hav bien challenghd in Romançs languiges as pseudo-etymological, moust viehementli in the Portuguies riform of 1911, so that in Romançs languiges wi nau hav the forms sistema, sinergeia, misticos, mitos, fantasia, tecnicos, caracter, wich in ristord Latin spelling mei bi spelt aither system, synergi, mystic, myth, phantasi, technical, character or sistem, sinergi, mistic, mith, fantasi, tecnical, caracter.

Côming tu French and Latin wœrds, special ruuls nied tu bi divasd for different ceises, e.g. prifixes, suffixes and Latinet tradishons wich wil bi trieted in mor diteil elsweer. bie that as it mei, French and Latin (and tu sôm extent Germanic wœrds) hav left Inglish with a ful reingh of ûnstresst vauels wich, after the storm of the greit shift, ar nau shipreckt in the ocean of schwa, the ûnstresst /ə/ that absorbd ther saunds. thies vauels wil rimein ûncheinghd, thûs accaunt insted of əccaunt. if the schwa is renderd bai tuu vauels, thei shal bi riduiçst tu wôn, wich wil bi the etymologicalli mor pœrtinent, thûs parlament insted of parliament, from parlare rather than parlire. As a general ruul, the ristord Latin spelling foucusses of vauels rather than consonants, and on stresst rather than ûntresst syllabels.

Consonantal cheinges

Conçœrning consonants, C as /k/ wil not muteit tu K bifor E, so that CEI and CEE wil bi oolweis /keɪ/ and /kɛː/ (wail /səː/ is ÇŒ as in çœrtan, çœrcel); yet C as /s/ muteits tu Ç bifor AI. thûs, wi hav ceim, ceik, ceer insted of keim, keik, keer, bût diçaid, riçait, priçais insted of disaid, risait, prisais. similarli, CIU wil oolweis bi /kju/ as in cuier, ciut, siciuer.

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The spelling kie meiks eni sailent GH and WH ridûndant, thûs dooter, thou, þruu, wot, wen, hus insted of dooghter, though, þruugh, whot, when, whus.

Endings in -DGE for /dʒ/ shal bi spelt -DGH, follouing the seim principel of -(T)CH, thûs bridgh, fûdgh, nolidgh, lodgh, similar tu catch, fetch, tôch, lûnch. Nout the vœrbal forms: lodgh, loghd, bût, lodges(t), lodging.

Fœrthermor, no dôbling of L shal occœr at the end of a wœrd, thûs wil, shal, tel, pul, yet willing, telling, pulling. endings with consonant and -LE shal bi renderd with -EL, beering in maind that this E is a schwa, thûs eibel, acceptabel, piepel, saddel. in the ceis of -CLE, the spelling -CEL shal bi red as /k(ə)l/: miracel, çœrcel, deibacel.

A fainal S mei saund as /s/ or /z/, thûs cies /s/ hostilitis and a scented rous /z/.

Th can bi a voiçst /ð/ as in the, this or a voiçsless /θ/ as in thing, think. in Germanic ruuts, the voiçsless th mei bi renderd with the Ould Inglish letter þorn: þ, thûs þing, þank, þoot, riþink, bouþ, Guþlac, Cûþbert, thou thing, thank etc. ar acceptabel.

Amông Latin and French sûffixes, -tion and -sion wil bi -shon and/or -jon after R or vauels, thûs classificeishon, proporshon, vijon, vœrjon, yet action, friction, perception. similarli, -ture and -sure mei bicôm -tchur and -jur, as literatchur, fœrnitchur, lejur, mejur, plejur, or litertur, fœrnitur, lesur, mesur, plesur.

8

Prefixes conteining an /ɪ/ shal bi renderd bi-, di-, pri-, ri-, si- etc, thûs pripeer, ristor, bifor, diçaid, sidiuçs. if the prefix is folloud bai an ûnstresst syllabel, wi often hav E, as in the RE- of reprisent; bût at eni reit riprint.

The Latin or French sûffixes: -acy, -age, -ain, -ate, -ately, -ance, -ence, -ity, -ty, -ate [stresst], -ify, -fy, -ive, -esque, -ious, -ous, -y; shal be riduiçst respectivli tu: -aci, -igh, -an, -et, -etli, -ançs, -ençs, -iti, -ti, -eit [stresst], -ifai, -fai, -iv, -esc, -ios, -os, -i.

Sinçs no wœrd shal end in a sailent E, the ending CE wil bi renderd as ÇS, thûs naiçs, feiçs, pleiçs, greiçs, bût with comparativ or plural naicer, feices, pleices, greices. this avoids an ending in Ç bai adding a mor canonical S. in the ÇS ending, Ç shous the etymologi wail S plieses the ais.

Conçœrning vœrbal -ED forms, the follouing muteishons wil teik pleiçs:

a) after eni vauel, b, g /g/, gh, l, m, n, r, s /z/, v, and z, wil follou ounli D, thûs braibd, logd, loghd, pleid, coold, neimd, reind, offerd, pliesd, folloud, rilievd, ameizd;

b) after ch, tch, çs, f, k, p, t, s, sh, ss, and x, follous ounli T, thûs tôcht, fetcht, rijoiçst, laft, wolkt, helpt, ciest, astonisht, blesst, vext;

c) after d and t wil follou ED as in added, nouted;

d) tu indiceit an uniusual, historical or poetic pronûncieishon, ÈD will bi used as in blessèd, bilôvèd, helpèd, bût wretched, neiked, rûgged rimein withaut accent, bicoos thies ar ounli adjectivs.

9

The vœrb use wil ritain the fainal E and ED or teik the ûnetymological forms yus, yusd. hauever, derivativs of use wil follou the ruul, thûs, use or yus, used or yusd, bût abiuse, abiusd.

French imports

6. After thies observeishons, it shud bi iesier tu concentreit on vauels. let ûs bigin with â and œ. oolthou thies ar sains imported from French, the practiçs is not ûnhistorical: French has oolweis exœrted a rimarkabel influençs on Inglish spelling. if eni addishonal sains nied tu bi sœrcht tu implement aur spelling, the fœrst pleiçs tu luk is French, and from French the ristord Latin spelling is teiking â, œ and ç. in fact, ool of them oolredi exist in Inglish, the fœrst in ceises sûch as pâte, pâté, the ligatchur œ in wœrds as onomatopœia, wich is facûltativ for onomatopoeia, and the cedilla in French ruuted wœrds laik façad.

Sinçs wi tolkt œrlier abaut the cedilla, let’s bigin with the ligatchur œ. oolthou /ə/ reprisents an ûnstresst schwa, theer is oolso the long and stresst form /əː/ wich moustli risûlts from a muteishon or umlaut of E, I, U bifor R. this stresst umlaut with R wil be renderd with ŒR, thûs bœrd, fœr, Sœr, tœrn, pœrt, gœrl, gœrdel, cœrl, lœrk and the w-rou of wœrd, wœrld, wœrk, wœrm, wœrþ, wœrthi. in longer wœrds, the ligatchur wil be risœrvd for stresst syllabels ounli, thûs perfection, pertein, periusing withaut Œ. nout oolso pervœrs, weer ounli the stresst /əː/ is renderd with a ligatchur.

10

As for the ôther saund, /ʌ/ is wot wi shud cool “the mûffeld vauel”, and the fact that it is renderd with  ounli miens a çœrtan proximiti tu a-sounds. yet the important element hier is the çœrcumflex accent, bicoos its form remainds ûs of tuu þings: fœrstli of the phonetic sain /ʌ/, secondli of a hat or a lid that is mûffling the vauel saund. bicoos it is the çœrcumflex that indiceits the pronûncieishon, /ʌ/ can bi renderd with eni çœcumflext vauel and wil stil signifai the seim saund, so that original vauels can bi kept. at eni reit, bût, ôther, ûnder, tôch, dôs mei bi spelt more niutralli as bât, âther, ânder, tâch, dâs. yes, a French kieboord on yor laptop wil bi helpful, and yes, it’s iesi tu daunloud.

Orthographi of A, E, I

7. Rigarding a-saunds, the letter A wil render /æ, a, ɑː/ as it presentli dôs, and nôþing els, thûs cat, mat, baþ, car, laf, clark, hart: yu hav a biutiful hart! mor importantli, ounli AI renders /aɪ/ (or /ʌɪ/), wich is wôn of the meijor cheinges of the greit vauel shift: inôf of /aɪ/ haiding bihaind an i-garment, thûs ai, maiself, bai, faier, laik, nait, said, taim, wai. fainalli, let ounli AU render /aʊ/, thûs aut, bauel, claud, daut, flauer, hau, mauþ, nau, plau, saund, thau. wau! the wei that saunds!

Tu render the long Germanic /ɑː/ in mor rifaind or poetic contexts, a dieresis Ä mei bi used, thûs änser, äsk, bäþ, fäst, fäther, gläss, häf, läf, läst, päss, räther. bifor R, the dieresis for /ɑː/ is not necesseri: car, star, dark, part, park.

11

Bût wi gou fœrther: conçœrning e-saunds, E renders /ɛ/, laik in bred, ded, hed, heven, meni, eni, sed, þred. wi shud celebreit EA for wot it is: a biutiful Ould Inglish ruin that has no pleiçs in modern Inglish and disœrvs tu rest in pieçs!

Bût /ɛ/ has an ielongeited vœrjon /ɛː/ before R, i.e. /ɛə/, sinçs this R is not oolweis pronaunçst and a longer vauel compenseits for it. ieven weer the R is pronaunçst, the baundari bitwien /ɛ/ and /r/ is fluid, so that /ɛː/ or simpli /ɛ/ bifor R wil bi renderd EER, laik in beer, cheer, deer, eer, feer, heer, ceer, preer, sheer, teer, weer.

As wi trieted the schwa /ə/ and the stresst umlaut ligatchur /əː/ œrlier, let’s tolk abaut /eɪ/, wich is anôther meijor cheingh of the greit shift, and hier wi sei agein: inôf of /eɪ/ dressing an a-garment. from nau on, ounli EI shal render /eɪ/, thûs beik, cleim, dei, feiçs, geiv, jeil, ceim, lei, meik, peid, stei, teik.

Wail /ɛː/ is renderd bai EE, and /eɪ/ with EI, the riegional /eː/ mei bi renderd with a dieresis Ë, thûs the Welsh forms fëçs, mëk, plëçs, tëk for feiçs, meik, pleiçs, teik.

After E côms I: the saunds /ɪ, i/ shal bi renderd I, thûs bigin, bild, enemi, ilect, marri, plenti, pripeer, ribild, silect, veri, wich. apart from that, IE renders /iː/ as in biest, driem, fier, fiet, gies, hier, (k)nie, lied, miet, spiek, sie. perhaps, moust rieders wil agrie that IE is better than II. besaid the aesthetic aspect, not ounli is IE used tu render /iː/ in French and German, bût it sômtaims oolso renderd the “ûnsteibel i” in Ould Inglish as in hiene, hieder, geliefan, giefan, iernan, so that it is far from bieying an eilien. thûs, wi compenseit the rijection of Ould Inglish EA bai teiking IE on boord and promouting it.

12

Fainalli, IU renders /juː, jʊ/ in the middel or the end of a wœrd, bût ounli in stresst syllabels, thûs assium, biuti, diuti, fiu, hiugh, ciut, miusic, (k)niu, niu, niuer, piuer, ribiuk, viu. at the biginning of a Latin wœrd, /juː, jʊ/ rimeins ûncheinghd or mei bi renderd informalli with ûnetymological YU, sûch as use, unait, utail or yus, yunait, yutail.

Orthographi of O, U

8. Ounli O renders /ɒ, ô/, thûs swon, swop, wol, wont, wor, worm, wosh, wot, wotch. at the seim taim, OO renders /ɔː/ as in boot, door, dooter, coold, coot, fool, loo, noot, oot, ool, soo, toot, þoot. “ai sie them swimming in the sie, and ai soo them yesterdei tuu. ai þoot ai had boot mai dooter a buk on common loo. don’t bi fuuld bai fool and don’t misteik yor luu for the loo!”

In polysyllabic Latin or French wœrds, hauever, /ɔː/ or /ɔ/ bifor R rimains O, thûs ristor, distorshon, cômfort, effort, bût nout the Germanic or monosyllabic wœrds door, foor (nûmber), hoors, coors.

OI renders /ɔɪ/ laik in boi, cloi, loier, ploi, toi, oolthou loier oolso can bi spelt looyer. ounli the dipththong OU renders /əʊ/, as it oolredi dôs in soul, thûs blou, coul, could, flou, gou, ouver, roud, sould, spouk, stoun, wouk. this meiks OA ridûndant in coul, cocou, bout, flout etc.

Wail OU renders /əʊ/ and OO renders /ɔː/, the riegional /oː/ mei bi renderd with a dieresis Ö, thûs the Welsh forms wök, gö, flöt, spök for wouk, gou, flout, spouk.

13

Rigarding u-saunds, ounli U renders /ʊ, u/, thûs buk, cud, fut, gud, huk, lukt, pul, shud, tu, tuk, wud, wul. similarli, ounli UU renders /uː/ as in bluu, buut, cuul, duum, druu, fruut, fuul, guus, muun, ruud, suun, tuul.

As Latin and Romançs languiges risist eni dôbling of vauels, in mor rifaind or poetic contexts /uː/ mei bi renderd bai a dieresis Ü, thûs früt, fül, grüp, inclüd, müv, müvment, süp for mor niutral fruut, fuul, gruup, incluud, muuv, muuvment, suup. Similarli, /ruːd/ can bi renderd as ruud [crucifix] for the wœrd from Ould Inglish rōd and ruud or rüd [impolait] for the wœrd from Latin rudis.

Nout that this use of dieresis indiceiting ielongeishon oolredi exists in Inglish, as in naïv, weer the sain separeits the fœrst vauel from the second bai ielongeiting the latter.

A fiu exceptions

9. As the spelling is not a phonetic transcription, a fiu beisic wœrds wil be spelt ôther than the kie sûggests. the definit articel, for exampel, is oolweis spelt the, ieven if it sounds /ðɪ, ðiː/ bifor a vauel. the indefinit articel is spelt a oolso wen stresst as /eɪ/.

Meni pœrsonal pronauns and a fiu adverbs kiep a shorter and less accuret ûnstresst spelling bisaid a mor emphatic stresst spelling, thûs ûnstresst hi, shi, wi, yi, yu, mi, her, yor, aur, ther (pr.), theer (adv.), mor, so, no and emphatic hie, shie, wie, yie, yuu, mie, hœr, yoor, auer, theer (pr.), theer (adv.), moor, sou, nou. the verb tu du has the emphatic form duu. exampels? “not hi, bût shie wil laik mai wœrds. her peitiençs is so greit, bût rielli sou greit that shi wil lissen tu eniþing. if yu miss the opportiuniti, then the pœrson tu bleim is not mi, no nou, it’s yuu!”

14

Conçœrning the verb tu bie, the form bi wil bi used as an ûnstresst infinitiv, wail bie will bi used as: (a) stresst infinitiv or end of sentençs (tu bie or not tu bie! hu wil thei bie?), (b) imperativ (bie thau clien!), (c) sûbjûnctiv (hi dimands that ai bie redi! ai shal obei if it bie possibel), (d) archeic present indicativ (and meni ôther þings theer bie, wich thei hav ricievd tu hould, Mark 7:4 KJV).

It’s not abaut a Parlament dicrie.

10. Sômhau, wot wi ar duing is not quait feer. wi don’t jûst prisent a theori and weit for piepel tu put it intu practiçs. it’s better tu expous evribodi tu the practiçs and then let them ask for a theori. yu don’t ask a Parlament tu impous a spelling wœrldwaid per dicrie: yu jûst meik yor oun impact with it and giv evriwôn the rait tu accept or riject. it teiks sôm côrigh tu du so. as it is, a spelling kie has bien put forword aut of the bluu. bût this was dôn for a bit of general orienteishon, a fœrst teist of fœrther þings tu côm. wi ar not prisenting this spelling as a fait accompli. wi ar invaiting the pûblic tu help ûs sheip it.

Aur focus wil bi tu use the ristord Latin spelling rather than explein it. bai giving it laif, wich incluuds a literari laif, wi shal sie wether and hau mûch and tu hum it wil appiel. meijor iffects ounli bicôm visibel in the long tœrm, and ounli a greiter varaieti of texts can giv a better teist of the cheingh. sôm mei get used tu it, sôm mei côm tu lôv it. the ounli þing wi ask and houp for is a digrie of gud wil and gud feiþ. in this quest for gud orthographi, theoretical problems wil bi discûsst littel bai littel, as the practiçs raipens.